A BRIEF ON...
SMALLER STATES
& PEACEMAKING

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

INTRODUCTION
Meghan O'Neill, Lucas Nieman, and Melody Stainbrook

"The meaning of power has changed. Today, power is something that we all have to exercise when we have to address common global challenges."[1] This assertion came from Mr. Bach Hansen, counsellor to the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN, at a 2014 panel regarding the role of smaller states in the multilateral global system. Nearly a decade later, Mr. Hansen's comment still rings true; in an increasingly interconnected world facing inevitably global issues, the issue of power has become a pressing issue within the international arena. Traditionally, larger states are those who boast the most consequential swaying power in the international arena, with smaller states finding themselves bobbing along in the wake of decisions made by their larger neighbours.

The world has seen an influx of international crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, wars, and mounting geopolitical conflicts affecting nearly every region of the globe. Though history dictates that smaller states are most usually subject to the whim of their larger counterparts, their evolving role in the context global crisis resolution demands a reexamination of their capacities; *in the face of impending obstacles that require globally-scaled solutions, does this power pendulum remain the default system for international problem solving*? Conversely,

---

[1] Trithart, Albert, Wendy MacClinchy Daniel Levine-Spound, Jenna Russo, Hana Salama, Agathe Sarfati, Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Eimer Curtin Agathe Sarfati, David Armstrong McKay, and Hafsa M. Maalim Cedric de Coning. "Small States in a Multilateral World." International Peace Institute, June 8, 2019. https://www.ipinst.org/2014/12/small-states-in-a-multilateral-world.

do these unprecedented challenges necessitate a new way of considering the role of states in addressing global issues?

      Smaller states, long overlooked with regards to their capacity to affect change, are perhaps the most perfectly primed actors to tackle the international crises that have tested governments across the international arena. Though small in size, smaller states possess an impressive capacity to manufacture solutions that extend far beyond their own borders; smaller states tend to have an unparalleled grasp on the *soft* and *smart* power necessary to create productive change in the face of global challenges. Some smaller states have already carved a path for themselves as international peace brokers, having made significant strides, in both capacity and effectiveness, for creating and enacting long-lasting, durable solutions for nations within their regions and others thousands of miles away[2]; Regardless of where smaller states may be in their journey to establish themselves as peacemaking entities within the multilateral system, several have already proven themselves to be effective brokers of resolution and bridge-building.

      In the following chapters, this handbook will attempt to demonstrate the problem-solving and peacemaking capacities of smaller states in the face of mounting global challenges. Focusing on the capacities of smaller states to serve as mediators, bridge-builders, and peacemakers, the chapters will delve into each smaller states' historical and regional peacemaking background, establishing necessary context to discuss their potential as global peacemakers. While each chapter's focus is distinct, we further explore global peacemaking through an environmental lens, examining smaller states' capacity to serve as changemakers amid the worsening climate crisis.

---

[2] Thorhallsson, Baldur. "Small States in the UN Security Council: Means of Influence?" *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 7 (December 2011): 135–60. https://doi.org/10.1163/187119112X628454.

The smaller states discussed within the contents of this handbook will be the following: Costa Rica, Panama, Cuba, Malaysia, Aotearoa New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, and Rwanda. Each chapter will include information on the state's history, a past, present or potential role as a regional peacemaker, and will conclude with a proposal for the smaller state's capacity to serve as a future peacemaker in the face of climate change. Though this handbook is not persuasive in nature, it is the collective hope of all authors that the following chapters demonstrate the immense potential that smaller states harness to serve as brokers of peace and resolution for distinct regional conflicts, as well as impending global issues.

COSTA RICA

Ireland Neville, Elizabeth Kean, and Melody Stainbrook

COSTA RICA'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON PEACEMAKING:

The attainment of international influence provides a specific set of challenges to smaller states due to their poor endowment of resources, geographical size and location, or, sometimes, historical injustice.[1] Despite their size, small states contribute greatly to the globe and can exert influence over the international community. For instance, smaller states can concentrate their limited resources to promote specific norms, occupy valuable international niches, and become effective peacemakers.[2] Costa Rica, a smaller state in Central America, not only exemplifies savvy resource usage as a smaller state, but also proves that smaller states can be entrepreneurial in the world by creating innovative solutions to niche regional and global issues of importance to their communities. Amidst the Cold War, Costa Rica developed a unique solution to national security that also promoted peace; they committed to collective security in lieu of a Costan Rican military.[3] Costa Rica also played a pivotal role in the Esquipulas II peace agreement, providing a solution to Central American violence that even outdid the United States: the clear hegemon in the region.[4] Likewise, the Costa Rican government has incentivized protecting the natural environment through a system that invests in Costa Rican property owners.[5] This system has

---

[1] Ingebritsen, Christine, "Small states in international relations," University of Washington Press, 2006.
[2] Bailes, Alyson JK, Bradley A. Thayer, and Baldur Thorhallsson, "Alliance theory and alliance 'Shelter': the complexities of small state alliance behavior," Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 1, no. 1 (2016): 11-13.
[3] Mercedes Muñoz G., "Costa Rica: La Abolición Del Ejército y La Construcción De La Paz Regional," *Historia y Comunicación Social* 19, no. 0 (2014), https://doi.org/10.5209/rev_hics.2014.v19.47301, 382.
[4] Francisco Rojas Aravena, "Esquipulas II: El Desafio De La Paz," *Relaciones Internacionales*, 1989, pp. 13-23, 16.
[5] "Payments for Environmental Services Program | Costa Rica," United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, accessed December 11, 2022,

since been replicated in other nations that wish to find solutions that protect their environment and provide wealth to their local economies.[6]

Geographically, Costa Rica is a smaller state; the Central American country is 51,100 square kilometers.[7] Moreover, Costa Rica has a population of only about 5 million people.[8] The 2021 GDP of the country was only $64.28 billion[9], far behind the economic prowess demonstrated by its regional neighbors, the United States ($22T in 2021) and Mexico ($1.2T in 2021) to the north and Brazil ($1.6T Colombia in 2021) and Colombia ($314B in 2021) to the south.[10] However, when accounting for population size, Costa Rica's GDP per capita in 2021 was $4,000 higher than the Latin American average.[11] Costa Rica also boasts one of the highest Human Development Index scores in the Latin America and Caribbean (preceded only by Chile, Argentina, the Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago).[12] Costa Rica has also become a global leader on good governance, environmental protection, and human rights promulgation. Costa Rica is a historical peacemaker, having made pioneering strides in non-militarism, environmentalism, and democracy.

Costa Rica was colonized by Spain under the Captaincy General of Guatemala (a region within the Viceroyalty of Spain) in 1522.[13] As a result of Spanish imposition upon indigenous territory, primarily for the cultivation of agricultural land, indigenous peoples in Costa Rica faced

---

[6] "Payments for Environmental Services Program | Costa Rica," United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, accessed December 11, 2022, https://unfccc.int/climate-action/momentum-for-change/financing-for-climate-friendly-investment/payments-for-environmental-services-program.
[7] Jason Bateman, "How Big Is Costa Rica?," CostaRica.Org, February 5, 2019, https://costarica.org/facts/size/.
[8] Bateman, "How Big Is Costa Rica?"
[9] "Data for Costa Rica, Latin America & Caribbean ." The World Bank. Accessed December 11, 2022. https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=CR-ZJ&most_recent_value_desc=false.
[10] "GDP (Current US$)," Data, accessed December 11, 2022, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.
[11] "GDP (Current US$)."
[12] United Nations, "Human Development Index," Human Development Reports, November 9, 2022, https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI.
[13] "About Costa Rica: Embajada De Costa Rica En DC," About Costa Rica | Embajada de Costa Rica en DC, accessed December 11, 2022, http://www.costarica-embassy.org/index.php?q=node%2F19.

violence from Spanish colonials.[14] On one occasion, 700 Suinse peoples were marched for two

weeks from Talamanca to Cartago in order to witness the public execution of an indigenous

revolt leader, 200 people died as a result of the arduous journey.[15] Spanish colonial rule ended in

1821, following Mexico's victory in their war of independence against Spain and Spain's

subsequent abandonment of their Central American colonial holdings.[16] Afterwhich, Costa Rica

joined the Mexican Empire.[17] The War of Ochomogo in 1821 pitted pro-imperialist forces

against the merchant class to decide the fate of Costa Rica: whether to remain under the control

of Mexican Emperor Iturbide or to join the Federal Republic of Central America along with

Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras.[18] The Republicans won out, cementing Costa

Rica's new fate as a member of the Federal Republic in 1823.[19] Yet, Costa Rica's membership in

the new Federal Republic of Central America was short-lived.[20] Factions within the new

Republic could not negotiate effectively between each other and civil wars eroded the Federal

Republic of Central America's control over the region, leading Costa Rica to secede from the

young union and become a sovereign state in 1838.[21]

Since declaring their independence in 1838, Costa Rica developed a reputation for taking

entrepreneurial action to ensure peace within their own borders and throughout Central

America.[22] The contested transition following the 1948 presidential election and the ensuing

---

[14] Monica A. Rankin, History of Costa Rica (ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2012), 25.

[15] Rankin, History of Costa Rica, 25.

[16] Jairo Hernandez, "Costa Rica: A Disarmed Democracy in a Complex Global Context," YouTube (BYU Kennedy Center, June 15, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ewvS5NlS2zo&t=287s.

[17] Guardia Fernández Ricardo, La Independencia: Historia De Costa Rica (San José, Costa Rica: EUNED, Editorial Universidad Estatal a Distancia, 2007).

[18] Ricardo, La Independencia: Historia De Costa Rica.

[19] Ricardo, La Independencia: Historia De Costa Rica

[20] John Misachi, "Federal Republic of Central America," WorldAtlas (WorldAtlas, June 30, 2021), https://www.worldatlas.com/geography/federal-republic-of-central-america.html.

[21] Misachi, "Federal Republic of Central America."

[22] Brysk, Alison. "Global Good Samaritans? Human Rights Foreign Policy in Costa Rica." Global Governance 11, no. 4 (2005): 446-8. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800585.

38-day civil war was the impetus for the creation of their peace-loving identity.[23] On February

8th, 1948, opposition candidate Otilio Ulate defeated former President Rafael Ángel Guardia

Calderón by almost 10,000 votes.[24] Calderón was initially willing to concede the election,

however, members of his National Republican Party were able to persuade Calderón to challenge

the result.[25] Negotiations, led by Ulate proved fruitless, even when he provided the left-leaning

Calderonistas with assurances that their social welfare political agenda would be salvaged.[26] José

Figueres, a coffee planter exiled from Costa Rica over his anti-war comments to the public in

1942 and a political foe to the National Republicans, began an attempt to force the Ulate-led

opposition into power.[27] Figueres was ultimately successful in his rebellion against the

Calderonistas, but due to the post-war weakness of the Costa Rican armed forces, the new

government relied on the *Tratado de Asistencia Recíproca (TIAR)* and the *Organización de*

Estados Americanos (OEA), two collective security organizations, to repel a counter-rebellion

led by Calderón only eight months later.[28] This is important for two reasons. First, the Figueres

government decided to rely on international organizations for their national defense because they

did not think Costa Rica's army could defend the country alone, given its limited resources.[29]

Second, observing the United State's policies towards other Latin American countries, Figueres

concluded that a bigger threat to the Costa Rican democratic experiment was not an offensive

attack from a neighbor, but rather the possibility that the United States could use the social

successes of an armed Costa Rica as a pretext for intervention into Costa Rica's domestic

---

[23] Marcia K. Olander, "Central American Foreign Policies and the Costa Rican Civil War of 1948: Picado, Somoza and the Desperate Alliance" (dissertation, 1999), 5.
[24] Olander, "Central American Foreign Policies and the Costa Rican Civil War of 1948," 228.
[25] Olander, "Central American Foreign Policies and the Costa Rican Civil War of 1948," 228-9.
[26] Olander, "Central American Foreign Policies and the Costa Rican Civil War of 1948," 230
[27] Olander, "Central American Foreign Policies and the Costa Rican Civil War of 1948," 56, 233
[28] Mercedes Muñoz G., "Costa Rica: La Abolición Del Ejército y La Construcción De La Paz Regional," *Historia y Comunicación Social* 19, no. 0 (2014), https://doi.org/10.5209/rev_hics.2014.v19.47301, 382.
[29] Mercedes Muñoz G., "Costa Rica: La Abolición Del Ejército y La Construcción De La Paz Regional," 382.

affairs.[30] For Costa Rica, "the best defense was to be defenseless."[31] Figueres's anticipation was correct; six years later in 1955, ex-President Calderón mounted an attack on Costa Rica from within its neighbor Nicaragua.[32] Costa Rica was defended successfully by TIAR and OEA.[33]

The exemplar of Costa Rican peacemaking is former President and Nobel Peace Prize winner Oscar Arias Sanchez. President Arias played a crucial role in solidifying Costa Rica's status as a peacemaker on both the regional and global level. During Arias' presidency in the 1980s, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador all faced internal turmoil.[34] In the 1980s, President Arias strove to promulgate regional peace in Central America through diplomatic means and was particularly skeptical of the United States intervention in the region.[35] In particular, he was critical of the United States' role in the internal conflict in Nicaragua in which they provided support to the armed anti-Marxist group known as the Contra.[36] In 1987, President Arias visited the White House to speak with President Ronald Reagan about Central American affairs, specifically the explicit U.S. military support for the Contras.[37] Despite the relative power of the United States and the assistance that the U.S. could provide to Costa Rica, Arias rejected the foreign policy goals of the U.S. in the region.[38] Even though the United States held massive influence in Latin America, their support of the Contras was not only criticized by President Arias, but also deterred the Central American presidents from cooperating with the Reagan Administration.[39] To the contrary, *Plan Arias* was ultimately accepted and the plan proposed by

---

[30] Mercedes Muñoz G., "Costa Rica: La Abolición Del Ejército y La Construcción De La Paz Regional," 386.
[31] Felde, Kitty. "Oscar Arias Sanchez: Harsh Words for the U.S. From a Voice of Peace and Prosperity." Other. *Los Angeles Times*, February 20, 2000.
[32] Mercedes Muñoz G., "Costa Rica: La Abolición Del Ejército y La Construcción De La Paz Regional," 384.
[33] Mercedes Muñoz G., "Costa Rica: La Abolición Del Ejército y La Construcción De La Paz Regional," 384.
[34] Francisco Rojas Aravena, "Esquipulas II: El Desafío De La Paz," *Relaciones Internacionales*, 1989, 13-23.
[35] Kitty. "Oscar Arias Sanchez: Harsh Words for the U.S. From a Voice of Peace and Prosperity."
[36] "Arias Asks for Cutoff of Contra Aid : Meets Reagan, Asks Congress to 'Give Peace a Chance.'"
[37] "Arias Asks for Cutoff of Contra Aid : Meets Reagan, Asks Congress to 'Give Peace a Chance."
[38] "Arias Asks for Cutoff of Contra Aid : Meets Reagan, Asks Congress to 'Give Peace a Chance."
[39] Aravena, "Esquipulas II: El Desafío De La Paz," 16.

President Reagan was rejected.[40] The final Esquipulas II Agreement created a number of inter-governmental structures committed to the termination of support for paramilitary and guerilla groups, the promotion of free elections, the end of all internal hostilities, and national reconciliation with anti-government irregular groups.[41] Presidents of all five Central American nations agreed to this plan on August 7, 1987, despite American reservations about the agreement.[42] Arias's rise in popularity as a result of his peace initiatives garnered him a second presidential term in Costa Rica sixteen years after his first term ended and won him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987.

Arias's regional peacemaking activities in the Esquipulas II Agreement and calculated defiance of US interests shifted Costa Rican foreign policy towards a greater focus on human rights promulgation.[43] In the decades since, human rights have become a cornerstone of Costa Rican foreign policy, with former Foreign Minister Ricardo going so far to state that the mission of the promotion of human rights "has become an active, constant, and priority goal for Costa Rica."[44] One of the main ways in which Costa achieved its goal of human rights promulgation was through its active participation in international institutions: both regional and global.[45]

Environmental concerns have also been central to Costa Rican policy goals. The small nation is home to approximately 2% of the world's biodiversity, yet, until the 1990s, Costa Rica suffered one of the worst rates of deforestation in the world, as ranchers cleared forests for cattle-grazing and agriculture. In 1950, more than 50% of Costa Rica's area was covered by

---

[40] Aravena, "Esquipulas II: El Desafio De La Paz," 16.
[41] Aravena, "Esquipulas II: El Desafio De La Paz," 16.
[42] Aravena, "Esquipulas II: El Desafio De La Paz," 16.
[43] Brysk, Alison. "Global Good Samaritans? Human Rights Foreign Policy in Costa Rica." *Global Governance* 11, no. 4 (2005): 446-8. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800585.
[44] Brysk, 447.
[45] Brysk, 447, 451.

rainforest compared to only 25% in 1995.[46] In 1997, Costa Rica began the Payment for

Environmental Services (PES) program which disperses cash payments to landowners who agree

to leave their land undeveloped, in an effort to protect the natural services that Costa Rica's

nature provides (the four services outlined by PES are carbon sequestration, biodiversity

protection, water regulation, and landscape beauty).[47] This decision was a concerted effort by

Costa Rica to not only protect their environment, but also to invest in their economy.[48] As a result

of this program and Costa Rica's protected forests, Costa Rica has become a popular tourist

destination for its natural beauty.[49] In fact, 60% of Costa Rica's tourism, which accounts for 8%

of Costa Rican GDP, is ecotourism.[50]

Costa Rica's history in international affairs, particularly their focus on regional peace and

environmentalism, position them well to engage in peacemaking.[51] Costa Rica was the first

demilitarized democracy in the world and brought its neighbors together to agree to strive for

internal peace with the *Esquipulas II* agreement, a task that the United States could not even

tackle.[52] They also influence global environmentalism through creating investment structures that

support local conservation.[53] The success of these structures have been recognized by others and

implemented in their own countries, specifically in Peru and Morocco.[54] Costa Rica is

[46] "Payments for Environmental Services Program | Costa Rica," United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, accessed December 11, 2022, https://unfccc.int/climate-action/momentum-for-change/financing-for-climate-friendly-investment/payments-for-environmental-services-program.
[47] "Payments for Environmental Services Program | Costa Rica," United Nations Framework Convention.
[48] Carol Konyn, "How Costa Rica Reversed Deforestation and Became an Environmental Model," Earth.Org (Earth.Org, October 28, 2021), https://earth.org/how-costa-rica-reversed-deforestation/..
[49] Carol Konyn, "How Costa Rica Reversed Deforestation and Became an Environmental Model," Earth.Org (Earth.Org, October 28, 2021), https://earth.org/how-costa-rica-reversed-deforestation/.
[50] "Payments for Environmental Services Program | Costa Rica," United Nations Framework Convention.
[51] "Payments for Environmental Services Program | Costa Rica," United Nations Framework Convention; Brysk, 447, 451.
[52] Aravena, "Esquipulas II: El Desafio De La Paz," 16.
[53] "Payments for Environmental Services Program | Costa Rica," United Nations Framework Convention.
[54] "Payments for Environmental Services Program | Costa Rica," United Nations Framework Convention.

recognized as a global leader today.[55] The United States selected Costa Rica as the representative

from Latin America to co-host the second *Summit for Democracy* in March 2023, along with

three other global democratic leaders.[56] Costa Rica will hold summits on a variety of issues faced

by democratic nations and host representatives from democracies and democratic organizations

across the region, using their own successes as an example for others.[57]

[55] "Summit for Democracy 2023 - United States Department of State," U.S. Department of State (U.S. Department of State, November 29, 2022), https://www.state.gov/summit-for-democracy-2023/.
[56] "Summit for Democracy 2023 - United States Department of State," U.S. Department of State
[57] "Summit for Democracy 2023 - United States Department of State," U.S. Department of State

COSTA RICA AS A REGIONAL PEACEMAKER:

With a national identity as a champion of regional human rights and security, Costa Rica is well positioned to engage as a peacemaker in the conflict between state and non-state actors in the border region of Colombia and Venezuela, particularly in the Colombian region of Arauca and the neighboring Venezuelan region of Apure.[58] Violence between the Colombian state and the non-state guerilla groups has lasted for over half a century, with conservative death toll estimates surpassing 450,000.[59] In 2016, with the peacemaking assistance of the smaller states Norway and Cuba, the Colombian government reached a peace deal with the then largest guerilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), that secured FARC's disarmament in exchange for incorporation into the Colombian political system.[60] Though the Colombia-FARC peace deal was an important step toward lasting peace, it did not go far enough. The mainstream components of FARC who engaged with and followed through on the 2016 peace deal were far from the only violent groups operating along the border region, and components of FARC who did not support the 2016 peace deal have created splinter groups that further contribute to the violence.[61] In addition to a massive death toll, the violence in the Colombia-Venezuela border region has also been linked to kidnappings, human trafficking, "forced recruitment" of child soldiers, rape, cocaine production, and smuggling operations.[62]

---

[58] Human Rights Watch. "Colombia/Venezuela: Border Area Abuses by Armed Groups," March 28, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/28/colombia/venezuela-border-area-abuses-armed-groups.
[59] Acosta, Luis Jaime. "Colombia Says 10 Armed Groups Agree to Unilateral Ceasefire." *Reuters*, September 28, 2022, sec. Americas. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombia-says-10-armed-groups-agree-unilateral-ceasefire-2022-09-28/.
[60] Affairs, Ministry of Foreign. "The Peace Process in Colombia." Redaksjonellartikkel. Government.no, July 6, 2022. https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/norways_eng agement/peace_colombia/id2522231/.; International Crisis Group. "Containing the Border Fallout of Colombia's New Guerrilla Schism." International Crisis Group, 2019. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep31568, 2; Human Rights Watch. "Colombia/Venezuela: Border Area Abuses by Armed Groups."
[61] International Crisis Group, 1.
[62] The New Humanitarian. "Venezuela Holds the Key as Petro Looks to Kickstart His Colombia Peace Plan," November 9, 2022. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2022/11/09/Colombia-Venezuela-border-EL N-Petro.; VOA. "Conflict on Colombia-Venezuela Border Fuels Sexual Violence." Accessed December 13, 2022. https://www.voanews.com/a/conflict-on-colombia-venezuela-border-fuels-sexual-violence/6259429.html.; Peace

Deteriorating diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela, culminating in the severing of diplomatic relations in 2019, resulted in a dramatic increase in these armed groups' control along the states' border.[63] In recent years, guerilla groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN), currently the largest guerilla group operating in this region, and offshoots of FARC, as well as their smaller contemporaries, have increased their reliance on Venezuelan material and territorial support.[64] Venezuelan support of these groups has increased diplomatic tension between Colombia and Venezuela and exacerbated distrust between these two states.[65]

Presently, there is a unique opportunity for Costa Rica to engage in peacemaking in this conflict. The ten largest guerrilla groups, including FARC splinter groups who refused to abide by the 2016 peace deal, have signaled their openness to begin the peace process by agreeing to unilateral ceasefires, creating the opening for a new, more expansive peace deal.[66] Recent changes in the diplomatic relationship between Venezuela and Colombia, as well as new Colombian domestic leadership, further create a situation ripe for peacemaking.[67] Costa Rica could help these parties cross the finish line, in a similar fashion as Norway did with the FARC peace deal.[68] On August 11th, 2022, Colombian President Gustavo Petro and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro announced plans to restore diplomatic relations following President Petro's public acknowledgment of the legitimacy of President Maduro's presidency.[69] In

Insight. "Drug Trafficking and the Colombian Conflict." Accessed December 13, 2022. https://www.peaceinsigh t.org/en/article s/drug-trafficking-colombian-conflict/.

[63] The New Humanitarian. "Venezuela Holds the Key as Petro Looks to Kickstart His Colombia Peace Plan."

[64] Human Rights Watch. "Colombia/Venezuela: Border Area Abuses by Armed Groups"; International Crisis Group. "Containing the Border Fallout of Colombia's New Guerrilla Schism," 6.

[65] International Crisis Group. "Containing the Border Fallout of Colombia's New Guerrilla Schism," 2, 6.

[66] Acosta, "Colombia Says 10 Armed Groups Agree to Unilateral Ceasefire."

[67] VOA. "Venezuela, Colombia Restore Diplomatic Ties After Three-Year Break." Accessed December 11, 2022; France 24. "Francia Marquez, the Afro-Colombian Rights Activist Campaigning for Vice President of Colombia," May 29, 2022. https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20220529-francia-marquez-the-afro-colombian-right s-activist-campaigning-for-vice-president-of-colomb; Acosta, "Colombia Says 10 Armed Groups Agree to Unilateral Ceasefire."

[68] Affairs, Ministry of Foreign. "The Peace Process in Colombia."

[69] VOA. "Venezuela, Colombia Restore Diplomatic Ties After Three-Year Break." https://www.voanews.com/a/venezuela-colombia-restore-diplomatic-ties-after-three-year-break/6720626.html.

Colombia, the recent election tipped power to the leftist Petro administration whose two highest-ranking members have backgrounds and policy agendas conducive to establishing peace. As a former member of the M-19 guerrilla group, President Petro could offer further legitimacy to the negotiations and assurances for the various guerilla groups that there will be room for post-peace political involvement in Colombia.[70] Additionally, the Colombian Vice President, Francia Marquez, has been a vocal advocate for the promulgation of human rights.[71] The combination of the identities and agendas of President Petro and Vice President Marquez lends itself well to the creation of a long-term peace.

One of the main issues Costa Rica encounters as a peacemaker is its small financial capacity to engage in peacemaking endeavors.[72] However, by partnering with other smaller states, such as Norway and Cuba, Costa Rica could pursue peacemaking by focusing on its strengths without being solely responsible for the significant financial cost. Cuba and Norway have been consistently committed to ensuring peace in Colombia. Even after the enactment of the 2016 peace deal, Norway continued to offer support to the peace process, and Cuba offered a location for more expansive peace talks to be hosted.[73] Despite the involvement of these other peacemaking actors, this paper asserts that Costa Rica, in concert with these other smaller states, could play a crucial role in the peacemaking process. By relying on the financial and location-based support of Cuba and Norway, Costa Rica could focus its internal resources to serve as that of regional leader in inter-American peacemaking and human rights promulgation.

---

[70] Acosta, "Colombia Says 10 Armed Groups Agree to Unilateral Ceasefire."

[71] France 24. "Francia Marquez, the Afro-Colombian Rights Activist Campaigning for Vice President of Colombia,"

[72] Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto. Accessed December 13, 2022. https://www.rree.go.cr/?sec=transparencia&cat=presupuestos&cont=1279.

[73] Staff. "Colombian Government and ELN Rebels Meet in Havana to Restart Peace Talks." *The Guardian*, August 12, 2022, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/12/colombia-eln-rebels-restart-peace-talks-havana.

Importantly, for a lasting peace to be instituted, the new peace deal would have to include Venezuela. Venezuela's credibility as a negotiator is tainted by its decades-long collaboration with ELN, casting doubt over its commitment to the peace process.[74] Venezuelan security forces stand accused of offering support to these guerilla groups, as well as partaking in some of their worst human rights abuses.[75] Costa Rica could add legitimacy to the negotiation process, using its identity as a "global good samaritan" to increase trust in the negotiations between Colombia and Venezuela.[76] Costa Rica is particularly well suited to this role because of its history in peacemaking in conflicts in which non-state actors are being supported by state actors. In, what can be argued to be, Costa Rica's defining peacemaking effort – The Esquipulas II Agreement – Costa Rican President and Nobel Peace laureate Oscar Arias Sanchez laid out pathways for the political incorporation of "political opposition groups who have laid down the arms"[77] such as the Contras in Nicaragua who were being heavily supported by the United States.[78]

In addition to its history of contending with conflicts in which non-state actors have support from state actors, Costa Rica is a regional power with a vested interest in regional security and a history of being a leading advocate for Latin American peace and security issues.[79] Costa Rica has a long record of regional human rights promulgation through regional institutions.[80] Costa Rica was one of the architects of, and continues to play a major role in, the

[74] The New Humanitarian. "Venezuela Holds the Key as Petro Looks to Kickstart His Colombia Peace Plan."
[75] Human Rights Watch. "Colombia/Venezuela: Border Area Abuses by Armed Groups"; The New Humanitarian. "Venezuela Holds the Key as Petro Looks to Kickstart His Colombia Peace Plan"; International Crisis Group. "Containing the Border Fallout of Colombia's New Guerrilla Schism." International Crisis Group, 2019. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep31568, 2.
[76] Brysk, Alison. "Global Good Samaritans? Human Rights Foreign Policy in Costa Rica." *Global Governance* 11, no. 4 (2005): 445–66. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800585.
[77] "Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America (Esquipulas II) | UN Peacemaker." Accessed December 12, 2022. https://peacemaker.un.org/centralamerica-esquipulasII87., 4.
[78] McKENNA, PETER. "NICARAGUA AND THE ESQUIPULAS II ACCORD: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT." *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Latino-Américaines et Caraïbes* 14, no. 27 (1989): 61–84. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41800694.
[79] Brysk, 449
[80] Brysk, 449-50

Inter-American Human Rights Institute, the Inter-American Court of the OAS, and the Inter-American Human Rights System, which is considered "among the strongest regional regimes."[81] The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), under the auspices of the OAS, has already begun capacity-building operations to increase their knowledge source surrounding the human rights abuses by Venezuelan security forces.[82] Costa Rica's prominent role in these organizations would serve the dual purpose of lending it credibility when engaging with groups who have minimal trust between each other, and providing access to greater information-based resources.

Engaging in the conflict along the Colombia-Venezuela border would serve Costa Rican domestic interests in two main ways. Firstly, as mentioned above, Costa Rica is a non-militarized state that relies on international and regional cooperative security for its national security.[83] Accordingly, the international promotion of human rights and supporting international institutions have become pillars of the Foreign Ministry's agenda.[84] Secondly, one of the leading causes of crime in Costa Rica stems from drug smuggling – particularly cocaine from Colombia.[85] The conflict along the Colombia-Venezuela border contributes greatly to the supply of cocaine as guerilla groups use the production of and proceeds generated by cocaine to increase their territory.[86] Thus, intervening in this issue will directly impact Costa Rican national security.

If Costa Rica intends to enter this conflict as a peacemaker, the following proposals should guide its initial steps. First, Costa Rica needs to quietly establish dialogue with the main

---

[81] Brysk, 449

[82] "OAS :: IACHR :: Special Monitoring Mechanism for Venezuela (MESEVE)." Accessed December 13, 2022. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/meseve/default.asp.

[83] CHAN, MARITZA. "Establishing a Cooperative Security System That Works: The Costa Rica Experience." Edited by DAN PLESCH, KEVIN MILETIC, and TARIQ RAUF. *Reintroducing Disarmament and Cooperative Security to the Toolbox of 21st Century Leaders*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24520.12, 53

[84] Brysk, "Global Good Samaritans? Human Rights Foreign Policy in Costa Rica." 446-8.

[85] "Criminality in Costa Rica - The Organized Crime Index." Accessed December 13, 2022. https://ocindex.net/.

[86] Peace Insight. "Drug Trafficking and the Colombian Conflict."

parties to the conflict to determine their interest in both establishing peace and Costa Rica entering the process. Secondly, Costa Rica needs to build its diplomatic capacity by investing in consultants with knowledge of the situation to guide its diplomatic efforts. Next, Costa Rica would have to establish dialogue with Norway and Cuba, both to ensure that they are willing to collaborate with Costa Rica entering their field and to gather more information on the conflict. Then Costa Rica should reach out to other regional actors to make sure that their diplomatic excursion will not become a source of regional diplomatic tension. Finally, if after these initial steps and conversations, Costa Rica believes that it would be beneficial for it to become a peacemaker in this conflict, it could quietly reach out to the involved parties with an official offer to enter the conflict as a peacemaker.

COSTA RICA AS A GLOBAL PEACEMAKER:

There are many ways smaller states can exert their limited influence on the international order. In "Ideas and Norms in Swedish Peace Policy," Annika Bjorkdahl offers one route that small states can use to "punch above their weight in world politics" — norm entrepreneurship.[87] Bjorkdahl explains that small states can use norm entrepreneurship by "setting international normative standards" and persuading others to share them.[88] Then, Bjorkdahl identifies three steps a small state must take to become a norm entrepreneur. First, states must commit to a "norm that agrees with their values, beliefs, identities, and practices."[89] Next, states must find an "organizational home" for the norm, typically found through organizational organizations which can embody or promote the state's norm. Finally, states must institutionalize their norm through these international structures so that other, more powerful states embrace this norm.[90]

Costa Rica can exert its influence on the international order by embracing norm entrepreneurship and promoting ecotourism. Costa Rica already fulfills Bjorkdahl's first requirement for norm entrepreneurship, identifying a norm that fits with the country's practices and policies, as environmental conservation is a top domestic priority in Costa Rica. The country has over 26 national parks, 58 wildlife refuges, and 32 protected zones.[91] An impressive 25% of Costa Rica's 19,730 square miles is protected from "future development"[92] compared to only about 13% of the United States' land.[93] Ecotourism provides a massive incentive for Costa Rica's

[87] Björkdahl, Annika, "Ideas and Norms in Swedish Peace Policy," *Swiss Political Science Review,* (2013), 19(3), 323, doi:10.1111/spsr.12046
[88] Björkdahl, "Ideas and Norms in Swedish Peace Policy," 325.
[89] Björkdahl, "Ideas and Norms in Swedish Peace Policy," 325.
[90] Björkdahl, "Ideas and Norms in Swedish Peace Policy," 325.
[91] Green Global Travel, "Ecotourism in Costa Rica: The Ultimate Eco Travel Guide," Accessed November 14, 2022, https://greenglobaltravel.com/ecotourism-in-costa-rica/.
[92] Green Global Travel, "Ecotourism in Costa Rica: The Ultimate Eco Travel Guide."
[93] O'Kruk, Amy, "Biden Wants to Protect 30% of US Land by 2030. Where We Are Now in Charts," NBCUniversal Media, April 22, 2022. https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/national-international/biden-wants-to-protect-30-of-us-land-by-2030-where-we-are-now-in-charts/3215856/#:~:text=About%2013%20percent%20of%20U.S.%20land%20is%20protected.

conservation initiatives, as tourism accounted for 10% of the country's total GDP in 2019 (it has since seen a slight decrease due to travel restrictions from the pandemic).[94]As a result, Costa Rica has created strong domestic politics, such as the PES program, to encourage local forest ecosystem conservation. The PES program showcases Costa Rica's strong regional environmental leadership, as it is the first financial environmental policy of the Latin American region.[95] Costa Rica has a clear, established history as a leader in land preservation and ecotourism, which makes it well-prepared to take on a role as an international norm entrepreneur. Thus, ecotourism is a norm that fits well with Costa Rica's practices and national identity.,

To achieve the second requirement of an "organizational home," Costa Rica must promote this norm on the international stage. International committees and treaties allow smaller states to leverage their niches to suggest policies and promote norms. For example, the Marshall Islands, a small island nation, successfully established the famous 1.5-degree Celsius warming limit during the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement, occupying an influential role as a norm entrepreneur. Costa Rica could use international environmental conferences similarly by promoting two practices in which it excels: ecotourism and environment protection. Large international conferences, such as COP 27 (a 2022 global climate conference attended by 190 states), could serve as an "organizational home" for Costa Rica's ecotourism norm.[96] By showcasing the benefits of ecotourism, such as employment opportunities and sustainable revenue, Costa Rica can lead other states to these environmental agreements through promoting

---

[94] Statista. "Travel and Tourism as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product in Costa Rica from 2019 to 2021." Accessed November 15, 2022. https://www.statista.com/statistics/873744/costal-rica-travel-tourism-breakdown-contribution-to-gdp/.

[95] United Nations Climate Change. "Payments for Environmental Services Program: Costa Rica." 2020. https://unfccc.int/climate-action/momentum-for-change/financing-for–friendly-investment/payments-for-environmental-services-program#:~:text=Costa%20Rica%27s%20Payments%20for%20Environmental,the%20country%20and%20the%20region.

[96] Friedman, Lisa, "What is COP27? And Other Questions About the Big U.N. Climate Summit," *The New York Times,* November 11, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/article/cop27-climate-change-summit.html

similar ecotourism programs. This organizational home is especially effective as many smaller states can feel conflicted between their domestic economic development and international commitment to environmental progress. By highlighting its thriving ecotourism sector, Costa Rica could provide a sustainable path to economic development for other smaller states.

After finding an "organizational home" for its norm, Bjorkdahl's final step is that Costa Rica institutionalizes this norm and convinces more powerful states to join in adopting the norm.[97] Some medium-sized states are already beginning to invest resources into developing ecotourism. For instance, ahead of COP 27, Egypt launched an "Eco-Egypt" campaign to expand and promote Egypt's protected areas and ecological sites.[98] Since tourism already plays an essential role in Egypt's economy, this program works to expand that industry to generate environmental protection.[99] Costa Rica, which has already successfully interwoven tourism and environmental conservation, could serve as a model for larger countries like Egypt aiming to do the same. Thus, Costa Rica could fulfill Bjorkdahl's final step of norm entrepreneurship.

Costa Rica's norm entrepreneurship would not only bring international recognition but potential advantages for peacemaking. In his essay, "How to realize social and conservation benefits from ecotourism in post-conflict contexts," Scott Winton describes how ecotourism prevents resource over-extraction in post-conflict biodiverse states. Over the past 50 years, 80% of armed conflicts have occurred in biodiversity hotspots; once the conflict is resolved in these areas, people often resort to resource exploitation to stimulate economic growth, leading to increased rates of "deforestation and defaunation."[100] Ecotourism can offer an alternative to this resource exploitation by promoting "both socioeconomic development and biodiversity in

---

[97] Björkdahl, "Ideas and Norms in Swedish Peace Policy," 325
[98] Ahram Online, "Egypt Launches Campaign to Promote Eco-tourism ahead of COP27," August, 19, 2022, https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/473445.aspx.
[99] Ahram Online, "Egypt Launches Campaign to Promote Eco-tourism ahead of COP27/"
[100] Scott Winton, R., and Peñuela, Natalia Ocampo, "How to Realize Social and Conservation Benefits from Ecotourism in Post- conflict Contexts," *Biotropica* 50, no. 5 (September 2018): 719. doi:10.1111/btp.12594.

post-conflict settings."[101] An example of such transformation has occurred in Rwanda, "which has enjoyed a lucrative ecotourism industry based around Mountain Gorillas after a bloody genocide in the early 1990s."[102] Initiatives targeted at these sorts of states would help Costa Rica encourage states to embrace ecotourism and cement its role as a norm entrepreneur. Furthermore, Costa Rica could engage in sustainable conflict resolution and economic rebuilding, ensuring that it fills a role as a norm entrepreneur that is concerned with "the right thing to do."[103] Costa Rica could use its role as a norm entrepreneur to help stabilize the economies of post-conflict areas by preventing intense resource extraction and encouraging more sustainable methods of revenue.

Not only would norm entrepreneurship further Costa Rica's international recognition, but it would serve its national interests as well. First, becoming a major global leader in ecotourism would further boost the popularity of Costa Rica's tourism worldwide. Accordingly, Costa Rica's economy would benefit from such international recognition surrounding their impressive ecotourism. Furthermore, given the previously mentioned values of ecotourism in preventing extreme resource degradation in post-conflict, biodiverse nations, ecotourism can play an essential role in risk de-escalation in the LAC (Latin American & Caribbean) region. Costa Rica would have a vested interest in this de-escalation because it does not have a military and thus relies on sustained peace and human rights for its national security. Beyond promoting peace in its own region, promoting ecotourism may give Costa Rica a foot in the door with more powerful states looking to expand their ecotourism that may have not been interested in the small state if it did not offer this knowledge and experience. Lastly, the importance of environmental policy will

---

[101] Scott Winton, et al. "How to Realize Social and Conservation Benefits from Ecotourism in Post- conflict Contexts," 720.
[102] Scott Winton, et al. "How to Realize Social and Conservation Benefits from Ecotourism in Post- conflict Contexts," 719.
[103] Björkdahl, "Ideas and Norms in Swedish Peace Policy," 322

only rise as the climate crisis worsens and countries look for economically feasible paths to sustainable development. It would be strategic for Costa Rica to claim a role as an environmental norm entrepreneur now as this norm is likely to become more valuable in the coming decades.

Some clear steps that Costa Rica can take to begin developing a strong ecotourism norm is diplomatic capacity and coalition building. Firstly, while Costa Rica already has a well-established and thriving ecotourism industry, they need to invest resources towards developing their diplomatic capacity to promote this industry. This could be as simple as designating one or two diplomats to specifically focus on promoting ecotourism through international cooperation. This kind of diplomatic capacity development can aid the second suggestion — coalition building. Currently, there are no international coalitions centering on ecotourism; Costa Rica could spearhead such a group, focusing on states with both long-standing and emerging ecotourism industries. By starting a coalition that would focus on economic development and conservation as it relates to ecotourism, Costa Rica would position itself as an international leader in ecotourism. As mentioned, this role will only become more influential as smaller countries look for creative and sustainable ways to develop their economies. In this way, Costa Rica can serve as an increasingly important model for other small states looking to develop both profitable and sustainable ecotourism sectors.

Bibliography

"About Costa Rica: Embajada De Costa Rica En DC." About Costa Rica | Embajada de Costa

Rica en DC. Accessed December 11, 2022. http://www.costarica-embassy.org/index.p

hp?q=node%2F19.

Acosta, Luis Jaime. "Colombia Says 10 Armed Groups Agree to Unilateral Ceasefire." *Reuters*,

September 28, 2022, sec. Americas. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombia-s

ays-10-armed-groups-agree-unilateral-ceasefire-2022-09-28/.

Affairs, Ministry of Foreign. "The Peace Process in Colombia." Redaksjonellartikkel.

Government.no, July 6, 2022. https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/pea

ce-and-reconciliation-efforts/norways_engagement/peace_colombia/id2522231/.

Ahram Online. "Egypt Launches Campaign to Promote Eco-tourism ahead of COP27." August,

19, 2022. https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/473445.aspx.

Aravena, Francisco Rojas. "Esquipulas II: El Desafio De La Paz." *Relaciones Internacionales*,

1989.

"Arias Asks for Cutoff of Contra Aid : Meets Reagan, Asks Congress to 'Give Peace a Chance.'"

Los Angeles Times, September 22, 1987.

Bailes, Alyson JK, Bradley A. Thayer, and Baldur Thorhallsson. "Alliance theory and alliance

'Shelter': the complexities of small state alliance behavior." Third World Thematics: A

TWQ Journal 1, no. 1 (2016): 11-13.

Bateman, Jason. "How Big Is Costa Rica?" CostaRica.Org, February 5, 2019. https://costarica.o

rg/facts/size/.

Björkdahl, Annika. "Ideas and Norms in Swedish Peace Policy." *Swiss Political Science Review,*

(2013), 19(3), 322–337. doi:10.1111/spsr.12046

Brysk, Alison. "Global Good Samaritans? Human Rights Foreign Policy in Costa Rica." *Global*

    Governance 11, no. 4 (2005): 445–66. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800585.

"Criminality in Costa Rica - The Organized Crime Index." Accessed December 13, 2022.

    https://ocindex.net/.

"Data for Costa Rica, Latin America & Caribbean ." The World Bank. Accessed December 11,

    2022. https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=CR-ZJ&most_recent_value_desc=false.

Felde, Kitty. Oscar Arias Sanchez: Harsh Words for the U.S. From a Voice of Peace and

    Prosperity. Other. *Los Angeles Times*, February 20, 2000.

France 24. "Francia Marquez, the Afro-Colombian Rights Activist Campaigning for Vice

    President of Colombia," May 29, 2022. https://www.france24.com/en/americas/2022052

    9-francia-marquez-the-afro-colombian-rights-activist-campaigning-for-vice-president-of-

    colombia.

Friedman, Lisa. "What is COP27? And Other Questions About the Big U.N. Climate Summit."

    The New York Times. November 11, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/article/cop27-clima

    te-change-summit.html

Green Global Travel. "Ecotourism in Costa Rica: The Ultimate Eco Travel Guide." Accessed

    November 14, 2022. https://greenglobaltravel.com/ecotourism-in-costa-rica/.

Guardia Fernández Ricardo. *La Independencia: Historia De Costa Rica*. San José, Costa Rica:

    EUNED, Editorial Universidad Estatal a Distancia, 2007.

Hernandez, Jairo. "Costa Rica: A Disarmed Democracy in a Complex Global Context."

    YouTube. BYU Kennedy Center, June 15, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v

    =ewvS5NlS2zo&t=287s.

Human Rights Watch. "Colombia/Venezuela: Border Area Abuses by Armed Groups," March
28, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/28/colombia/venezuela-border-area-abus
es-armed-groups

Ingebritsen, Christine. "Small states in international relations." University of Washington Press.
2006.

International Crisis Group. "Containing the Border Fallout of Colombia's New Guerrilla
Schism." International Crisis Group, 2019. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep31568, 2.

Konyn, Carol. "How Costa Rica Reversed Deforestation and Became an Environmental Model."
Earth.Org. Earth.Org, October 28, 2021.
https://earth.org/how-costa-rica-reversed-deforestation/.

McKenna, Peter. "NICARAGUA AND THE ESQUIPULAS II ACCORD: SETTING THE
RECORD STRAIGHT." *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies /
Revue Canadienne Des Études Latino-Américaines et Caraïbes* 14, no. 27 (1989): 61–84.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41800694.

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto. Accessed December 13, 2022.
https://www.rree.go.cr/?sec=transparencia&cat=presupuestos&cont=1279.

Misachi, John. "Federal Republic of Central America." WorldAtlas. WorldAtlas, June 30, 2021.
https://www.worldatlas.com/geography/federal-republic-of-central-america.html.

Muñoz G., Mercedes. "Costa Rica: La Abolición Del Ejército y La Construcción De La Paz
Regional." *Historia y Comunicación Social* 19 (2014). https://doi.org/10.5209/rev_h
ics.2014.v19.47301.

Nations, United. "Human Development Index." Human Development Reports, November 9,
2022. https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI.

"OAS :: IACHR :: Special Monitoring Mechanism for Venezuela (MESEVE)." Accessed December 13, 2022. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/meseve /default.asp.

O'Kruk, Amy. "Biden Wants to Protect 30% of US Land by 2030. Where We Are Now in Charts." NBCUniversal Media. April 22, 2022. https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/ national-international/biden-wants-to-protect-30-of-us-land-by-2030-where-we-are-now-i n-charts/3215856/#:~:

Olander, Marcia K. "Central American Foreign Policies and the Costa Rican Civil War of 1948: Picado, Somoza and the Desperate Alliance," 1999.

"Payments for Environmental Services Program | Costa Rica." United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Accessed December 11, 2022. https://unfccc.int/climat e-action/momentum-for-change/financing-for-climate-friendly-investment/payments-for-environmental-services-program.

Peace Insight. "Drug Trafficking and the Colombian Conflict." Accessed December 13, 2022. https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/articles/drug-trafficking-colombian-conflict/.

"Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America (Esquipulas II) | UN Peacemaker." Accessed December 12, 2022. https://peacemaker.un.org/centralamer ica-esquipulasII87.

Rankin, Monica A. *History of Costa Rica*. ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2012.]

Scott Winton, R., and Peñuela, Natalia Ocampo, "How to Realize Social and Conservation Benefits from Ecotourism in Post- conflict Contexts," *Biotropica* 50, no. 5 (September 2018): 719. doi:10.1111/btp.12594.

Staff. "Colombian Government and ELN Rebels Meet in Havana to Restart Peace Talks." *The Guardian*, August 12, 2022, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/wo rld/2022/aug/12/colombia-eln-rebels-restart-peace-talks-havana.

Statista. "Travel and Tourism as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product in Costa Rica from 2019 to 2021." Accessed November 15, 2022. https://www.statista.com/statistics/873744/cos tal-rica-travel-tourism-breakdown-contribution-to-gdp/.

"Summit for Democracy 2023 - United States Department of State." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, November 29, 2022. https://www.state.gov/summit-for-demo cracy-2023/.

The New Humanitarian. "Venezuela Holds the Key as Petro Looks to Kickstart His Colombia Peace Plan," November 9, 2022. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2022/11/ 09/Colombia-Venezuela-border-ELN-Petro.

United Nations Climate Change. "Payments for Environmental Services Program: Costa Rica." 2020. https://unfccc.int/climate-action/momentum-for-change/financing-for–friendly-in vestment/payments-for-environmental-services-program#:~:text=Costa%20Rica%27s%2 0Payments%20for%20Environmental,the%20country%20and%20the%20region.

VOA. "Venezuela, Colombia Restore Diplomatic Ties After Three-Year Break." Accessed December 11, 2022. https://www.voanews.com/a/venezuela-colombia-restore-diploma tic-ties-after-three-year-break/6720626.html.

PANAMA

Markus Kempin, Gabe Gerstel, and Jack Grier

PANAMA'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON PEACEMAKING:

Demographic and Geographical Information

Panama is a small, Spanish-speaking state consisting of 75,420 square kilometers in geographical area and an estimated population of 4,337,768, with the majority falling between the ages of 25 and 54. Formerly known as the Isthmus of Darien, it was a Spanish colony before gaining independence in 1821 and joining the Republic of Gran Colombia (with Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela). While the Republic of Gran Colombia dissolved in 1830, Panama remained a part of Colombia. The United States' support allowed Panama to secede from Colombia in 1903.[1] The country has a democratic, representative system of government with executive, legislative and judicial branches.[2] The current president is Laurentino Cortizo. Although Panama is a legal and economic powerhouse in the international sphere, it is still riddled with corruption and racism against ethnic minorities, especially indigenous peoples.

---

[1] "Panama," in *The World Factbook* (Central Intelligence Agency, December 13, 2022), https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/panama/.

[2] "Panama: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report," Freedom House, 2021, https://freedomhouse.org/country/panama/freedom-world/2021.

Conflict History and Conflict Resolution: Panama Canal

Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor and King of Spain, first conceived of the Canal in 1534 when he ordered a survey for a route through the Americas. He had planned on decreasing the voyage time for ships traveling between Spain and Peru. In 1788, Thomas Jefferson, then U.S. Minister to France, encouraged the Spanish to build the canal since they controlled the colonies where it would be built. Consequently, Alessando Malaspina designed and attempted to plan the construction of the canal. The collapse of the Spanish Empire in Latin America resulted in a growing U.S. interest in building the canal. In 1846, the Mallarino Bidlack Treaty gave the United States transit rights and the right to intervene militarily in the isthmus. This permission eventually led to American construction of the Panama Railroad.

On January 22, 1903 the United States and Gran Colombia signed the Hay Herran Treaty, which granted an annual lease of $10M to the American government to build the canal. While the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty, Gran Colombia's Senate did not. The Gran Colombian refusal provoked President Theodore Roosevelt to support Panamanian rebels, desiring independence, in order to pressure the opposition party to accept the terms. On November 2, 1903, American warships blocked sea lanes against Colombian troop movements on their way to fight the rebellion, and Panama declared independence the next day. Four days later, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, Panama's ambassador to the United States, signed the Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty, which granted the United States access to administer and defend the Panama Canal Zone.

The Torrijos-Carter Treaty, a direct reaction to the increased tensions between the US and Panama during the 20th century, facilitated the transfer of the Panama Canal to the Panamanian authorities. In 1964, a deadly riot between U.S. residents in the Canal Zone and the Panamanian people instigated debates regarding the right to fly the Panamanian flag in the Zone. The riots

resulted in a temporary suspension of diplomatic relations between the United States and Panama, but they both later aimed to establish ties.

Nevertheless, Panama suffered more political instability during newly-elected President Arnulfo Arias' transition to power in 1968. Only 11 days after Arias' victory, Colonel Omar Torrijos staged a coup d'état, hindering negotiations to establish diplomatic ties. Torrijos, similar to his predecessors, aspired to regain the Canal, and President Carter—given his desire for conflict resolution globally—agreed with Torrijos. Then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated: "If these [Canal] negotiations fail, we will be beaten to death in every international forum and there will be riots all over Latin America." Preceding the Carter Administration, Ellsworth Bunker, a "seasoned" American diplomat, led the charge in negotiations which eventually led to draft agreements that served as the foundation for the Torrijos Carter Treaties.[3]

When Carter won the 1976 election, he vowed to not surrender the Panama Canal Zone in the immediate future, since it would hurt the White House's ratings. However, Secretary Cyrus Vance and businessman Sol Linowitz persuaded Carter to revert to his original intention. In this, the administration needed to overcome many challenges. First, it began holding hundreds of forums where policymakers explained Carter's rationale for handing over the Canal. Torrijos, meanwhile, hosted U.S. Senators in Panama and reaffirmed his anti-communist views to refute the conservative wing, led by Strom Thurmond (R-SC), who said the country would fall to the "domino effect." Negotiations concluded that The Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal and The Panama Canal Treaty would reach the Senate floor.[4] The former ensured the U.S. Military's agency in defending the Panama Canal against any threat

---

[3]   "Milestones: 1977–1980," Office of the Historian in the Department of State, accessed December 15, 2022, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/panama-canal.

[4]   "History Day - Panama Canal," Robert and Elizabeth Dole Archive and Special Collections, April 17, 2013, https://dolearchives.ku.edu/hdtopics_panama.

to its neutrality, and the latter eliminated the Panama Canal Zone. The Senate eventually ratified both on April 18, 1978 and officially returned the Canal to Panama on December 31, 1999. To this day, the Panama Canal Authority (ACP) enjoys retaining full authority over its waterways and has since expanded the canal's capacity to welcome economic trade success to the country.

Current Diplomatic and Peacekeeping efforts

Panama has conducted two notable high profile peacekeeping missions. In 2015, it hosted the 7th Summit of the Americas, which invited all thirty-five members of the Organization of American States (OAS). The summit notably hosted Cuba, which the OAS first expelled following the 1959 Revolution. Cuban President Raul Castro greeted President Obama in the countries' first full meeting since the US decided to negotiate new relations with Cuba. During the meeting, Panama served as a mediator for dialogue between the two adversaries, who could finally discuss their shared histories and both peoples' consensus that thawing relations would prove a beneficial step for diplomatic relations in the Americas.[5] Through Panama, President Obama felt safe to announce that both Cuba and the United States were working to normalize diplomatic relations between the two nations and open embassies in both capitals. The OAS's decision to entrust Panama as a host for a monumental and successful meeting allowed the state to rise to the global stage and prove its competence in mediation and negotiation.

The second peacekeeping mission manifested itself at the International World Youth Day festival in 2019. Panama hosted the event from January 22nd to January 27th to recognize the Catholic faith and its accomplishments.[6] At the festival, the Pope and a variety of religious

---

[5] "2015 Summit of the Americas," US Department of State, 2015, https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/wha/rt/soa/2015/index.htm.

[6] St. John the Baptist Parish, "World Youth Day 2019 Panama Pilgrim Packet," 2019, https://www.scd.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/WYD%20Panama%20Packet_0.pdf.

leaders celebrated young adults and children's religious roles and contributions.[7] Pope Francis

attended and spoke about global politics, migration, corruption, violence and the role of women.[8]

Despite the Vatican's controversy following its clergy's involvement in covering up and

committing sexual abuse cases against minors, Panama's Foreign Ministry still felt that hosting

the event was necessary to promote its dominant religion and act as a marketing device for one

of Europe's norm entrepreneurs that possesses a near monopoly on religious diplomacy.[9] To

mend the Vatican's reputation, the Pope addressed two masses and delivered seven speeches to

over 150,000 people from over 150 countries; he even went to a prison in Pacora to hear

confessions from thousands of inmates.[10] By defending a country and supporting its niche

diplomacy, Panama created a new reputation for itself as another entrepreneur. Returning to the

world stage assisted Panama in its efforts to become a key player in the mediating and religious

aspects of diplomacy. Reflecting traits of a peaceful nation not only improved its image, but

launched a new career for the Foreign Ministry as a potential peacemaker.

---

[7]   St. John the Baptist Parish, "World Youth Day 2019 Panama Pilgrim Packet."
[8]   Rosa Flores, "Could World Youth Day in Panama Give the Pope a Boost?," CNN, January 22, 2019,
https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/22/world/pope-panama-preview.
[9]   Rosa Flores, "Could World Youth Day in Panama Give the Pope a Boost?."
[10]   Sabina Castelfranco, "Pope Heads to Panama to Celebrate World Youth Day," VOA, January 22, 2019,
https://www.voanews.com/a/pope-heads-to-panama-to-celebrate-world-youth-day/4753755.html.

PANAMA AS A REGIONAL PEACEMAKER:

Security Crisis in The Republic of Haiti

On July 7th, 2021, the already-unstable Caribbean nation of Haiti was plunged into even more chaos upon the assassination of its President, Jovenel Moise. On top of the state failing to investigate and prosecute those behind the killing, it hasn't delivered on general elections, kidnappings have risen, and gang warfare is rocking the capital.[11] A two-month blockade of a key fuel terminal by armed gangs paralyzed various sectors and reduced access to basic goods and services such as electricity and clean water. In light of this security crisis, the government has asked for military assistance from the international community, but countries like the US have thus far not offered to send troops.[12] Regardless, looking at the historical context suggests that a foreign military intervention by a nation like the US would neither be welcomed nor productive. Consequently, an alternative that can help restore security without the baggage or overt visibility of a military intervention could be improving Haitian law enforcement through a re-emphasis and reforming of the national police. While fixing Haiti's crisis will take the work of more than just one nation, Panama, a nation in the region with a similar history, is well-positioned to assist by acting as a norm entrepreneur for law enforcement depoliticization.

None of these problems are completely new to Haiti, a country that only had its first democratically-elected President in 1990 who was deposed by the military a mere one year

---

[11]   "A Year after the President's Assassination, Haitians Endure a Broken Nation or Flee," *NPR*, July 7, 2022, sec. Latin America, https://www.npr.org/2022/07/07/1110257719/haiti-assassination-president-jovenel-moise-anniversary-gangs-refugees.

[12]   Reuters, "Explainer: What's Driving Haiti's Humanitarian Crisis?," *Reuters*, October 19, 2022, sec. Americas, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/whats-driving-haitis-humanitarian-crisis-2022-10-18/.

later.[13] Before Moise's assassination, the country was already experiencing a constitutional crisis.[14] The gangs, which currently control around 60% of the capital, historically had a major presence in the country. With previous gang crises, however, UN peacekeepers often helped to quell them.[15] This suggests that law enforcement of some manner still can help, even if it cannot itself solve the crisis. Nonetheless, the presence of UN peacekeepers from 2004 to 2017 is controversial, as they were accused of causing a devastating cholera outbreak in the aftermath of the devastating 2010 earthquake, from which Haiti never fully recovered.[16]

Haiti was also the site of other foreign interventions, notably the American occupation from 1915 to 1934 and the sending of US Marines during the Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies.[17] It was the US occupation that created what would eventually evolve into the Armed Forces of Haiti, which engaged in political interventions, human rights abuses, and coups. Finally, in 1995, then-President Jean-Bertrand Aristide disbanded the armed forces and created the Haitian National Police (HNP). This was the first time that Haiti had a police force independent of the army.[18] However, in 2017, President Moise re-established the army in a divisive move decried as a way to go after rivals.[19] Some appointed to the High Command of this

[13]   Farah Stockman, "Opinion | Did a Coup Attempt Really Happen Two Weeks Ago in Haiti?," *The New York Times*, February 23, 2021, sec. Opinion,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/23/opinion/haiti-coup-jovenel-moise.html.
[14]   Laurel Wamsley, "Even Before Jovenel Moïse's Assassination, Haiti Was In Crisis," *NPR*, July 7, 2021, sec. Politics,
https://www.npr.org/2021/07/07/1013879000/even-before-jovenel-moises-assassination-haiti-was-in-crisis
[15]   Danica Coto, "Haiti Gang Makes Demands in Test of Power with Government," AP News, October 14, 2022,
https://apnews.com/article/caribbean-united-nations-haiti-puerto-rico-gangs-9d6257f66d724c0a5578ad41d3597b82.
[16] Wamsley, "Even Before Jovenel Moïse's Assassination, Haiti Was In Crisis."
[17] Wamsley, "Even Before Jovenel Moïse's Assassination, Haiti Was In Crisis."
[18] Helen Chapin Metz and Library of Congress, "Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies," Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540 USA, 2001, 459–60, https://www.loc.gov/item/2001023524/.
[19] Andres Martinez Casares and Joseph Guyler Delva, "Haitian Army Set to Make Controversial Return after Two Decades," Reuters, November 18, 2017,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-military/haitian-army-set-to-make-controversial-return-after-two-decades-idUSKBN1DJ01M.

new military were involved in the previous military and, by extension, its abuses.[20] Given this, the legitimacy and need for this revived military is in question. With this history, many Haitians harbor mistrust towards the military and the idea of foreign intervention (especially by the UN or US) and demonstrations have broken out against the government's request.[21]

Collective Experiences

The most effective global partners are often those that share common experiences and lack historical baggage like an imperialist past. Norway, famously involved in humanitarianism and peacemaking worldwide, exemplifies this. Former Norwegian Ambassador to the US Knut Vollabaek described how Norway is a viable partner because it was once poor, lacks the history of being a colonizer, and is not seen as malevolent or threatening.[22] In this case, like Haiti, Panama has never been a colonizer, has experienced American occupation, and has struggled with politicized law enforcement, making Panama a more trustworthy partner for Haiti.

American involvement in Panama is clear in the country's first constitution in 1904 that gave the US "...the power to intervene in any part of the Republic of Panama to reestablish public peace and constitutional order…"[23] In addition, for decades, the US controlled the Panama Canal and the zone 5 miles on each side.[24] In Panama, too, there was resentment towards the American presence, culminating in the anti-American riots.[25] Finally, the US outright intervened

[20] Jake Johnston, "Meet the New Haitian Military ? It's Starting to Look a Lot Like the Old One," *Center for Economic and Policy Research* (blog), March 16, 2018, https://www.cepr.net/meet-the-new-haitian-military-it-s-starting-to-look-a-lot-like-the-old-one/.

[21] Eyder Peralta, "Reporter's Notebook: Haiti's at a Breaking Point but Few Want Foreign Intervention," *NPR*, November 4, 2022, sec. World, https://www.npr.org/2022/11/04/1131254613/haiti-sanctions-foreign-intervention-protests-gangs-cholera.

[22] Knut Vollabaek, "Ambassador Knut Vollabaek on Norway's Role as Peacemaker" (INAF 360 Middle Power Perspectives on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Georgetown University, September 20, 2006), 1.

[23] Panama Constitution (1904), Title XV, art. 136.

[24] T. Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Canal Zone," Encyclopedia Britannica, May 1, 2020, https://www.britannica.com/place/Canal-Zone.

[25] Sandra W. Meditz, Dennis Michael Hanratty, and Library of Congress, "Panama: A Country Study," image, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540 USA, 1989, 36, https://www.loc.gov/item/88600486/.

militarily when it invaded Panama in 1989. With the Canal having only been turned over to

Panama at the turn of the century, the memory of US control remains familiar for many.

Panama has also suffered from military involvement in politics, but eventually abolished

its military and replaced it with a law enforcement body that has coexisted with democracy.

Panama's former military, the Panama Defense Forces, and its predecessor, the National Guard,

were the culmination of successive leaders recognizing that a national police force could only

wield limited political power, while a National Guard and, later, a military could meddle in

politics.[26] For example, the Guard's leader, Jose Antonio Remon, installed and removed

Presidents and himself became President in 1952.[27] The Guard, a dominant institution, was

eventually replaced by the PDF, but the military influence over politics remained.[28] The PDF was

led by Manuel Noriega, who had led the Guard and dominated politics.[29] Eventually, after the

1989 invasion that overthrew him, "The [Panamanian] administration succeeded in abolishing

the PDF and replacing it with a new national police known as the Public Force, and it amended

the constitution to prohibit the creation of a regular military."[30] Today, the security forces have

been "depoliticised…and by the end of 1990s had emerged as civilian police institutions that

functioned somewhat efficiently and (an oddity in the region) enjoyed the trust of the public."[31]

Although Panama's police aren't perfect, its success in transforming law enforcement into a

trusted actor by eliminating the military and depoliticizing the national police has provided

Panama with the necessary practical experience and context to assist Haiti.

---

[26] Meditz, Hanratty, and Library of Congress, "Panama: A Country Study," 219–21.
[27] Ronald D. Sylvia and Constantine Danopoulos, "Civil-Military Relations in a Civilianized State: Panama," *Journal of Political & Military Sociology* 33, no. 1 (2005): 83.
[28] Meditz, Hanratty, and Library of Congress, "Panama: A Country Study," 219–21.
[29] Sylvia and Danopoulos, "Civil-Military Relations in a Civilianized State: Panama," 86–87.
[30] T. Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Invasion of Panama," Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/place/Panama/Invasion-of-Panama#ref672336.
[31] Corinne Caumartin, "'Depoliticisation' in the Reform of the Panamanian Security Apparatus," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 39, no. 1 (2007): 131, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X06002057.

The Norm Entrepreneur: Partnering With Haiti

Given the shared histories and practical experiences, Panama is well-placed to help Haiti recover from its security crisis. While the media has focused on the UN's proposed international military intervention, military force is sometimes not enough to provide stability and security and can sometimes even further exacerbate the situation. Oftentimes, police as part of law enforcement builds sustained state authority, capacity, stability, security, and overall rule of law.[32]

Panama's government and Public Forces can help Haiti build law enforcement capacity by advising Haiti on how to create a depoliticized, effective apparatus based upon its own experience. In doing so, Panama would join smaller nations like Sweden that commit themselves to a norm based on their own practices (in Panama's case, law enforcement depoliticization) and then promote and advocate for it globally.[33] This norm entrepreneurship and advocacy in Haiti could take the form of removing the military from the law enforcement equation in favor of a reformed HNP. The controversial reinstatement of the military was a divisive move executed by a similarly divisive President that was even more worrisome considering Haiti's history with military influence over political affairs. Secondly, a military "...may divert scarce resources from what should be the priorities for enhancing Haiti's security: building the HNP's operational capacities and clarifying key aspects of its organizational structure."[34]

---

[32] Dilshika Jayamaha et al., "Introduction," Lessons Learned From U.S. Government Law Enforcement in International Operations (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2010), 1, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/stable/resrep12125.5.

[33] Annika Björkdahl, "Ideas and Norms in Swedish Peace Policy," *Swiss Political Science Review* 19, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 322–37, https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12046.

[34] International Crisis Group, "Keeping Haiti Safe: Police Reform" (International Crisis Group, 2011), 11, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/stable/resrep36780.

Haiti should, like Panama, prohibit a regular military in its constitution, which would thenceforth require an amendment for the military to be reinstated.[35] In Haiti, constitutional amendments require a high vote threshold and "...may enter into effect only after installation of the next elected President. In no case may the President under the Government that approved the amendment benefit from any advantages deriving there from."[36] A constitutional safeguard against a military would thus make it hard for future governments to repeat Moise's move to reinstate the military allegedly for his own benefit and without broad popular and political support. In turn, this can help to uphold the credibility of law enforcement as a whole.

Beyond abolishing the military, it is also necessary for the HNP to be retrained and reconstituted, something that can be done with Panama's help based on its own experience doing this. When Panama went through this process, it prohibited "...any form of overt political party activity or affiliation beyond that of voting…" and imposed "...restrictions imposed upon the political activities of the security forces…to include public statements of a political nature."[37] It allowed ex-PDF and staff to join but excluded those unwilling to submit to civilian oversight and those with links to drug or criminal networks and human rights violations.[38] By not having a blanket exclusion of ex-PDF members, Panama kept a critical sector involved in the reform, prevented a mass of trained (and potentially armed) jobless people roaming the streets, and made sure those who abused their power could not do so in the new national police force.[39] Panamanians involved in that process can advise Haitian lawmakers and security officials on replicating these same policies and norms that created a depoliticized national police and allowed

---

[35] Ryan Swanson, "Country Profile: Haiti," pdf, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540 USA, May 9, 2006, 21, https://www.loc.gov/item/copr/7297105/.
[36] Haiti Constitution, Title XIII, art. 282-284.
[37] Caumartin, "'Depoliticisation' in the Reform of the Panamanian Security Apparatus," 113.
[38] Caumartin, "'Depoliticisation' in the Reform of the Panamanian Security Apparatus," 114.
[39] Richard H. Shultz, *In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala: Air University Press, 1993), 46.

most ex-soldiers to join it while removing the bad apples. This is a crucial step for Haiti, as depoliticizing law enforcement while excluding (and perhaps prosecuting) ex-soldiers and police with criminal links or rights violations can help to restore the credibility of and trust in law enforcement. It would also keep most ex-soldiers and police involved in the reform process rather than joining gangs and further exacerbating the security crisis.

In order to draft these laws reforming law enforcement, Haiti could replicate Panama's successful process of setting up a commission of different political parties, civil society (including human rights organizations), and law enforcement. In an effort to combat the gang crisis, it could also involve representatives of the neighborhoods and sectors most susceptible to gangs. This body can unify previous laws and reform efforts regarding the police with new laws and anchor them cohesively in Haitian law.[40] Having multiple sectors of society be a part of this process, making it more accountable to elected citizens, and reinforcing anti-politicization laws would stabilize the force, increase the possibility of further foreign assistance towards the police, and further enhance its capability, professionalism, and overall quality.

Finally, and most importantly, the Panamanian model of reforming and depoliticizing law enforcement through an inclusive process can lend it greater credibility in the eyes of the citizenry. Right now, Haitians lack confidence in the force and, as a result, are often hesitant to cooperate with it.[41] Previous attempts at reform, such as during the mid-to-late 1990s, yielded an initial high level of public acceptance until the force became corrupted by politicization.[42] Therefore, reform can lead to increased public acceptance and such acceptance can be maintained through robust depoliticization. Meanwhile, Haiti's attempt at police reform in the

---

[40] Caumartin, "'Depoliticisation' in the Reform of the Panamanian Security Apparatus," 124.
[41] International Crisis Group, "Haiti: A Path to Stability for a Nation in Shock" (International Crisis Group, 2021), 8, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep36471.
[42] International Crisis Group, "Haiti: Security and the Reintegration of the State" (International Crisis Group, 2006), 3, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep43783.

early 2000s suffered from "…a sense that civil society, political elites, private sector, the media, and the larger public had not been widely consulted."[43] With this in mind, Panama's comprehensive and inclusive approach addresses the shortcomings of previous reform efforts by institutionalizing depoliticization under a unified set of laws, including a wide range of Haitian actors to lead reform, resetting citizen-police relations, and nurturing an environment more conducive to cooperation between citizen and police in the fight against gang violence.

In its own reform effort, Panama experienced challenges, including an initially-uncertain blueprint for the process and limited staff with relevant knowledge.[44] Panama could thus help Haiti avoid the same challenges that it faced by hosting training sessions for the Haitian police and sending police advisors or even forces over to Haiti that can be there to physically embed themselves into this process and help provide security in the midst of it (such as through joint patrols). While Panama does not yet contribute police globally, the International Peace Institute finds that potential police contributors may be found with countries with higher police densities and police services of 10,000 or more. According to the IPI, Panama, with 12,000 police and a high density of 333 officers per 100,000 people, is well-placed to become a police contributor.[45]

One could argue that other countries have attempted training Haiti's police in the past and that yet another attempt would just be moot. For instance, the US Justice Department created Haiti's first National Police Academy and also trained its first civilian police force. However, the US – with a decentralized police force – has a fundamentally different police structure than the one they were working with in Haiti. Furthermore, the US used commercial contractors in lieu of

[43] Arthur Boutellis, "What Army for Haiti?" (International Peace Institute, 2011), 3, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09486.

[44] Caumartin, "'Depoliticisation' in the Reform of the Panamanian Security Apparatus," 132.

[45] William J. Durch and Michelle Ker, "Broadening the Base of Police-Contributing Countries," Police in UN Peacekeeping: Improving Selection, Recruitment, and Deployment (International Peace Institute, 2013), 31, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09594.11.

national police.[46] In addition, while the US is a large and capable nation, it does not have the

same common background regarding the intersection of law enforcement and politics that

Panama and Haiti have, meaning that they likely were not equipped to address the underlying

issues. Similarly, Haitian police already attend programs in other countries, such as Chile,

France, and Mexico.[47] However, none of these have dealt with reforming law enforcement by

abolishing their military and depoliticizing their national police as Panama has. Thus, Panama

adds to the training that Haitian police already receive by helping to develop practical rules,

procedures, and training for a national police force specifically in the context of underlying

systemic and institutionalized law enforcement issues that both Haiti and Panama experienced.

While Panama cannot alone solve Haiti's law enforcement crisis and wider humanitarian

catastrophe, it is surely well-positioned to contribute by becoming a norm entrepreneur for law

enforcement depoliticization and helping to restore HNP's credibility at home and abroad,

further strengthening the police and promoting citizen cooperation in the fight against gangs.

---

[46] Robert M. Perito, "U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations," United States Institute of Peace, August 1, 2007, 6, https://www.usip.org/publications/2007/08/us-police-peace-and-stability-operations.
[47] International Crisis Group, "Keeping Haiti Safe: Police Reform," 11.

PANAMA AS A GLOBAL PEACEMAKER:

Water We Waiting For? Let's Go Global!

Climate change impacts fisheries more than any other Panamanian industry, prompting Panama to serve as the foremost climate leader in the region for over a decade. With some of the largest renewable freshwater resources per capita, its interests lie not only in sustaining its domestic environmental and economic needs but also in the aspirations of foreign investors whom the waters attract. Hence, Panama must develop policy solutions to address the social, political, and economic problems—foreign and domestic—stemming from the threat of climate change.

Climate Change vs. Panamanian Fisheries (Mutual Economic Threat)

Since 1958, Japan has arranged fleets of fishing vessels for exploring yellowfin tuna and shrimp around Panamanian waters and has used its ally's storage units in Vacamonte and Panama City as intermediaries for exporting seafood to the United States.[48] Panama, reflecting its small-state characteristics, simultaneously benefits its own import economy and Japan's export economy. While Japan exploits Panama's resource areas, Panama reaps socio-economic benefits from Japanese involvement in Central American trade.

Climate change's largest maritime target lies with the Panama Canal, the Western Hemisphere's most important artificial waterway for maritime trade. Behind the US and the People's Republic of China (PRC), Japan has remained the third largest user of this strategic

---

[48] U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, "Japanese Fisheries Based in Overseas Areas," 22.

isthmus, whose geostrategic prominence manifests itself by connecting Pacific and Atlantic economies.[49] After having expanded the Canal Zone on June 26, 2016, Panama doubled its capacity—consequently more than doubling the annual tonnage—and increased its annual revenues by 20%, 12%, and 34% each successive year.[50] This impact evidently empowered Japan to increase its already-dominant presence in the Panama Canal and also in the broader Latin American and the Caribbean region. Japanese mega-ships displayed the regional transshipment area's transition to a larger economy of scale, inviting other port terminals such as Kingston (Jamaica), Freeport (Bahamas), Caucedo (Dominican Republic), and San Juan (Puerto Rico, U.S.A.) to join Panama City in the discussion on global trade.[51] Hence, both Panamanian waterways and freshwater locations attract powers—small, middle, and large—and generate a large and unique trade zone. If Panama does not act quickly, trade in the Panama Canal will continue to gradually drop, and the marine ecosystem's health will severely decline.

However, an exceptional dry spell forced the country to reconsider its sole concentration on commerce. Following Panama's hottest year (signaling climate change's presence) in 2019, John Langman, Vice President of Water Projects at the Panama Canal recognized the canal's "huge significance to the Panamanian economy" but also emphasized "finding [climate] solutions to ensure the canal does not run out of water."[52] For the past three years, Panama has deepened its artificial lakes to capture more rainwater and has desalinated sea water (emptying into the artificial lake) for human consumption.[53] In addition to improving water sources, Panama has worked to combat climate change itself. One of the top-three carbon negative states,

[49]   Bureau of Transportation Statistics, "Table 1-10 Top 25 Countries Using the Panama Canal by Origin and Destination of Cargo, FY2007 (Long Tons)."
[50]   Kahuina Miller and Tetsuro Hyodo, "Impact of the Panama Canal Expansion on Latin American and Caribbean Ports: Difference in Difference (DID) Method."
[51]   Miller and Hyodo, "Impact of the Panama Canal Expansion"
[52]   BBC News, "Panama Canal Grapples with Climate Change Threat."
[53]   BBC, "Panama Canal Grapples."

Panama reduced its CO_2 levels by 13% in 2020.[54] The search for freshwater sources thus extends beyond domestic consumption and protection. Equipped with that understanding, the country could apply its role in resolving climate change to settling other climate-related issues.

Climate Change vs. International Law (National Security Threat):

The aforementioned economic details also obligate Panama to focus on climate change as a national security issue, in addition to the economic ramifications in the tourism and commercial sectors. While Japanese and American trade with Panama operates within legal parameters, China's maritime encounters seriously violate international law.[55] On one hand, Panama permits illegal Chinese fishing in protected areas in the Panama Bay and the Gulf of Panama in order to appease its key Asiatic power in a mutually-beneficial financial relationship. On the other hand, the PRC deployed its most notorious company, holding the industry's longest criminal record, which flies the Panamanian ensign as a "flag of convenience" to conceal its identity.[56] Thus, Panama has hurt its international reputation, as proven through the "yellow card" issued by the European Commission, for failing to prevent and report illegal and unregulated (IUU) fishing; the Commission has also threatened suspending the country's seafood exports.[57] Further pressure from the European Union would convince Panama to minimize its rapport with the PRC, and Panama wishes to neither harm its already endangered waters nor agitate Asia's central actor.

The situation undoubtedly hurts China too. This year, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) ranked illegal fishing the third most lucrative illicit

---

54   Yasiel Burillo, "Panama Leading By Example On Climate Change."
55   Mary Triny Zea and Michelle Carrere, "Panama: A 'Flag of Convenience' for Illegal Fishing and Lack of Control at Sea."
56   Zea and Carrere, "Panama: A 'Flag of Convenience' for Illegal Fishing."
57   Zea and Carrere, "Panama: A 'Flag of Convenience' for Illegal Fishing."

activity in the world, estimated at $17 billion in 2022, behind drug and arms trafficking.[58] Thus, halting a key player's fishing operation indicates a detrimental path for Chinese trade. Although the PRC's military and foreign-policy toolbox could decimate its Central American ally (if Panama were to agitate its East Asian partner), an aggressive pivot towards a significantly smaller state would destroy the dominant power's global image. China also realizes Panama's accomplishments in the climate-action field. Nevertheless, soft power (commonly displayed through propaganda) or subtle hard power (through its infamous cyber attacks) could hurt Panama enough to force the country to ally closer to the United States and Japan, key adversaries of the PRC. No one should doubt climate change's power to increase conflict over fishing and exclusive economic zones (EEZs), as seen in the South China Sea for the past century. Although China hopes to avoid conflict with these two states, increased tension could drive the three larger powers to act aimlessly, especially due to each state's unpredictable foreign policy.

Panama's Potential for Peacemaking:

Panama's current role as a peacemaker suggests that the country possesses the potential to mitigate transnational conflicts, such as climate change. Given its abundance of extreme weather events, ranging from tropical cyclones to wildfires, Panama remains highly vulnerable to climate change. Additionally, detriments to the Panama Canal, small-scale and large-scale fisheries, and national security explains why Panama has invested so much time and resources in the fight against the twenty-first century's most pressing environmental issue.

Since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has thoroughly demonstrated its commitment to mediating conflict in the international arena, Panama should engage in climate change resolution with countries whom the Ministry has either collaborated with or assisted in the past. By

---

[58]   Zea and Carrere, "Panama: A 'Flag of Convenience' for Illegal Fishing."

focusing on ways in which the domestic economy relates to both its internal development and its foreign trade, this small state could take advantage of climate change's effects to improve other countries' economic and international standing while (as an ulterior motive) ameliorating its own situation regarding the environment, economy, and national security.

From a social perspective, Panama's profound contributions stand tall. The Western Hemisphere's leader in marine protected area extension, Panama increased its marine protected area by 30% in 2021 by designating a reserve compiling over 67,000 square kilometers.[59] Panama remains only the second in Latin America to attain the UN's "30X30 Initiative" desired level.[60] Excelling in the field of climate change mitigation should inspire Panama to engage in environmental diplomacy as its niche in foreign affairs. By exceeding expectations on its commitment to sustainability and marine conservation, the government will garner attention from states adhering to regional frameworks, UN frameworks, and/or the Paris Agreement.

Beyond domestic climate action, Panama embodies leadership in institutional implementation and environmental collaboration at regional and global levels. It exemplified its global leadership skills at the COP26 Conference in Glasgow, leading the Declaration of Carbon Negative Countries with fellow small-state climate allies Bhutan and Suriname.[61] At a regional level, Panamanian officials then returned home to convince President Laurentino Cortizo to act as the lead signatory for the declaration for the conservation of the East Tropical Pacific Marine Corridor System for Latin America.[62] Inviting Ecuador, Columbia, and Costa Rica, this agreement inspired the same levels of biological and water protection for a collaborative process.[63] If Panama can convince Latin American and Asian governments to follow various

---

[59]   Burillo, "Panama Leading By Example."
[60]   Burillo, "Panama Leading By Example."
[61]   Burillo, "Panama Leading By Example."
[62]   Burillo, "Panama Leading By Example."
[63]   Burillo, "Panama Leading By Example."

environmental measures, it can become a norm entrepreneur in establishing standards for fishing

practices, CO_2 levels, water elevation and quality, and other scientific activity.

Furthermore, Panama should expand beyond the regional level by exploring climate

collaboration with partners in the Eastern Hemisphere, such as Iceland. Emulating Nordic-style

diplomacy, Iceland has collaborated with Norway and a few European Union member states to

find economic and environmental solutions.[64] At the beginning of the twenty-first century,

having intended to placate Britain, Ireland, and Norway's accusations of stealing against each

other's fisheries, Iceland successfully mediated numerous maritime trade disputes between the

North Sea states by setting parameters.[65] Panama and Iceland both have compelled their

neighbors and states typically outside of their typical foreign relations to follow institutional

guidelines on climate. Consequently, after establishing the framework for climate action, Panama

should recommend and assist with technology, such as water basins and desalination techniques.

Providing the knowledge and skills to develop concrete solutions to Iceland will open up a new

channel to European actors, thereby making Iceland an intermediary to an increasingly powerful

Panama. Collaboration in this field would add legitimacy to Panama's role as a norm

entrepreneur and increase the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' diplomatic standing.

Finally, Panama must consider the security implications of climate change in the Canal

Zone. H2ub Verde Panama, the government's green initiative, feels determined to convert its

container ships from fossil-fuel-run to hydrogen-based. In 2017, after having witnessed France's

Energy Observer (purely-powered by hydrogen) Panama initiated, and has since accelerated, its

own hydrogen plant project.[66] Since Japan also imports green hydrogen, Panama should

---

[64]   Kendra Pierre-Louis, "Warming Waters, Moving Fish: How Climate Change Is Reshaping Iceland."
[65]   Pierre-Louis, "Warming Waters"
[66]   Maxim Rebolledo, "Panama as a Green Hydrogen Hub and the Role of the Canal," *El Faro* (blog), May 2,
2021, https://elfarodelcanal.com/en/panama-as-a-green-hydrogen-hub-and-the-role-of-the-canal/.

collaborate with its Pacific ally to convert large vessels to hydrogen. Thereafter, Panama can provide economic incentives, such as discounts or special trade privileges in the Panama Canal to Japan. Giving Japan an advantage will convince the Chinese and American governments—notorious for their carbon emissions—to curtail CO_2 levels, set higher environmental standards, and join Panama in the effort to improve the Canal's environment. Therefore, this small state would punch above its weight by creating normative competition between larger states, thereby contributing to the Panamanian economy and social well-being.

Bibliography

Associated Press. "A Year after the President's Assassination, Haitians Endure a Broken
    Nation or Flee." *NPR*, July 7, 2022.
    https://www.npr.org/2022/07/07/1110257719/haiti-assassination-president-jovenel-mois
    e-anniversary-gangs-refugees.

BBC News. "Panama Canal Grapples with Climate Change Threat." *BBC News*, August 9,
    2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-62407514.

Björkdahl, Annika. "Ideas and Norms in Swedish Peace Policy." *Swiss Political Science
    Review* 19, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 322–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12046.

Boutellis, Arthur. "What Army for Haiti?" International Peace Institute, 2011. JSTOR.
    http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09486.

Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Canal Zone." Encyclopedia Britannica, May 1,
    2020. https://www.britannica.com/place/Canal-Zone.

———. "Invasion of Panama." Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed December 5, 2022.
    https://www.britannica.com/place/Panama/Invasion-of-Panama#ref672336.

Bureau of Transportation Statistics. "Table 1-10 Top 25 Countries Using the Panama Canal
    by Origin and Destination of Cargo, FY2007 (Long Tons)." United States Department
    of Transportation, November 30, 2011.
    https://www.bts.gov/archive/publications/maritime_trade_and_transportation/2007/tabl
    e_01_10.

Burillo, Yasiel. "Panama Leading By Example On Climate Change." *The Diplomatist*,
    December 14, 2021.
    https://diplomatist.com/2021/12/14/panama-leading-by-example-on-climate-change/.

Casares, Andres Martinez, and Joseph Guyler Delva. "Haitian Army Set to Make
    Controversial Return after Two Decades." *Reuters*, November 18, 2017.
    https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-military/haitian-army-set-to-make-controversia
    l-return-after-two-decades-idUSKBN1DJ01M.

Castelfranco, Sabina. "Pope Heads to Panama to Celebrate World Youth Day." *VOA*,
    January 22, 2019.

https://www.voanews.com/a/pope-heads-to-panama-to-celebrate-world-youth-day/4753755.html.

Caumartin, Corinne. "'Depoliticisation' in the Reform of the Panamanian Security Apparatus." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 39, no. 1 (2007): 107–32. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X06002057.

CIA, "Panama." In *The World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency, December 13, 2022. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/panama/.

Coto, Danica. "Haiti Gang Makes Demands in Test of Power with Government." AP News, October 14, 2022. https://apnews.com/article/caribbean-united-nations-haiti-puerto-rico-gangs-9d6257f66d724c0a5578ad41d3597b82.

Durch, William J., and Michelle Ker. "Broadening the Base of Police-Contributing Countries." Police in UN Peacekeeping: Improving Selection, Recruitment, and Deployment. International Peace Institute, 2013. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09594.11.

Flores, Rosa. "Could World Youth Day in Panama Give the Pope a Boost?" *CNN*, January 22, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/22/world/pope-panama-preview.

Freedom House. "Panama: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report," 2021. https://freedomhouse.org/country/panama/freedom-world/2021.

International Crisis Group. "Haiti: A Path to Stability for a Nation in Shock." International Crisis Group, 2021. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep36471.

———. "Haiti: Security and the Reintegration of the State." International Crisis Group, 2006. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep43783.

———. "Keeping Haiti Safe: Police Reform." International Crisis Group, 2011. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/stable/resrep36780.

Jayamaha, Dilshika, Scott Brady, Ben Fitzgerald, and Jason Fritz. "Introduction." Lessons Learned From U.S. Government Law Enforcement in International Operations. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2010. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/stable/resrep12125.5.

Johnston, Jake. "Meet the New Haitian Military ? It's Starting to Look a Lot Like the Old One." *Center for Economic and Policy Research* (blog), March 16, 2018.

https://www.cepr.net/meet-the-new-haitian-military-it-s-starting-to-look-a-lot-like-the-old-one/.

Meditz, Sandra W., Dennis Michael Hanratty, and Library of Congress. "Panama: A Country Study." Image. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540 USA, 1989. https://www.loc.gov/item/88600486/.

Metz, Helen Chapin and Library of Congress. "Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies." Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540 USA, 2001. https://www.loc.gov/item/2001023524/.

Miller, Kahuina, and Tetsuro Hyodo. "Impact of the Panama Canal Expansion on Latin American and Caribbean Ports: Difference in Difference (DID) Method." *Journal of Shipping and Trade* 6, no. 8 (July 8, 2021). https://doi.org/10.1186/s41072-021-00091-5.

Office of the Historian. "Milestones: 1977–1980." U.S. Department of State, 2022. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/panama-canal.

Peralta, Eyder. "Reporter's Notebook: Haiti's at a Breaking Point but Few Want Foreign Intervention." *NPR*, November 4, 2022, sec. World. https://www.npr.org/2022/11/04/1131254613/haiti-sanctions-foreign-intervention-protests-gangs-cholera.

Perito, Robert M. "U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations." United States Institute of Peace, August 1, 2007. https://www.usip.org/publications/2007/08/us-police-peace-and-stability-operations.

Pierre-Louis, Kendra. "Warming Waters, Moving Fish: How Climate Change Is Reshaping Iceland." *The New York Times*, November 29, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/29/climate/climate-change-ocean-fish-iceland.html.

Rebolledo, Maxim. "Panama as a Green Hydrogen Hub and the Role of the Canal." El Faro, May 2, 2021. https://elfarodelcanal.com/en/panama-as-a-green-hydrogen-hub-and-the-role-of-the-canal/.

Reuters. "Explainer: What's Driving Haiti's Humanitarian Crisis?" *Reuters*, October 19, 2022, sec. Americas.

https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/whats-driving-haitis-humanitarian-crisis-2022-10-18/.

Robert and Elizabeth Dole Archive and Special Collections. "History Day - Panama Canal." Kansas University, April 17, 2013. https://dolearchives.ku.edu/hdtopics_panama.

Shultz, Richard H. *In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala: Air University Press, 1993.

St. John the Baptist Parish. "World Youth Day 2019 Panama Pilgrim Packet," Diocese of Sacramento, 2019. https://www.scd.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/WYD%20Panama%20Packet_0.pdf.

Stockman, Farah. "Opinion | Did a Coup Attempt Really Happen Two Weeks Ago in Haiti?" *The New York Times*, February 23, 2021, sec. Opinion. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/23/opinion/haiti-coup-jovenel-moise.html.

Swanson, Ryan. "Country Profile: Haiti." Pdf. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540 USA, May 9, 2006. https://www.loc.gov/item/copr/7297105/.

Sylvia, Ronald D., and Constantine Danopoulos. "Civil-Military Relations in a Civilianized State: Panama." *Journal of Political & Military Sociology* 33, no. 1 (2005): 81–96.

U.S. Department of State. "2015 Summit of the Americas," 2015. https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/wha/rt/soa/2015/index.htm.

U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of Commercial Fisheries. "Japanese Fisheries Based in Overseas Areas." United States Department of the Interior, May 1959. https://spo.nmfs.noaa.gov/sites/default/files/legacy-pdfs/leaflet485.pdf.

Vollabaek, Knut. "Ambassador Knut Vollabaek on Norway's Role as Peacemaker." Presented at the INAF 360 Middle Power Perspectives on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Georgetown University, September 20, 2006.

Wamsley, Laurel. "Even Before Jovenel Moïse's Assassination, Haiti Was In Crisis." *NPR*, July 7, 2021, sec. Politics. https://www.npr.org/2021/07/07/1013879000/even-before-jovenel-moises-assassination-haiti-was-in-crisis.

Zea, Mary Triny, and Michelle Carrere. "Panama: A 'Flag of Convenience' for Illegal
    Fishing and Lack of Control at Sea." *Mongabay*, October 13, 2022.
    https://news.mongabay.com/2022/10/panama-a-flag-of-convenience-for-illegal-fishing-
    and-lack-of-control-at-sea/.

CUBA

Brennan Young and Colin McLaughlin

CUBA'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON PEACEMAKING

In general, Cuba does not have a strong history of peacemaking. Throughout the 20th century, it consistently supported foreign revolutions that sought to overthrow existing political structures and replace them with Communist governments. Despite their facilitation of these guerilla groups, Cuba did not limit its foreign interventionism to violent causes, often sending its military forces and other personnel abroad to aid in health care and disaster relief programs. Further, Cuban interventionist policies constantly changed throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries, as Cuban foreign policy responded to outside events and influences in tandem with the evolving interests of the island nation.

Although Cuba has rarely engaged in traditional peacemaking activity in its history, their later forms of nonviolent interventionism and limited success in traditional peacemaking have the potential to aid in future conflicts surrounding our modern climate crisis.

Potential Obstacles to Peacemaking: Cuban Interventionism in the 20th Century

       The rationale behind Cuban interventionism as a foreign policy strategy stemmed from

two factors linked with the island nation's history and revolutionary thought: the United States'

long-term influence over the island and Cuban internationalism developed by Che Guevara and

executed by Fidel Castro. Even before Castro's 26th of July Movement, the looming presence of

the Americans dominated much of Cuba's modern history and shaped their approach to foreign

policy. For the newly formed government under Castro, this American pressure existed through

its military force, leading to the development of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces

(*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias*; FAR).[1] FAR's development coincided with Guevara's

internationalism that combined aspects of Marxist-Leninist ideology with a "Hispanic kind" of

internationalism focused on the independence struggle of Spain's former American colonies.[2]

With the development of both Cuba's institutions and the ideology, Guevara and FAR began to

intervene in the Caribbean, training and sending forces to fight on behalf of leftist guerilla

movements in a number of countries.[3] The genesis of Cuban intervention can further be

attributed to the Americans increasingly isolating Cuba on the international stage; their response

to the Cuban effort to distance themselves from American hegemony.[4] Granted, the Americans

did initially try to cooperate with Cuba; however, Castro's actions and the shift of the Cuban

government to favor the Soviets led to the gradual deterioration of the U.S.-Cuban relationship.[5]

Due to this American-imposed isolation, aiding rebel groups not only served to fulfill Guevara's

---

[1] Philip Brenner, Marguerite Rose Jiménez, John M. Kirk, William M. Leogrande, *A Contemporary Cuba Reader: The Revolution under Raúl Castro*, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 2015), 215.
[2] Edward George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991*, (New York: Frank Cass 2005), 17.
[3] Ibid., 17-18.
[4] Catherine Krull, ed. *Cuba in a Global Context*, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida 2014), 46
[5] Jorge I. Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1989), 16-24.

ideological dreams, but also met Castro's relative pragmatism by creating potentially friendly

governments in close proximity to the island nation. Cuba did not spark any of the conflicts it

eventually supported; rather, the island nation offered aid and training to guerilla fighters or

military assistance to already established governments that needed aid.[6]

The majority of Cuban intervention efforts initially centered around foreign conflicts in

Latin and South America to alleviate their U.S.-imposed isolation. In 1959, Cuba had already

engaged "in attempts to overthrow the governments of Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican

Republic, and Haiti."[7] Their commitment to interventionism and conflict with the interest of the

U.S. would become fully codified in 1960 with the Declaration of Havana. The Declaration

directly responded to the Declaration of San José, a document issued by the signatories of the

Rio Treaty (the U.S. and a large number of Latin American, South American, and Caribbean

nations) that opposed inter-state interventionism in the Americas.[8] The Havana Declaration

condemned such "North American imperialism," criticized Latin American governments that

accepted the Americans' "historically irrefutable intervention," and proclaimed Cuba's

internationalist and Bolivarist ideals.[9]

The Cubans would seek to act on the ideals expressed in the Declaration of Havana

through the continuation of training, sheltering, and providing other forms of aid to foreign leftist

movements. Cuban intervention in such foreign revolutions generally followed a set pattern that

attempted to improve Cuba's international standing. To this end, the Cubans would refuse aid to

revolutionaries in countries with friendly governments to them or the USSR.[10] This practice,

alongside other rules, would define Cuban revolutionary support. These other rules would

---

[6] Ibid., 2.
[7] Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution*, 26.
[8] Ibid., 27.
[9] The National General Assembly of Cuba, *The First Declaration of Havana*, September 2, 1960,
http://www.walterlippmann.com/fc-09-02-1960.html.
[10] Domínguez, 117.

include the following: Cuba must follow Cuban internationalist guidelines (essentially the Declaration of Havana), leave the support of revolutions "subordinate" to the "higher value" of the survival of the Cuban state, use support for revolutionaries as a means of bargaining with foreign states, and not support "revolutionary movements that do not defer to Cuba."[11] These rules arguably kept Cuba from becoming war mongers as, at least under Castro's vision, the needs of the revolution fell well after the needs of the state. It must be noted that Cuba, especially during the 1960s, did not always follow these rules in its foreign policy. Thus, their relationships with other Latin American governments especially suffered during the decade due to their support of rebel groups in their neighbors.[12] Cuba's rules for intervention would later evolve out of these mistakes, representing a pattern of development in Cuban foreign policy and internationalism in the 20th century.

With these rules and context surrounding them in mind, how did the Cuban government actually support these revolutionary movements? Although the level of assistance varied from revolution to revolution, the type of aid remained relatively the same. To its affiliated revolutionary movements and states, the Cubans provided physical aid (food, medical supplies, arms), personnel (guerilla fighters, medical experts), shelter, and training. Shelter and training on Cuban soil generally remained exclusive to Latin American revolutionaries due to their proximity and familiarity with Cuba's revolution.[13] Other aid, although initially limited to Latin America, eventually spread to other revolutionary groups in other regions. Guevara would represent this form of Cuban internationalism on the international stage, connecting to Communist movements and states in Latin America, North Africa, and Asia. [14]

---

[11] Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution,* 116, 117-118, 120, 124.
[12] Ibid., 28.
[13] George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola,* 18.
[14] Ibid., 19.

Outside of its support of leftist militant groups, the RAF engaged in interventionism on the behalf of its fellow Marxist ally states, notably in Angola beginning in 1975. Unlike other Cuban efforts, this intervention came in support of an already established leftist Angolan government instead of a revolutionary force. Through Guevara, Cubans had previously aligned themselves and supported the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (*Movimento Popular para a Liberção de Angola*, MPLA) in their fight against their Portuguese colonizers. The Cuban government had previously sent instructors and guerillas to Angola for a two-year mission that supported the MPLA and other leftist movements in Africa. [15] In 1975, the Cubans directly responded to the occupation of Angola by anti-Communist South African troops after the establishment of a failed transitional government.[16] Although Cuba would involve itself into two other conflicts after the Angolan intervention, both conflicts came on the behalf of already existing governments, breaking the pattern of revolutionary interventionism.

The closing line of the Declaration of Havana, "*Patria* or Death," exemplified the revolutionary ideology behind Cuban internationalism in the early 1960s; however, such ideology would continuously face challenges over the remainder of the century until it became nearly unrecognizable from Castro and Guevara's initial vision. Cuba's foreign policy would drastically change both in its goals and means over the 20th century, with major events such as Guevara's death, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the transition of power from Fidel to Raúl all playing a major role. With the death of Guevara, much of Cuban support for foreign revolutions ceased, although it would not end completely.[17] Before his death, Cuban interventionist activity had already begun to irk the Soviets and their "delicate modus operandi" in Latin America.[18]

---

[15] George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola,* 28, 32.
[16] Ibid., 62-63
[17] Krull, ed. *Cuba in a Global Context,* 48.
[18] George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola,* 41.

They would express such displeasure in the form of an oil embargo, which eventually brought the Cubans in line. This caused the rules of Cuban foreign intervention to change drastically to fit the needs of the USSR; however, Cuban internationalism still retained some of its unique characteristics. Cuban leaders would continue to disagree with other Communist leaders "on the issue of support for revolutionary movements" and remain engaged in foreign revolutions, just not to the same extent as before.[19]

---

[19] Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution,* 121.

CUBA AS A REGIONAL PEACEMAKER:

Colombian-FARC Conflict

Cuba's involvement with the 2012 Colombian-FARC Peace Talks reconciles Cuba's revolutionary past with its modern brand of internationalism. Its success in cooperating with both the parties in conflict and other peacemakers should further be noted. However, the questionable success of the peace process and Cuba's role in such failures requires further examination.

The conflict between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*; FARC) stretches back to the founding of the Colombian Commuinist Party (*Partido Comunista Colombiano*, PCC) and its mobilization of "peasant leaders in rural regions" in the early years of its history.[20] This mobilization eventually led to *la Violencia,* when groups connected to the Colombian government and supported by the United States committed counter-violence and political attacks against such leaders, their communities, and the PCC.[21] FARC, officially founded on May 27, 1964, emerged from "self-defense" efforts that, at least initially, sought to provide security for Communist communities in rural Colombia.[22]

Although FARC arguably never deviated from its original goal of self-defense and preservation of its communities, it did engage in outwardly aggressive activity in opposition to the Colombian government and its allies. This includes kidnapping, extortion, drug trafficking, and other acts of terror that the group committed not directly in self defense.[23] They took such

---

[20] Jorge P. Osterling, *Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfar*e. (Oxford: Routledge 1989), 83.
[21] James J. Brittain, *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia : The Origin and Direction of the FARC-EP*, (London: Pluto Press, 2009), 6-7.
[22] Ibid., 8.
[23] Claire Klobucista and Danielle Renwick, "Colombia's Civil Conflict," Council on Foreign Relations, January 11, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/colombias-civil-conflict.

actions against prospective and current government officials while also engaging in the torture and murder of civilians.[24] The Colombian government would further add to the violence as the century passed, as they would fire upon civilians from the air and falsely abduct and torture civilians thought to be part of FARC.[25] Over the decades, the conflict has spread across Colombia, with the Colombian government placing the number of conflict victims at 9,379,858 (includes the deceased, displaced, injured, and otherwise affected by the conflict).[26] It cannot be forgotten that Cuba helped to train and support FARC during its years of conflict with the Colombian state. Cuba contributed to FARC and other Colombian Marxist-Leninist organizations through aiding, sheltering, and training their guerilla fighters. In the modern day, many conservative members of the Colombian government still view Castro as a warmonger that promoted "the country's suffering."[27]

The peace process between FARC and the Colombian government began well before the peace talks hosted in Havana in 2012. Before these talks, FARC and Colombia continually failed to reach any sort of lasting agreement. They came somewhat close in 1998, with peace talks supported by the United States and United Nations, although those would fail due to a variety of issues.[28] The UN first stepped in as a neutral party in 1997, pushing members of both sides to sign the Quirama Declaration, a document that codified the intent to conduct peace talks. Neither FARC nor the Colombian government under President Ernesto Samper had expressed concrete

---

[24] Farah, "Colombian Guerrillas Lone Survivors"

[25] Douglas Farah, "Colombian Guerrillas Lone Survivors of Cuba-Inspired Leftist Movements," The Washington Post, January 4, 1992, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/01/04/colombian-guerrillas-lone-survivors-of-cuba-inspired-leftist-movements/942f8460-ad5e-4a84-be98-7b8f61d13135/.

[26] "Registro Único De Víctimas (RUV)," Unidad para las Víctimas, June 13, 2020, https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/en/node/37394.

[27] John Otis, "Cuba's Dictator Was Colombia's Peacemaker: How Castro Helped End Conflict with FARC," CBCnews, December 2, 2016, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/castro-cuba-farc-colombia-peace-1.3878489.

[28] Nazih Richani, "Third Parties, War Systems' Inertia, and Conflict Termination: The Doomed Peace Process in Colombia, 1998-2002," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 25, no. 2, 75-103, 78.

interest in peace prior to this meeting, but they signed the Declaration regardless.[29] The 1998

peace process falls outside the scope of the paper; however, an understanding of the failures of

the series of talks can shine light on the successes Cuba and the other nations involved in the

2012 peace process achieved. Some of the failures, such as a general lack of direction, did not

fall on the third parties.[30] The UN intervention failed due to this lack of direction and a general

lack of interest from both sides. Further, the UN presence potentially invigorated an increasingly

stagnant conflict, as the intensity of fighting rose in the years after the peace talks.[31] Due to their

monetary and diplomatic support of the Colombian government, the "biased" U.S. intervention

in 1999 would further doom the process.[32]

The Cubans would prove instrumental in the peace process between the Colombian

government and FARC that began with secret talks in 2012 and concluded – at least initially –

with a peace agreement between the two sides. Fidel Castro would especially push for peace in

the period after the 1998 talks and offered, alongside his brother Raúl, the island as a host for the

preliminary conversations between the two sides.[33] Although the two parties would agree to

initialize formal peace talks in Oslo later that year, the Norwegians did not host the entirety of

the talks, as both sides had agreed that the majority of the proceedings would occur in Havana.[34]

Of the third parties that played a role in the talks, Norway and Cuba acted as "guarantors" of the

process, while Chile and Venezuela would "accompany" the conflicting and third parties.[35]

---

[29] Ibid., 79.
[30] Richani, "Third Parties," 81.
[31] Ibid., 83
[32] Ibid., 84.
[33] Otis, "Cuba's Dictator Was Colombia's Peacemaker."
[34] Ibid., 17
[35] "General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace," opened for signature Aug 26, 2012, published in *Columbia: Peace at Last?* Latin America Report (International Crisis Group), Number 45, September 25, 2012, 2.

The Cubans would serve in their role exceptionally, as it provided a stable environment for "closed door talks" between the two sides removed from the violence still occurring throughout Colombia.[36] The success of the Cubans in the facilitation of this process brought another Colombian insurgent group, the Nationalist Liberation Army (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*, ELN), to preliminary talks with the Colombian government (the role of the Cubans in this process is unknown).[37] Outside of hosting the talks, the Cubans further worked alongside the Norwegians to smooth over Colombian domestic issues. Most notably, mediators from the two nations negotiated the release of a Colombian brigadier general, corporal, a civilian, and other FARC prisoners in 2014.[38] The peace talks would continue with the Cubans hosting and managing the process alongside the Norwegians, culminating in the *Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace* in 2016.

Keeping the timeline of the peace process in mind, why did this effort by the two sides succeed when every previous attempt had not? Unlike the 1998-2002 peace talks, FARC and the Colombians expressed mutual interest in achieving peace before initiating talks. Further, each group expressed their interests and necessary talking points before engaging in any substantive peace discussion. These points included addressing poverty in the countryside, allowing FARC political participation, combating the illicit drug trade, providing justice for victims of the conflict, ending the conflict itself, and implementing all reforms agreed upon during the talks.[39] The Cuban involvement in the formation of these talking points remains somewhat unclear, but their lack of biased support allowed the conflicting sides to stick to their issues and eventually come to a resolution. An argument exists for Cuba as a biased actor similar to the U.S. due to its

[36] June S Beittel, "Peace Talks in Colombia," CRS Report (Congressional Research Service, March 31, 2015), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42982.pdf, ii.
[37] Ibid., 24.
[38] Ibid., 25
[39] "Colombia's 2012 - 2016 Peace Talks: Fact Sheet," Colombia News | Colombia Reports, September 25, 2016, https://colombiareports.com/amp/colombia-peace-talks-fact-sheet/.

previous support of FARC; however, unlike the U.S., Cuba had established a relationship with

both parties prior to the peace talks, even signing agreements with the Colombian government to

help counteract some of FARC's later illicit activities.[40] Cuba further displayed its neutrality

throughout the process through its joint mediation with Norway, especially in aforementioned

times of crises.

Although FARC and the Colombian government would reach the aforementioned

agreement in 2016, the implementation of that agreement would face numerous difficulties. Part

of this failure lies on the Colombian government, who have underspent the necessary funds for

the implementation significantly. As of November 2021, 29% of the way through the

implementation, the Colombian government has only spent 15% of the funds estimated

necessary by a 2017 Implementation Framework Plan.[41] This lack of effort on the part of the

government has potentially delayed the peace process by nearly 10 years, at least in terms of

spending alone.[42] The government has also fallen behind on spending for many of the reforms

promised in the agreement, namely territorial and rural development. Although FARC officially

disbanded in 2017, many armed guerilla groups remain, including the ELN and FARC dissident

groups, which have contributed to a rising homicide rate and committed murders of "social

leaders and human rights defenders."[43] Outside events, such as the global pandemic and

continued U.S. intervention have affected the implementation of the peace agreement; however,

the Colombian government and FARC still share some of the responsibility.[44]

---

[40] "Cuba," Minsterio de Relacions Exteriores (Gov.Co), accessed December 13, 2022,
https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/en/cuba.
[41] Adam Isacson, "A Long Way to Go: Implementing Colombia's Peace Accord after Five Years," WOLA,
November 23, 2021,
https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/pdf_211123_web_colombia_5_years.pages.pdf, 6.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid., 20-21
[44] Ibid., 62-64.

Cuba's role in this poor implementation has also been somewhat mixed. Although it has committed to supporting a new peace process alongside the Norwegians, the Americans have designated it as a state sponsor of terrorism due to their refusal "to extradite ten ELN leaders living in Havana" after a 2019 ELN bombing.[45] Does this American designation mean that Cuba has fully returned to its Guevarist routes? Not necessarily, as Cuba has continuously reengaged in the peace process with the Colombians and ELN, planning to conduct talks between the two nations, alongside Venezuela, in the upcoming year.[46]

At first glance, Cuba's history as a facilitator of leftist revolutionary activity limits its potential as a contemporary peacemaker. Its involvement in foreign revolutions only created conflict, indirectly taking thousands of lives and shaping the histories of those countries. To an extent, Cuba's future as a potential peacemaker remains hampered by its past involvement in such revolutions. Further, the mixed success of the FARC-Colombia peace talks puts even Cuba's successes into question. Despite these misgivings, Cuba has spent much of the late 20th and early 21st centuries reconciling with its past by joining international institutions and, to an extent, promoting peace in nations where it originally supported armed conflicts. Cuba's activity throughout the Colombian peace talks both demonstrate their effectiveness as a potential peacemaker while cautioning against placing too much responsibility on their shoulders. One peace process with varying degrees of success does not immediately turn Cuba into the next Norway; however, it represents a possibility for Cuba to act in a specific peacekeeping niche in the future.

---

[45] U.S. Embassy Havana, "U.S. Announces Designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism," U.S. Embassy in Cuba, December 8, 2021,
https://cu.usembassy.gov/u-s-announces-designation-of-cuba-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism/.
[46] AP, "Colombia to Restart Peace Talks with the Country's Largest Active Guerrilla Group," The Guardian, October 4, 2022,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/04/colombia-to-restart-peace-talks-with-the-countrys-largest-active-guerrilla-group.

CUBA AS A GLOBAL PEACEMAKER:

Cuba's main role in ameliorating the effects of global climate change is just as unorthodox as its peacemaking capacity. As mentioned before, Cuba's current foreign policy is leaving the realm of interventionism, and is moving more towards internationalism. During the current climate crisis this emphasis is of even more importance, as issues become increasingly global. One of the many impacts of climate change is its role in facilitating disease. The World Health Organization (WHO) states that not only are extreme weather events becoming more frequent, so too are increases in zoonoses - diseases that are transmitted from animals to humans- and food, water and vector borne diseases.[47] These two factors put immense pressure on already fragile social safety nets, as livelihoods can be lost to climate issues, leading to little money left to help keep people healthy, which can lead to increased feedback loops that result in greater poverty, especially in low and middle income countries (LMICs), of which many are located in the global south.[48] In an increasingly globalized world, even the smallest outbreak or food chain disruption in one country can have devastating effects on global supply chains, and the health of billions, further raising the stakes of the health of rural and agricultural communities in disproportionately undercovered regions.[49] While there is little that Cuba can do directly about the extreme weather events, and there other nations that specialize in foreign aid to alleviate poverty, Cuba's niche is helping to strengthen those local safety nets by creating healthier individuals and training better physicians, as international assistance in increasing the capacity of

---

[47] "Climate Change and Health." https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health
[48] "Climate Change and Health."
[49] Guest, Greg, ed. Globalization, Health, and the Environment: An Integrated Perspective. Globalization and the Environment 5 (2005): 162.

LMICs to stop the spread of emerging diseases quicker benefits both the host country, and the broader international community.[50][51]

This niche ties perfectly into Cuba's natural theories on social wellbeing. The philosopher José Martí is one of the Cuban government's favorite inspirations for social programs. Martí was an early supporter of an independent Cuba and pushed for Latin American unity through two main philosophies: a respect for nature, and a pushback against imperialism of any kind.[52] While the latter is apparent through interventionist policies taken by the Cuban government, the former is more complex, and also required for the latter. José Martí believed that an individual needed control over basic needs, such as education, health, and resources, in order to participate in society, and participation in society was also a prerequisite for the solidarity required to defeat imperialism.[53] Health as a concept is not simply just being able to function throughout a day, but instead an ideal state of being, with the body operating at its peak performance. After all, Martí believed that, "True medicine is not the one that cures, but the one that prevents".[54] This belief in a strong safety net ties in strongly with Cuba's both internal and external policies.

Guevara's death served as a symbolic end to the support of Cuban foreign revolutionary groups. Although the practice would continue, the Cuban government with Castro at its helm would focus more on reestablishing good relations with its neighbors while balancing the Soviet relationship. Despite this change in policy, internationalist pursuits similar in ideology, but not in methodology would continue to shape Cuban foreign policy towards the modern day. This less

[50] Wright, Caradee Yael, et al "A Transdisciplinary Approach to Address Climate Change Adaptation for Human Health and Well-Being in Africa." (2021): 4258.
[51] "Neglected Tropical Diseases: PAHO Calls for an End to Delays in Treatment in the Americas - PAHO/WHO | Pan American Health Organization." (2022)
[52] Huish, Robert. Where No Doctor Has Gone before: Cuba's Place in the Global Health Landscape (2013): 34
[53] Huish, Where No Doctor (2013): 34.
[54] Hernández González, O., & Zaragoza Viera, I. La medicina hecha palabras: Medicine made into words: Comments on the Cuban apostle José Martí (2020): 993–994.

violent internationalism did exist during the early days of the Cuban state, but became much more prominent as the century progressed.

Due to Cuba's unique, isolated position on the global stage, its development of a strong health care system was borne out of a necessity, but Cuba's commitment to healthcare goes far beyond that. Despite only beginning its medical internationalism policies following a Chilean earthquake in the 1960s, Cuba has historical ties to medicine dating back to the foundation of the University of Havana, one of the oldest institutions in the western hemisphere. The Cuban ethos of practicing medicine for the benefit of society culminated in the pre-revolution 1950s, where Cuba held the highest doctor per capita ratio, peaking at around 1000 patients per physician in 1958.[55] Additionally, in the capital of Havana, there were even community forms of socialized medicare that assisted the poor, but these were not common outside of the capital.[56]

The revolution would derive social policies from this egalitarian ethos. Despite the argument that these policies were exaggerated for popular legitimacy, the Cuba of the post-revolution was in a similar state to that which had radicalized revolutionaries across Latin America.[57] As such, initial Cuban policies emphasized on aiding Cubans first. While several thousand physicians did leave for the west during this time, the few hundred physicians that stayed soon grew back into the thousands as Castro re-opened the school that had been closed by Batista before the revolution.[58][59] These local physicians largely volunteered their abilities for rural clinics designed to provide targeted primary care on a regional basis through an emphasis on women and natal issues, children, and adults.[60] Through these efforts, infant mortality rates fell, polio and tuberculosis were eradicated in the 1970s, and *policlinicos*, or speciality clinics,

---

[55] Huish, Where No Doctor (2013): 36.
[56] Ibid: 36.
[57] Ibid
[58] Ibid: 37.
[59] Fitz, Don. "Cuba's First Military Doctors." (2018) 46–62.
[60] Huish, Where No Doctor (2013): 38.

soon spread throughout the island to ensure equal care per region.[61] While these systems had

their shortcomings, by the 1980s more Cubans were suffering from chronic and degenerative

diseases than poverty related ills, cementing the overall success of emphasizing primary care for

the overall health of the nation, which are policies still continued to this day.[62] Today, Cuba

preserves their emphasis on primary care, however they have expanded their biotechnological

and pharmaceutical industries, finding ways to innovate both backwards and forwards in

developing drugs that both exist in the embargoed west, and that do not yet exist.[63]

     During the cold war, medical internationalism was attempted by the Cubans. In the

earliest days of the post-revolution, medical doctors accompanied Cuban soldiers on

interventionist policies into Zaire.[64] While these doctors were primarily focused on the needs of

the soldiers, they were also able to provide primary care to the local people, sometimes going on

long walks into the countryside where they would be greeted with hopeful peasants.[65] Here, an

emphasis on simple, primary procedures, such as tooth extractions, operations for hernias and

cataracts, and treatments for high fever, diarrhea, confusion, stomachaches, and shoulder pain,

helped to engender themselves with the local population.[66] These doctors were treated as de facto

ambassadors of Cuba, and were sent in small numbers throughout Africa to nations such as

Algeria, Tanzania and Guinea-Bissau during the height of the Cold War.[67] Cuba didn't just export

its healthcare, it also began to provide medical treatments and training for its aligned nations

during this period as well. One notable example is the reception and treatment for thousands of

Ukrainians following the Chernobyl incident in Cuba.[68]

---

[61] Ibid: 38.
[62] Ibid: 40.
[63] Ibid: 10.
[64] Fitz, "Cuba's First Military Doctors." (2018) 46–62.
[65] Ibid: 46–62.
[66] Ibid: 46–62.
[67] Ibid: 46–62.
[68] "Cuba Sola Atendió Más Niños de Chernóbil Que Todo El Mundo," (2018).

The fall of the Soviet Union, Cuba's benefactor during the Cold War, ironically accelerated the process of Cuba's medical internationalism. Despite the essential collapse of the Cuban economy, it reoriented the focus of the Castro regime away from the military, and towards the social programs that could not have their budgets cut during the economic downturn of the 1990s. Additionally, by the government focusing on maintaining its preventative healthcare policies, less reactionary funds had to be spent on healthcare during a healthcare crisis due to a lack of nutrition and other goods, which did help to alleviate the crisis.[69] However, the most notable international success story from the crisis was the creation of the *Escuela Latinoamericana de Ciencias Médicas*, or Latin American Medical School (ELAM). Instead of dismantling a military institute, the government took to creating a school to accept foreigners, and to fully integrate building up other nations' medical facilities. The school primarily accepts students from the global south, regions with typically high inequalities when it comes to medical availability, and the school has ramped up its availability following devastating hurricanes in the Caribbean.[70]

While there have been complaints about the low wages sought by graduates from ELAM, or Cuban doctors in general flooding established medical hierarchies in new countries, generally their presence has been seen as a net positive.[71][72] Additionally, Cuban doctors enter countries under three conditions.[73] First, that the country accepts collaborators in comprehensive general medicine who stay for two-year periods and then are replaced by volunteers. Secondly, the Cubans will begin to develop a more robust healthcare infrastructure at the local level, including enrollment of host country citizens at the ELAM. Finally, Cuban medical teams will avoid

---

[69] Huish, Where No Doctor (2013): 46.
[70] "Cuba's Piece in the Global Health Workforce Puzzle." (2007): 44.
[71] Alves, Lise. "Cuba's Doctors-Abroad Programme Comes under Fire." (2019).
[72] Brouwer, Steve. Revolutionary Doctors: How Venezuela and Cuba Are Changing the World's Conception of Health Care. (2011): 27.
[73] Brouwer, Revolutionary Doctors (2011): 27.

interfering with medical practices of local doctors, instead seeking the rural areas. This plan has worked incredibly well in locations such as Timor Leste, where Cuban medical teams entered a country devastated by war, only fielding a physician to patient ratio of 1:28,571 in 1999.[74] By 2010 that ratio increased to 1.3:1000, still short of the WHO's recommendation of 2.3:1000 patients, but a marked increase.[75]

Cuba therefore has been in a position to aid global initiatives, such as the One Health initiative, which seeks to investigate further the direct and indirect linkages of climate change with natural, biological, and other human-induced hazards.[76] By directly building healthcare infrastructure in regions that have previously been passed over historically, Cuba is helping to create stronger environmental resilience towards the diseases of the future, while also fulfilling its ideological needs to help bring more people into society and to raise the standard of living throughout the global south and in LMICs.

Conclusion

Cuba's international identity has been strongly molded by the Cold War and the ideological struggle that brought Fidel Castro to power, linking domestic struggles with the plight of millions worldwide. While Cuba has had to tone down its revolutionary impulses in the decades following independence, and especially following the end of the Cold War, its pursuit of peacemaking in Latin America shows a willingness to break from its old habits and to further integrate itself into the global community. Coincidentally, one of those tools of ingratiating itself with the global community - medical support and training - also puts Cuba on the front lines in

---

[74] Huish, Where No Doctor (2013): 83.
[75] Asante, Augustine D, et al. "Retaining Doctors in Rural Timor-Leste: A Critical Appraisal of the Opportunities and Challenges." (2014): 277–82.
[76] Zhang, Renhe, et al. "From Concept to Action: A United, Holistic and One Health Approach to Respond to the Climate Change Crisis." (2022): 17.

combating the rise in diseases due to climate change. Though overcoming an aggressive past,

Cuba's future lies in new approaches to its north star of assisting the common person.

Bibliography

Albornoz, Sara Carrillo de. "On a Mission: How Cuba Uses Its Doctors Abroad." *BMJ* 333, no.
      7566 (September 2, 2006): 464.1. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.333.7566.464.

Alves, Lise. "Cuba's Doctors-Abroad Programme Comes under Fire." *The Lancet* 394, no.
      10204 (September 2019): 1132. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)32214-7.

AP, "Colombia to Restart Peace Talks with the Country's Largest Active Guerrilla Group," The
      Guardian, October 4, 2022,
      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/04/colombia-to-restart-peace-talks-with-the
      -countrys-largest-active-guerrilla-group.

Asante, Augustine D, Nelson Martins, Michael E Otim, and John Dewdney. "Retaining Doctors
      in Rural Timor-Leste: A Critical Appraisal of the Opportunities and Challenges." *Bulletin
      of the World Health Organization* 92, no. 4 (April 1, 2014): 277–82.
      https://doi.org/10.2471/BLT.13.123141.

Beittel, June S. "Peace Talks in Colombia." CRS Report. Congressional Research Service,
      March 31, 2015. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42982.pdf.

Brenner, Philip, Jiménez, Marguerite Rose, Kirk, John M., Leogrande, William M., ed. *A
      Contemporary Cuba Reader: The Revolution under Raúl Castro*, (Lanham:
      Rowman & Littlefield 2015)

Brouwer, Steve. *Revolutionary Doctors: How Venezuela and Cuba Are Changing the World's
      Conception of Health Care*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2011.

"Climate Change and Health." Accessed December 5, 2022.
      https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health.

"Climate Change and Infectious Diseases | What We Do | Ncezid | Cdc," August 2, 2022.
      https://www.cdc.gov/ncezid/what-we-do/climate-change-and-infectious-diseases/index.ht
      Ml.

"Colombia's 2012 - 2016 Peace Talks: Fact Sheet." Colombia News | Colombia Reports,
      September 25, 2016. https://colombiareports.com/amp/colombia-peace-talks-fact-sheet/.

"Cuba." Minsterio de Relacions Exteriores. Gov.Co. Accessed December 13, 2022.
      https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/en/cuba.

"Cuba's Piece in the Global Health Workforce Puzzle." *MEDICC Review* 9, no. 1 (2007): 44.
      https://doi.org/10.37757/MR2007V9.N1.8.

"Cuba Sola Atendió Más Niños de Chernóbil Que Todo El Mundo," Granma.cu, April 27, 2018.

Domínguez, Jorge I., *To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1989), 16-24.

Fitz, Don. "Cuba's First Military Doctors." *Monthly Review*, November 1, 2018, 46–62. https://doi.org/10.14452/MR-070-06-2018-10_4.

George, Edward, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991*, (New York: Frank Cass 2005).

Guest, Greg, ed. *Globalization, Health, and the Environment: An Integrated Perspective*. Globalization and the Environment 5. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 2005.

Farah, Douglas. "Colombian Guerrillas Lone Survivors of Cuba-Inspired Leftist Movements." The Washington Post, January 4, 1992. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/01/04/colombian-guerrillas-lone-survivors-of-cuba-inspired-leftist-movements/942f8460-ad5e-4a84-be98-7b8f61d13135/.

"Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace," opened for signature November 24, 2016, https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/1845.

Hernández González, O., & Zaragoza Viera, I. La medicina hecha palabras: Comentarios sobre el apóstol cubano José Martí [Medicine made into words: Comments on the Cuban apostle José Martí]. Revista chilena de pediatria 91, no. 6 (2020), 993–994. https://doi.org/10.32641/rchped.vi91i6.3075

Huish, Robert. *Where No Doctor Has Gone before: Cuba's Place in the Global Health Landscape*. Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2013.

Isacson, Adam. "A Long Way to Go: Implementing Colombia's Peace Accord after Five Years." WOLA, November 23, 2021. https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/pdf_211123_web_colombia_5_years.pages.pdf.

Klobucista, Claire, and Danielle Renwick. "Colombia's Civil Conflict." Council on Foreign Relations, January 11, 2017. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/colombias-civil-conflict.

Krull, Catherine, ed. *Cuba in a Global Context*, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida 2014).

"Neglected Tropical Diseases: PAHO Calls for an End to Delays in Treatment in the Americas - PAHO/WHO | Pan American Health Organization." Accessed December 6, 2022. https://www.paho.org/en/news/28-1-2022-neglected-tropical-diseases-paho-calls-end-del

ays-treatment-americas.

Osterling, Jorge P., *Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfar*e.
(Oxford: Routledge 1989).

Otis, John. "Cuba's Dictator Was Colombia's Peacemaker: How Castro Helped End Conflict with
FARC." CBCnews, December 2, 2016.
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/castro-cuba-farc-colombia-peace-1.3878489.

"Registro Único De Víctimas (RUV)." Unidad para las Víctimas, June 13, 2020.
https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/en/node/37394.

Nazih Richani, "Third Parties, War Systems' Inertia, and Conflict Termination: The Doomed
Peace Process in Colombia, 1998-2002," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 25, no. 2, 75-103.

The National General Assembly of Cuba, *The First Declaration of Havana*, September 2,
1960, http://www.walterlippmann.com/fc-09-02-1960.html.

U.S. Embassy Havana, "U.S. Announces Designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism,"
U.S. Embassy in Cuba, December 8, 2021,
https://cu.usembassy.gov/u-s-announces-designation-of-cuba-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism/.

Wright, Caradee Yael, Candice Eleanor Moore, Matthew Chersich, Rebecca Hester, Patricia
Nayna Schwerdtle, Guy Kakumbi Mbayo, Charles Ndika Akong, and Colin D. Butler. "A
Transdisciplinary Approach to Address Climate Change Adaptation for Human Health
and Well-Being in Africa." *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public
Health* 18, no. 8 (April 17, 2021): 4258. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18084258.

Zhang, Renhe, Xu Tang, Jian Liu, Martin Visbeck, Huadong Guo, Virginia Murray, Catherine
Mcgillycuddy, et al. "From Concept to Action: A United, Holistic and One Health
Approach to Respond to the Climate Change Crisis." *Infectious Diseases of Poverty* 11,
no. 1 (December 2022): 17, s40249-022-00941–49.
https://doi.org/10.1186/s40249-022-00941-9.

SOUTH AFRICA

Cynthia Desmet Villar, Lucass Nieman, and Meghan O'Neill

SOUTH AFRICA'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON PEACEMAKING:

South Africa is a small state located in the southernmost point of the African continent, sharing a border with Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Eswatini. South Africa is known as the "rainbow nation" due to its rich cultural, linguistic, and ethnic diversity. In particular, there are 11 official languages and countless ethnic groups. Of the approximately 55.7 million South Africans, three-fourths are black Africans coming from the Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho, or Tswana groups. The remaining one-fourth come from European, South Asian, or mixed descent.[1]

South Africa's profile as a peace-maker, particularly within the African continent, is inextricably linked to its history of apartheid, its recent transition into a constitutional democracy, and its anti-imperialist outlook on international affairs

---

[1] Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "South Africa summary." Encyclopedia Britannica, April 29, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/summary/South-Africa.

South Africa's History of Apartheid: Transforming Guilt into Regional Peace-Making

While law-sanctioned racial segregation existed prior to the apartheid regime, it became further extended and formalized in 1948, when the all-white National Party won office. From 1948 until 1994, South Africa's apartheid regime implemented a series of policies to segregate, control, and dehumanize individuals based on the color of their skin. For instance, the 1950 Population Registration Act classified South Africans into four different racial categories which were utilized to define what privileges were granted to each racial group. In addition, the 1950 Group Areas Act further segregated urban zones, separating residential and business areas by race. [2] As a result, white individuals were granted access to better living conditions and economic opportunities, while non-white individuals were excluded. Other acts and laws were passed to further legalize and institutionalize the apartheid system. For instance, unequal standards of education and medical care were granted to white versus non-white individuals.

While the apartheid regime directly targeted non-white South Africans, the outright discrimination and gross human rights violations had a profound effect on not just South Africa, butthe African continent as a whole. As a result, South Africa currently feels a moral obligation to make reparations and heal the nation internally, but also to extend their peace-making abilities to the African continent. [3] This moral duty has encouraged African states to increase their demand for South African assistance as well as to generate an expectation that South Africa will remain a reliable actor with a particular focus on promoting development and economic growth in Africa. However, while South Africa has intervened in African conflicts and has supported development projects within the UN peacebuilding commission, BRICS, or IBSA, it has been unable to

---

[2] Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "apartheid." Encyclopedia Britannica, November 11, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/topic/apartheid.
[3] Cedric de Coning and Charles T. Cong. Rising powers and peacebuilding: Breaking the mold?. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, (2017): 112.

provide equally-distributed and consistent support across the continent.[4] Instead, South Africa has received criticism for placing more energy into resolving certain conflicts while pulling back support from others.[5]

South Africa's Peace-Making Framework: From "Healing" the Nation to Healing the Continent

South Africa's unique internal transition from an apartheid regime to a democratic government has directly shaped the state's peace-building approach within the African continent.

In an attempt to leave apartheid in the past and "heal" the nation's wounds, Nelson Mandela's African National Congress party established the uniquely transformative Truth and Justice Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as well as the post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP). The TRC was a series of unique public hearings that allowed victims of apartheid to share their individual stories, to be publicly heard and acknowledged, and to confront their perpetrators and demand answers. While the TRC was effective in exposing the "truth" and in having perpetrators admit to their horrific crimes, the TRC was far from perfect. Amongst some of its flaws, not all "victims" were given a space to share their stories, individuals often experienced post-traumatic stress disorder while re-telling and re-living their painful experiences, and seeing many of their perpetrators being granted full amnesty in exchange for admitting to their actions was painful for many. In addition, victims of apartheid are still awaiting psychological and monetary repatriations from the South African government. While the TRC exposed the gross human rights violations of the apartheid regime to the rest of the world, it assumed that the hearings would suddenly "heal" the nation.

---

[4] De Coning and Cong. Rising powers and peacebuilding. (2017): 112.
[5] De Coning and Cong. Rising powers and peacebuilding. (2017): 109.

The RDP was an attempt to address the deep structural consequences of the apartheid regime that were not mitigated by the TRC. In particular, the RDP aimed at alleviating poverty and ameliorating the wide-spread shortfalls in social services across the country.[6] Furthermore, the RDP was designed with a need-driven approach, combining socialist and neo-liberal elements. In this way, the RDP combined measures to boost the economy (i.e.:reducing government debt, fostering trade liberalization, and lowering taxes) with the establishment of infrastructural projects (i.e.: building roads to connect marginalized communities).[7]

Overall, the TRC was a unique dialogic space that prioritized individual storytelling as a way to expose the truth, sensitize the public, and heal the nation via healing individuals. The stories shared at the TRC shocked the nation, the continent, and the world as a whole, motivating South Africa to heal the nation and to contribute to peace-making efforts, particularly within the African continent. TheRDP was a program aimed at addressing the structural consequences and injustices generated by the apartheid regime. This program, while utilized domestically, has become South Africa's framework for peace-making interventions in Africa.

In utilizing the RDP as a peace-building framework, South Africa has undertaken four primary forms of interventions: governance, capacity-building, implementation support, and economic development.[8] As a response to the criticism of unequally-distributed support, South African interventions have, over time, become limited to those that are done under a multilateral mandate, ensuring the consultation of other African countries as well as clear communication.[9] This encourages South African peace-making interventions to remain needs-based and not become paternalistic in nature. In a similar vein, South Africa's anti-imperialist outlook on

---

6 De Coning and Cong. Rising powers and peacebuilding. (2017): 108.
7 De Coning and Cong. Rising powers and peacebuilding. (2017): 108.
8 De Coning and Cong. Rising powers and peacebuilding. (2017): 116.
9 De Coning and Cong. Rising powers and peacebuilding. (2017): 109.

international affairs motivates the state to prevent Western powers from engineering regime changes or establishing puppet governments in African countries.[10] Therefore, South Africa is attempting to take the leading role in achieving the shared goals of the African continent through peace-making interventions. These motivations are further exacerbated by geographic, security, humanitarian, and political interests.

---

[10] De Coning and Cong. Rising powers and peacebuilding. (2017): 111. .

Regional Conflict Case Study: Democratic Republic of Congo

South Africa's capacity for regional peacekeeping was realized after the country emerged from its own peaceful, democratic transition process; following 1994 (the year in which Mandela took office, concretizing South Africa's democratic transition), the African nation began seeking out situations that demanded support in the surrounding region. Though South Africa has engaged in a variety of peacekeeping efforts since the inception of its democratic government, its most furtive effort to date has been that undertaken in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). South Africa's peacekeeping mission in the DRC is one of its longest peace projects to date, having been prioritized as a primary foreign policy focus during nearly all of the country's post-apartheid history. Thus, South Africa's efforts in the DRC are the most helpful case study in understanding both the depth and breadth of the country's capacity and commitment to playing peacemaker within its region. The following text will summarize South Africa's peacemaking engagement with the DRC, as well as what can be distilled from the peace process in terms of signature South African peacemaking strategy.

South Africa's Commitment to Peace in the DRC: A Synopsis

South Africa initiated its work in the DRC in 1996, with the beginning of the First Congo War; the South-African country, then named Zaire, was deeply embroiled in a bloody conflict between the sitting president Sese Seko Mobutu and the rebel group Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL). Comprised of Congolese rebels as well as forces from neighboring Uganda and Rwanda, the rage that infused the ADFL was catalyzed

directly by the Rwandan Genocide[11]; the loose coalition was consolidated under the common

goal of ousting Mobutu following the turmoil created in the region by the genocide[12]. The ADFL

went about capturing territory around the former Zaire, destroying scores of residual refugee

camps from the Rwandan Genocide. The AFDL's campaign was bloody, leaving tens of

thousands of refugees dead in its wake[13].

Mandela entered the peacekeeping scene with an attempt at convening the two sides -

President Sese Seko Mobutu and the ADFL's de facto leader, Laurent-Désiré Kabila - for a peace

talk in South Africa in May 1997[14]. The meeting fell through after Kabila failed to attend, though

South Africa doubled down on its efforts in the early 2000s and produced tangible steps forwards

in the peacemaking process in the DRC. The peace talks hosted in South Africa became known

as the "Sun City Talks", a nod to the name of the South African city they took place in, and were

convened by the South African president Thabo Mbeki. Mbeki was considered to be

"omnipresent throughout the transition" of the peacekeeping process, "jetting into the DRC

every time peace [was] threatened and taking part in all the important events."[15] The 2010s saw

another doubling down of South African peacemaking effort in the DRC, and the further

installment of "trust and common interests" between the two African nations[16].

---

[11] Zapata, Mollie. "A Brief History of Congo's Wars." The Christian Science Monitor. The Christian Science Monitor, November 29, 2011.
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/1129/A-brief-history-of-Congo-s-wars.
[12] "AFDL AND HUTU GENOCIDE." Hutu genocide, n.d. https://www.hutugenocide.org/afdl-and-hutu-genocide/.
[13] "AFDL AND HUTU GENOCIDE." Hutu genocide, n.d. https://www.hutugenocide.org/afdl-and-hutu-genocide/.
[14] Tonheim, Milfrid, and Gerrie Swart. "Africa's Pre-Eminent Peacemaker? An Appraisal of South Africa's Peacemaking Role in the Democratic Republic of Congo." NOREF. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, February 2015. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/187977/eb92234f3f8c3ac5f7751627c78ea320.pdf.
[15] Tonheim, Milfrid, and Gerrie Swart. "Africa's Pre-Eminent Peacemaker? An Appraisal of South Africa's Peacemaking Role in the Democratic Republic of Congo." NOREF. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, February 2015. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/187977/eb92234f3f8c3ac5f7751627c78ea320.pdf.
[16] Tonheim, Milfrid, and Gerrie Swart. "Africa's Pre-Eminent Peacemaker? An Appraisal of South Africa's Peacemaking Role in the Democratic Republic of Congo." NOREF. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, February 2015. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/187977/eb92234f3f8c3ac5f7751627c78ea320.pdf.

South Africa's role as a peacemaker in the DRC was the first time the country took the stage in the role of peacemaker, making this mission critically important in terms of establishing South African peacemaking capacity. Its involvement in the process and the strides towards peace produced since the beginning of South African peacemaking in the region have allowed South Africa to flex its peacemaking strategies, most of which are unique to the country and effective upon reflection of the effects they had in the DRC. When using the South African peacemaking process in the DRC as a case study, there emerges identifiable South African peacemaking strategy to be analyzed. These strategies were invented in South Africa's own peaceful transition to democracy following Apartheid, crystallized under the Mandela presidency, and remained relatively uniform throughout the DRC peace process. The following text will examine the uniqueness of the South African peacemaking process, identifying its signature traits and assessing its effectiveness.

The South African Strategy: Four Pillars of Peacemaking

South Africa is a country built on 'lessons learned'[17]; after a decades long struggle against a racist regime, the nation reinvented itself into a vibrant democracy presided over by an internationally celebrated champion of peace and compassion - Nelson Mandela. Mandela inspired virtue amongst the newly minted South African government, prioritizing collective progress both within the nation itself and regionally in Southern Africa; the president initiated the South African peacemaking mission in the DRC, implementing many of the same tactics he used himself during South Africa's democratic own transition. These tactics fall under four principle categories of peacemaking ideology and strategy: *1. Negotiations work, 2. Personal diplomacy is effective, 3. All negotiating parties merit empowerment*, and *4. Compromise leads*

---

[17] Williams, Christopher. "Peacemaking from the Inside out: How South Africa's Negotiated Transition Influenced the Mandela Administration's Regional Conflict Resolution Strategies." *South African Journal of International Affairs* 22, no. 3 (2015): 359–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2015.1090912.

to success[18]. These strategies were visible in other South African peacemaking processes, including those undertaken in neighboring Lesotho and Sudan[19]; this text will focus primarily on where these strategies can be identified in the country's peacemaking efforts in the DRC - the most critical peacemaking process initiated by the South African government.

The South African peacemaking efforts in the DRC were built and sustained by *peace talks and negotiations*, something crucial to South Africa's own democratic transition. Mandela learned early in his political career that negotiations were effective with respect to forming joint action and creating collective progress, and this is something that the president (and other presidents following him) sought to introduce to the conflict in the DRC. Mandela extended the invitation for peace talks towards the embittered sides of the Congo wars, with much of the progress made in the decades following South Africa's first engagement in the country being made after critical conversations between warring parties. Additionally, Mandela and his successors understood *the importance of personal diplomacy* in demonstrating their commitment to the peace process in the DRC and their Congolese counterparts; uniform across the multiple South African presidencies involved in the peacemaking mission in the DRC, both the presidents themselves and their administrations would assume a personal role in initiating, encouraging, and protecting the peacemaking process as it occurred both in the DRC and within the peace talks hosted in South Africa. Uniformly understood also was the necessity of *empowering all parties of the conflict*, with South Africa taking care to invite key players to the table despite the existence of what was then considered to irreconcilable differences between the parties. The two opposing sides were invited for direct talks in South Africa, with no special preference extended

[18] Williams, Christopher. "Peacemaking from the Inside out: How South Africa's Negotiated Transition Influenced the Mandela Administration's Regional Conflict Resolution Strategies." *South African Journal of International Affairs* 22, no. 3 (2015): 359–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2015.1090912.
[19] Tonheim, Milfrid, and Gerrie Swart. "Africa's Pre-Eminent Peacemaker? An Appraisal of South Africa's Peacemaking Role in the Democratic Republic of Congo." NOREF. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, February 2015. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/187977/eb92234f3f8c3ac5f7751627c78ea320.pdf.

towards either particular party when it came to the negotiations. Finally, South Africa attempted

to encourage *compromise* throughout the peace talks, employing tactical flexibility and strategic

rigidity when necessary[20].

---

[20] Williams, Christopher. "Peacemaking from the Inside out: How South Africa's Negotiated Transition Influenced the Mandela Administration's Regional Conflict Resolution Strategies." *South African Journal of International Affairs* 22, no. 3 (2015): 359–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2015.1090912.

South Africa and Climate Change

The effects of climate change are not foreign to Sub-Saharan Africa in recent decades. A growing point of political contention around the world are the appropriate responses to climate change. Being a regional leader in a disproportionately affected region, South Africa has risen to the occasion in a number of peacebuilding, diplomacy, and environmental policy areas.

Firstly, it is important to understand the effects on climate change on South Africa and its neighboring countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa, unpredictable rainfall, prolonged droughts, desertification, environmental degradation, and sea-level rise are some of the many climate-related crises affecting the region.[21] In a country and region that heavily rely on the agricultural industry, increases in average annual temperatures combined with a decrease in rainfall can be detrimental to national economies and civilian livelihoods. Populations face worsened individual health as a result of food insecurity, a reduction in home safety, and decreases in household/land asset value due to degradation. Further compounding these effects, black and low-income climate migrants are often disproportionately affected by climate change compared to white and high-income counterparts as a result of the country's Apartheid history.[22] By 2050, the region is expected to see over 85 million "internal climate migrants."[23] This frightening statistic holds significant implications for regional economic development, cooperation, and peacebuilding. This begs the question, what are possible remedies, policy, and

---

[21] "Climate Change and Disaster Displacement," UNHCR.
[22] Mastrorillo, Marina, "Climate Change and Migration in South Africa," 2022.
[23] Rigaud et al, "Internal Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration*, 2018, 1.

peacebuilding solutions for South Africa to address the detrimental effects of climate change and increases in climate migration?

South African Peacebuilding Capacity in Climate Areas

The South African government is acutely aware of the effects of climate change and boasts recent improvements in their foreign policy capabilities. At the recent COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stressed the importance of sustainable development, Just Transition processes, and fundamental transformations and modernizations in the global financial architecture to support developing regions in climate stability.[24] These suggestions are in lieu of revamped South African foreign policy initiatives. Peacebuilding initiatives in the late 2000s "bolstered the country's standings" with the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).[25] The African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF) Act has allocated R143.6 million (US $8.84 million) to climate related initiatives for the 2019-2024 period.[26]

Furthermore, the long awaited Foreign Service Act, that provides improved operational and support systems for the South African Foreign Service came into effect on August 25, 2022.[27] While the ARF fund operations are being pushed towards the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), the Presidential Climate Commission (PCC) spearheads a majority of the government's current climate change-related operations. These include advising on the country's climate change response and supporting Just Transition

---

[24] "South Africa Welcomes COP27 Outcomes," 2022, The Presidency Republic of South Africa.
[25] Singh, Priyal, "South African Peacebuilding Needs New Purpose," 2020, *Institute for Security Studies*, 2.
[26] Ibid., 4.
[27] "Foreign Service Act in Effect," *Sabinet Law*. August 25, 2022.

initiatives to build a "low-carbon climate-resilient economy and society."[28] As one can see, South African foreign policy and peacebuilding capabilities have greatly expanded in the past few years alone, creating a strong foundation for the country's pivotal role in regional and global negotiations on climate policy, migration, and climate-induced instability.

A Just Transition and Current Policy

South Africa assumed the role of a prominent figurehead among Sub-Saharan countries in terms of climate policy and fostering regional stability. The government recognizes the need to address their "triple challenges of poverty" that are exacerbated by climate change; poverty, unemployment, and inequality."[29] The Just Transition Framework for climate policy is a monumental shift in national approaches to climate-induced inequality and should serve as a pioneering model for any country adopting climate policy. The model and subsequent policy recommendations are built upon the understanding of environmental, economic, and social issues with a long-term planning orientation. This includes commitments to procedural, redistributive, and restorative justice alongside centering human development concerns.[30] Most importantly, this framework guides policy decisions to achieve "quality life for all South Africans" while accounting for gender, race, class, and ethnicity inequalities.[31] This framework and associated policies were brought to the international stage at COP27, where President Ramaphosa and representatives created the Just Energy Transition Partnership-Investment Plan (JETP) based on multilateral consensus from Germany, France, the European Union, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom.[32] Pioneering a "first of its kind," multilateral,

---

[28] *A Framework for a Just Transition in South Africa*, Presidential Climate Commission, Government of South Africa, 2022, 2.
[29] Ibid, 2.
[30] Ibid, 5-6.
[31] Ibid, 7.
[32] "South Africa Welcomes COP27 Outcomes."

equity-oriented, climate change funding plan is a remarkable achievement for South Africa and takes important steps towards climate equity/prosperity in Sub-Saharan Africa. It marks one of the first comprehensive climate development plans in Sub-Saharan Africa that also takes into account the livelihoods of employees in the coal, auto, agriculture, and tourism industries that may be adversely affected by climate-informed development policy.[33] The Just Transition model and Investment Plan ought to serve as an example for future climate policy in regional and global efforts. JETP promotes economic and social stability within South Africa—and by both practical and ideological extension—the region as a whole.

Next Steps

Building upon the momentum and success of South Africa's foreign policy and JETP initiatives, next steps are already underway in terms of regional and global stability (in regards to climate change). The International Partners Group pledged, "including over $1 billion from United States Government agencies," $8.5 billion to the JETP investment plan to improve clean energy, electric vehicles, and green energy infrastructure while supporting displaced workers.[34] In terms of regional peacebuilding, South Africa has called for a target increase of resilience against climate change effects in global populations by 50% in 2030, with Just Transition plans underway.[35] On theme with central tenets of the JETP, South Africa promotes both their own interests alongside regional stability and prosperity in response to the impacts of climate change.

---

[33] *A Framework for a Just Transition in South Africa*, 10-14.
[34] "U.S. Departments of the Treasury and State, and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa Announce Endorsement of the South Africa Just Energy Transition Partnership Investment Plan," *U.S. Department of Treasury*, 2022.
[35] "South Africa Welcomes COP27 Outcomes."

Bibliography

A Framework for a Just Transition in South Africa, 2022, Presidential Climate Commission, *Government of South Africa*. Accessed December 10, 2022, https://pccommissionflow.imgix.net/uploads/images/A-Just-Transition-Framework-for-South-Africa-2022.pdf.

Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "apartheid." *Encyclopedia Britannica*, November 11, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/topic/apartheid.

Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "South Africa summary." *Encyclopedia Britannica*, April 29, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/summary/South-Africa.

"Climate change and disaster displacement," *UNCHR*. Accessed December 10, 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/climate-change-and-disasters.html.

De Coning, Cedric, Call, Charles T.. *Rising powers and peacebuilding: Breaking the mold?*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

"Foreign Service Act in Effect," *Sabinet Law*, Accessed December 10, 2022, https://legal.sabinet.co.za/articles/foreign-service-act-in-effect/#:~:text=It%20was%20designed%20to%20provide,and%20support%20the%20Foreign%20Service.

Mastrorillo, Marina, "Climate Change and Migration in South Africa," *Climate and Migration Coalition*, Accessed December 10, 2022, https://climatemigration.org.uk/climate-change-and-migration-in-south-africa/.

Rigaud et al, "Internal Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration*, 2018, Accessed December 10, 2022, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/29461/GroundswellPN1.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y.

Singh, Priyal, "South African Peacebuilding Needs New Purpose," 2020, *Institute for Security Studies*, Accessed December 10, 2022, https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb-154-2.pdf.

"South Africa Welcomes COP27 Outcomes," *South African Government*, November 22, 2022, Accessed December 10, 2022, https://www.gov.za/speeches/south-africa-welcomes-cop27-outcomes-22-nov-2022-0000.

"U.S. Departments of the Treasury and State, and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa Announce Endorsement of the South Africa Just Energy Transition Partnership Investment Plan," *US Department of Treasury*, November 7, 2022, Accessed December 10, 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1085.

RWANDA

Jada Farrar, Emily Hardy, and Inès Gbadoe

RWANDA'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON PEACEMAKING:

Rwanda, a small state with a population of 13.8 million, is bordered by Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, and Uganda.[1] The state comprises three main ethnic groups, Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa (Pygmy).[2] 93.2% of the population speaks the official language of Kinyarwanda, a universal Bantu vernacular, but English and French are also officially recognized languages.[3]

As of 2022, 17.7% of the total state population lives in urban areas with a positive 3.07% annual rate of change towards city centers.[4] Rwanda's economy is majority agrarian with agriculture accounting for about 63% of export earnings or $27.18 billion (2020 est.) real GDP. Over 859,000 people reside in the state's capital Kigali which is located in the country's center. [5]

[1] "Rwanda The World Factbook." *Central Intelligence Agency*, Central Intelligence Agency.
[2] "Rwanda The World Factbook." *Central Intelligence Agency*, Central Intelligence Agency.
[3] "Rwanda The World Factbook." *Central Intelligence Agency*, Central Intelligence Agency.
[4] "Rwanda The World Factbook." *Central Intelligence Agency*, Central Intelligence Agency.
[5] "Rwanda The World Factbook." *Central Intelligence Agency*, Central Intelligence Agency.

Rwanda hosts a significant number of external refugees, namely 76,465 from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 48,474 from Burundi.[6] However, there remains both internal and external displacement as a result of the 1994 Rwanada Genocide. As of mid-2021, there are an estimated 9,500 stateless persons who have yet to return to Rwanda for fear of persecution and/or harm.

Rwanda's position as a peacekeeper cannot be divorced from its history of colonialism and genocide. At the end of World War I, Belgium colonized Ruanda-Urundi (which would later split into two countries: Rwanda and Burundi), a region which had previously been under German colonial rule. Belgian socio-cultural policies disrupted the social and economic structures of the country. In an attempt to facilitate local administration, Belgians imposed Tutsis as the governors, failing to consider the fact that Hutu Mwamis were ruling over certain clans, creating a space for future political conflict. First segregation began, imposed by Belgium between on the one hand the Tutsis, that were guaranteed a privileged access to education and positions of power, and on the other hand the Hutus and Twas dominated by the Tutsi minority, without any possibility of access to social mobility. After independence, promises of reconciliation and inclusion were made by the various governments. However, they did not lead to concrete action by the authorities, and ethnic tensions deteriorated to a point of no return.

Following years of ethnic conflicts of discrimination, exclusion, and tension, the assassination of president Juvenal Habyarimana on April 6, 1994 ultimately triggered the Rwandan civil war between the Hutus and the Tutsis. The massacres that followed resulted in the years between 1990 and 1994 to become infamously known as the Rwandan genocide.

As a response to the Rwandan genocide, the UN sent a peace-keeping mission which was ultimately regardedas an international humanitarian failure. The tragedy during the genocide has

---

[6] "Rwanda The World Factbook." *Central Intelligence Agency*, Central Intelligence Agency.

contributed to their emerging role as peacekeeping leader: in June 2022, Rwanada was the 4th largest troop contributor.

Rwandan peacekeepers are deployed through five peacekeeping missions. On the one hand, in UNMISS (in South Sudan), MINUSCA (in the Central African Republic) and UNAMID (in Darfur), Rwanada is a major contributor. On the other hand, in UNIOSIL (in Haiti) and UNIFIL (in the disputed region of Abiyeh, between Sudan and South Sudan), Rwanda is a smaller contributor. Furthermore, Rwanda has also been essential in helping found the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and establish the Kigali principles.

The Kigali principles, sponsored by the Netherlands, the United States, and Rwanda, are 18 non-binding articles that seek to enshrine the protection of civilians in peacekeeping missions. These principles were created as a response to the glaring problems with international engagement in Rwanda as well as the failure of some peacekeeping operations, especially in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic.

The first article stipulates that ratifying states pledge to "train all of [their] troops on the protection of civilians prior to their deployment to missions."[7] A peacekeeper who is threatened can use his weapon, but can do little when a civilian is in danger. It is precisely this principle that the signatories want to change. Specifically, they want to allow peacekeepers to fight armed groups that attack civilians. To this day, UN contingents intervening in the field are still waiting for the green light from their respective governments. This considerably slows down intervention times. The "Kigali Principles" would prefer if the commander of these contingents on the ground could obtain this power ashis would make operations much more fluid. As of 2020, the Kigali

---

[7] "The Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians." *Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect*, Apr. 2020.

principles have over 40 member state endorsements, including Thailand, Canada, Ethiopia, and the United States.[8]

While a small country, Rwanda remains essential to international United Nations peacekeeping missions both as a significant troop contributor and as a key driver of civilian protections in peacekeeping norms. The Rwandan-led effort on peace promotion is largely a response to the failure of effective UN peacekeeping during the 1994 genocide. In the words of United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, "peacekeeping is a noble, necessary but dangerous mission. The sacrifice and risk peacekeepers endure is always at the forefront of my thoughts…It is particularly commendable that a nation that has endured the worst atrocities should risk its soldiers to ensure those atrocities cannot happen elsewhere."[9]

Beyond being a contributor to UN peacekeeping missions and an advocate for improved civilian conduct, Rwanda is at the forefront of progressive gender politics. Following the genocide, Rwanada introduced a reformed constitution with a 30% quota for women in elected positions. However, in the 2021 election women comprised 61.25% of total elected officials--placing Rwanda first in all states for feminization rates (or the saturation of women in legislative positions).[10] Being at the forefront of political gender integration has translated into the Rwandan military with 22.3% of military observers and staff officers deployed on UNMEM and SO being female.[11] Rwanda exceeds the UN recommended quota of 18% female observers and officers. As such, Rwanda is uniquely situated as an effective state to champion gender transformative politics. While Rwanda's female troop saturation is only 5.4 % (below the 8% desired threshold)

[8] "The Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians." *Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect*, Apr. 2020.
[9] "Service Born of Sacrifice: Rwanda's Commitment to UN Peacekeeping | UN News." *United Nations*, United Nations.
[10] "Monthly Ranking of Women in National Parliaments." *Parline: the IPU's Open Data Platform*, https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking.
[11] "Operational Effect and Women Peacekeepers - Peacekeeping.un.org." *Peacekeeping* , United Nations.

the degree of saturation is still in the mid-range of contributing states.[12] The presence of female peacekeeping troops is significant to peacekeeping missions, particularly when rape and sexual violence by UN troops against local populations have been reported.

---

[12] "Operational Effect and Women Peacekeepers - Peacekeeping.un.org." *Peacekeeping* , United Nations.

RWANDA AS A REGIONAL PEACEMAKER:

History of Ethiopa's Tigray Conflict

In attempting to understand Rwanda's role as a peacekeeper, we might first situate Rwanda in the context of a regional conflict. The Tigray region is the northernmost regional state in Ethiopia with a population of roughly 7 million. In November of 2020, a long-simmering conflict finally boiled over: military confrontation arose between the Ethiopian federal government and the Tigray region's leading party, The Tigray People's Liberation Front.[13]

The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) had been the dominant party in Ethiopia for decades, but lost some momentum with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's ascent to power in 2018. At the time of his election, Abiy– who is a member of the Prosperity Party– hoped to address domestic dissatisfaction with political repression, adjust access to resources and opportunities, and shift the perception the 6% of Tigrayans in Ethiopia held a disproportionate amount of power and influence.[14] The TPLF felt threatened by the new government's staff and policies, and the two parties saw rising tensions throughout the years. During that time, the TPLF reportedly conducted its own regional elections in defiance of a federal decision to postpone elections due to Covid and attacked federal forces stationed in the region.[15]

The conflict left Tigray in complete disorder, despite claims of victory by the federal government. Over sixty thousand refugees fled the country with another half a million displaced, and there were reports of the destruction of critical infrastructure and war atrocities in the region.[16] According to analysts, there was cause for concern about a full-scale insurgency due to

[13] https://www.hrw.org/tag/tigray-conflict
[14] Gavin, M. (2021). The Conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray Region: What to Know. *Council on Foreign Relations*.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.

how unstable the security situation is in parts of Tigray. Other reports were not fully fleshed out— journalists and humanitarian organizations were actually barred from many crucial areas because of security and bureaucratic hurdles. The small amount of information available to the global community included reports of forces on the ground like Ethiopia's military, Eritetrian troops, and ethnic militias perpetrating acts of sexual violence, ethnic-based targeted attacks, and looting.[17] Based on word from refugees and others, the United Nations estimated that almost three million Tigrayans had no access to water, food, and health care, risking the possibility of a famine in the region.[18] In light of this, the World Food Program reached an agreement with the Ethiopian government to improve access to these resources.

In early November of 2022, the two warring sides formally agreed to a permanent ceasefire while meeting in South Africa. Authorities on both sides have agreed on "orderly, smooth and coordinated disarmament", "restoration of law and order", "restoration of services", and "unhindered access to humanitarian supplies".[19] However, Eritrea was not privy to these peace talks. Considering that many have pointed to Eritrean forces as the perpetrators of horrific sexual and physical violence, the conflict may not be fully settled despite the official talks between Tigray and Ethiopian negotiators. Indeed, Eritrea's traditionally repressive government has reportedly long considered Tigray authorities a threat— leaving the question of how closely they will follow this agreement unanswered.[20] Moreover, there is still the matter of rushing aid into Tigray after an abrupt return to the brutal fighting occurred in August following months of lull.[21] Humanitarian sources report that if granted unfettered aid access to Tigray, they could

---

[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] https://www.npr.org/2022/11/02/1133594939/ethiopia-tigray-cease-fire-agreement
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.

quickly help alleviate issues like running out of medicines and food— "open-air prison" conditions, as one surgeon put it.

Rwanda's Ability to Function As a Peacemaker in the Tigray Conflict

Peacemaking *in* Rwanda has been a topic of discussion since the late 20th century. However, Rwanda actually stands to function *as* a peacemaker or a peacekeeper in relation to the Tigray conflict. Rwanda boasts significant engagements in United Nations missions historically, being placed fourth in the list of countries that contribute the most personnel to those missions in the world.[22] Moreover, Rwanda's pattern of contributions aligns closely with the civil war in Ethiopia— notably their part in the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). UNAMID was established in 2007 in response to the civil war in Sudan. The War in Darfur echoes the Tigray Conflict in the way that non-federal groups began fighting against the federal government of Sudan, which they accused of oppressing Darfur's Black African population. The Rwandan Defence Force was equally a part of the African Union Mission to Sudan beginning in 2004, which was the first deployment of RDF within an international mission, in fact.[23]

If they were to continue in a similar line of contributions by peacekeeping in Ethiopia following the ceasefire, Rwanda has several things to gain. Most notably, it could further support its image as a strong regional actor and it could help contain a breakout of insurgency in the event that Eritrea decides not to cooperate with the agreement that the Ethiopian government and the TPLF came to.

When it comes to conflict resolution strategies, Rwanda would benefit from continuing its pattern of proactive and bold moves in the regional sphere. A unilateral approach to

---

[22] Čáslavová, V. Rwanda as a Peace Maker? Regional and International Implications of Rwandan Engagement in Cabo Delgado. *Self-Determination and Conflict of Norms in the Ethiopia Civil War*, 15.
[23] Ibid.

peacekeeping is not out of the question: in the past, Rwanda unilaterally deployed troops in the

Moxambican region of Cabo Delgado, pushing back a violent Islamist insurgency led by the

terrorist group Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah (ASWJ).[24] Indeed, President Kagame has focused on

military diplomacy as a way to draw attention in the international sphere, and its willingness to

dedicate troops to multiple UN missions has garnered international respect for its military's

efficiency and professionalism.[25] Specifically, the RDF has a reputation for skillfully navigating

civil war environments and counter-insurgency actions— two areas of expertise that bear

relevance to the Tigray Conflict and its aftermath.

     Analysts note that Rwanda wants to increase its strategic relevance for global players by

assuming a role of responsibility in various African contexts of instability, such as Mozambique,

Mali, and Sudan. While the civil war in Ethiopia has been officially settled diplomatically, the

remaining unknown peace about Eritrea's adherence to this settlement and the donation of aid

and resources to those still suffering in Tigray leaves the situation in Ethiopia unstable.

---

[24]
https://trendsresearch.org/insight/rwandas-unilateral-interventionism-in-african-conflicts-determinants-and-implications/
[25] Ibid.

RWANDA AS A GLOBAL PEACEMAKER:

Climate Change and Water Insecurity

US Aid defines water security as "the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for: a) Sustaining livelihoods- human well-being and socioeconomic development, b) Ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, c) Preserving ecosystems promoting peace and political stability."[26]

Dr. Marcus King of Georgetown University divides water stress into four main categories: water quality, accessibility, environmental flows, and volumetric availability.[27] Water quality pertains to the resource's ability to maintain both human and aquatic life void of contamination and pollution. Environmental flows relate to the timing, quantity, and quality of water flows that are related to ecosystem services. Often intimately linked to livelihoods in rural or agrarian states (like Rwanda), disruption to environmental water flows may induce economic insecurity. Volumetric availability accounts for the narrow traditional depiction of water insecurity as the physical abundance of water. This limited definition fails to account for the specific environmental, animal, and human needs that express various stressors on volumetric availability. The most pronounced water stress experienced in Rwanda is accessibility. Water accessibility, as defined by King, is the physical availability of water supplies as a function of infrastructure and affordability.[28] Simply put, there may be volumetric availability in a state but the financial or infrastructure barriers imposed by inaccessibility may induce water scarcity.

---

[26] "What Is Water Security?" *What Is Water Security? | Globalwaters.org*, US AID.
[27] Reed, David, and Marcus King. *Water, Security and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Routledge, an Imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.
[28] Reed, David, and Marcus King. *Water, Security and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Routledge, an Imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.

A changing climate possesses unknown, intersecting, and variable environmental impacts. Accordingly, Climate change remains an acute global threat to peace and security. In evaluating Rwanda's capacity as a peacemaker it is important to underscore that increasing resource insecurity has been classified as a threat multiplier-- not necessarily a direct cause of conflict but a contributing variable. Simply put, the advent of a changing environment increases the risk and likelihood of conflict by exacerbating pre-existing tensions. Climate change may ignite conflict between groups with underlying cleavages, namely religious, ethnic, class, or gender divisions.

However,water insecurity should not be regarded exclusively as an instigator of conflict. Water insecurity also has a robust record of facilitating collaboration. The best example of such an endeavor is the Indus Water Treaty that seeks to regulate water flow orchestrated by international institutions to divide scarce water resources in the area.[29] Following the state partition, both India and Pakistan began to immediately dispute the river network that fed into the Indus Valley basin. Created by the World Bank in 1960, the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) divided water resources amongst four key states-- India, Pakistan, China and Afghanistan-- with an emphasis placed on the dual ownership of both India and Pakistan.[30] Ensuring equitable and accessible distribution of water resources in Rwanda is of paramount importance to internal state security and their ability to be a peacekeeping state abroad.

Water scarcity in Rwanda

As discussed in the previous section, water scarcity is the main problem facing Rwanda. There are two kinds of water scarcity: water inaccessibility or economic scarcity refers to the

---

[29] Adeel, Zafar, *Imagining Industan: Overcoming Water Insecurity in the Indus Basin*, Springer, 2016, (37-48).
[30] Adeel, Zafar, *Imagining Industan: Overcoming Water Insecurity in the Indus Basin*, Springer, 2016, (37-48).

inaccessibility of water due to institutional failures, including lack of planning, investment and infrastructure[31]. Volumetric scarcity is a by-product of climate change, including droughts and changes in weather patterns.

In terms of economic scarcity, currently only 57% of the population has access to a safe water source within 30 minutes of their home.[32] Furthermore, water resources are limited due to low sanitation rates, with basic sanitation meaning that each household has its own toilet and does not share it with another household. In Rwanda, only 64% of the population has access to these sanitation services.

In terms of hygiene, Rwanda's water shortage is also felt, with only 5% of Rwandan households having a place where family members can wash their hands with soap. Handwashing with soap at critical times is essential for good health, especially for children.

In terms of physical or volumetric scarcity, the coming years will be pivotal in terms of actions to combat global warming. Currently, Rwanda relies on rain-fed agriculture for rural sustainability and some exports (such as tea and coffee), and half of its electricity is hydroelectric. The temperature has risen by 1.4°C since 1970 - higher than the global average - and is expected to rise by 2.5°C by 2050. During the rainy seasons of February to May and November to December, it is projected that rainfall could increase by 20 percent by 2050, causing landslides, crop losses, health risks, and infrastructure damage, according to a 2011 report from the Republic of Rwanda. Figure 6 shows current rainfall rates in Rwanda, but larger areas surrounding high rainfall regions may be more affected in future years by increased flooding during the rainy season.

---

[31] Mlaba, Khanyi. 2022. "Water Scarcity in Africa: Everything You Need to Know." Global Citizen. https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/water-scarcity-in-africa-explainer-what-to-know/.
[32] "Water, sanitation and hygiene." n.d. UNICEF. Accessed December 5, 2022. https://www.unicef.org/rwanda/water-sanitation-and-hygiene.

Alternating droughts and floods have a strong impact on Rwandan communities. The dry season leads to more extreme water shortages, while the rainy season can lead to flooding, resulting in damage and contamination of water sources. The simultaneous increase in temperature can also lead to the outbreak of vector-borne and water-borne diseases, resulting in increased health risks to humans and animals, reduced crop yields, and negative effects on the export sector of the economy, according to the same 2011 Government of Rwanda report.

Some specific impacts of climate variability are watershed degradation (which increases erosion and runoff), drying of rivers, lowering of lake levels, significant siltation of dams for hydropower and water supply, and deterioration of water quality (Government of Kenya, Ministry of Water and Irrigation, 2006). Solutions have been proposed by experts to address the changes imposed by global warming[33]:

First, address irrigation infrastructure: such infrastructure allocates greater control of water resources to farmers, thus reducing susceptibility to changes in rainfall. They also allow for crop diversification, efficient use of land and water, and the supply of water to dry areas that would not otherwise receive it.

Second, establish stronger road networks: poor roads, such as dirt roads, contribute to the loss of products in transit and increased vulnerability of transport routes to extreme weather conditions. Building and maintaining stronger roads that are more resilient to extreme weather conditions and future climate change will promote economic development.

Finally, as advocated by Kianna Billman in *A Clean 5 Gallons a Day Keeps the Doctor Away: The Water Crisis in Kenya and Rwanda*[34], the establishment of a center for climate knowledge and development would be necessary, as the lack of data on projected climate change

---

[33] Billman, Kianna. 2014. "A Clean 5 Gallons a Day Keeps the Doctor Away: The Water Crisis in Kenya and Rwanda." *Global Majority E-Journal* 5, no. 2 (December): 75-88.
[34] Ibid

hinders the ability to plan for the future, which hinders adaptation to future increases in temperature and precipitation. By providing more detail and information, a wider range of policy options will be available for decision makers to plan for future adaptation.

Bibliography

Billman, Kianna. 2014. "A Clean 5 Gallons a Day Keeps the Doctor Away: The Water Crisis in
        Kenya and Rwanda." *Global Majority E-Journal* 5, no. 2 (December): 75-88.

Mlaba, Khanyi. 2022. "Water Scarcity in Africa: Everything You Need to Know." Global
        Citizen.
        https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/water-scarcity-in-africa-explainer-what-to-know
        /.

"What Is Water Security?" *What Is Water Security? | Globalwaters.org*, US AID,
        https://www.globalwaters.org/resources/blogs/swp/what-water-security#:~:text=SWP%20
        defines%20water%20security%20as,%2C%20ecosystems%20and%20productive%20eco
        nomies.%E2%80%9D

Reed, David, and Marcus King. *Water, Security and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Routledge, an Imprint
        of the Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.

"Rwanda The World Factbook." *Central Intelligence Agency*, Central Intelligence Agency,
        https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/rwanda/.

"The Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians." *Global Centre for the Responsibility to
        Protect*, 16 Apr. 2020,
        https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/the-kigali-principles-on-the-protection-of-civilians/.

"Service Born of Sacrifice: Rwanda's Commitment to UN Peacekeeping | UN News." *United
        Nations*, United Nations, https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/05/1009492.

"Operational Effect and Women Peacekeepers - Peacekeeping.un.org." *Peacekeeping* , United
        Nations,
        https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/operational_effect_and_women_peacekeep
        ers_30_june_2022.pdf.

"Monthly Ranking of Women in National Parliaments." *Parline: the IPU's Open Data Platform*,
        https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking.

MALAYSIA

Eric Clarke, Sandeep Gingipalli, and Areej Raad

MALAYSIA'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON PEACEMAKING:

Malaysia is a Southeast Asian country, neighboring Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Brunei and Philippines. It is a multilingual and multiethnic country having Malay, Chinese, Indian and indigenous peoples. The GDP of Malaysia in 2021 is 372.7 billion Dollars and their military power ranks 44th in the world. Malaysia uses its military forces and money to participate in the peace process.

This chapter will uncover the role of Malaysia in peace processes and its history of participating in peacemaking and peacekeeping regionally and internationally. It will also examine the multilateral organizations that Malaysia plays a significant role in.

Involvement in the United Nations

The United Nations has played a crucial role in establishing and promoting world peace and security, helping other countries when they are in need by giving aid, and providing peacekeeping military forces to protect human rights.[4] Malaysia has been a regular participant in the peacekeeping process in many UN missions, giving their military support and funds when needed. In 1960, the UN selected the Malaysian military forces to participate in the Congo in an effort to withdraw the Belgian forces, maintain security and peace, and help establish and legitimize the Congolese government after their independence.[5]

---

[1]Klaus Kästle, "Political and Administrative Map of Malaysia," Political Map of Malaysia - Nations Online Project, www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/malaysia_map.htm.

[2] "Malaysia," Malaysia - Place Explorer - Data Commons.

[3]Maria Gourtsilidou, "Ranked: Military Strength of Nations, 2020 (Comparing Global Armed Forces)," CEOWORLD magazine, March 3, 2020, https://ceoworld.biz/2020/03/03/ranked-military-strength-of-nations-2020-comparing-global-armed-forces/.

[4] Ramli Nik, "Indonesia-Malaysia's Strategic Contribution Towards International Peace and Security," The Journal of Defence and Security, Vol. 9, No.1 (2018): 69.

[5] Ibid, 70.

Malaysia, along with Indonesia, plays a key role in sending troops to support the UN in peacekeeping missions. In 2015, during the Peacemaking Summit in New York, Malaysia showed their commitment to continuing the deployment of their forces in various peacekeeping missions.[6] For example, in 2007, the Malaysian military assisted the Lebanese military and forces by providing training.[7] In 1965, Malaysia became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in recognition of the MSF's commitment to the United Nations Force in the Congo. Furthermore, it was elected in 1989 with 143 votes to join the non permanent member of the UN security Council, and again in 2015 with 187 votes.[8]

In the past few years, Malaysia has demonstrated its good standing in the international community and has taken an active role in promoting peace and security globally. For instance, despite the volatility of the Israel-Palestine conflict in recent years, Malaysia has been actively helping work towards a peaceful resolution through moderation and the protection of civilians and laws.[9]

Involvement in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations - ASEAN

Soon after its independence in 1963, Malaysia – along with four other Southeast Asian nations – became a founding member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with the signing of the Bangkok Declaration in 1967. Although Malaysia has been involved in disputes with other countries in the region – including the Philippines over competing claims over the Sabah islands and Singapore over various waterways – it has remained an exemplary

---

[6] Ibid, 71.
[7] United Nations, "Service and Sacrifice: Malaysian Peacekeepers in Lebanon Proud to Serve Their Homeland and the United Nations," United Nations. March 21, 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/03/1035131.
[8] Ramli Nik, "Indonesia-Malaysia's Strategic Contribution Towards International Peace and Security," The Journal of Defence and Security, Vol. 9, No.1 (2018): 73.
[9] Ibid, 73.

member of the alliance through its efforts to strengthen regional governance, regional

cooperation, and humanitarian assistance.[10]

With respect to regional governance, Malaysia was the key actor that put forward the idea

of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Under ZOPFAN, ASEAN would

make a concerted effort to exclude foreign powers which have historically had a presence in the

region, such as the U.S., Russia, and China, from interfering in the internal affairs of ASEAN

countries. The neutrality aspect of ZOPFAN would ensure that ASEAN would not directly

interfere in the internal affairs of ASEAN countries; this did not mean, however, that ASEAN

would stand idly by when conflicts broke out. Even in the conflict over the territory of Sabah,

Malaysia has acted as both a stakeholder and mediator.[11]

With respect to regional cooperation, in 1990 Malaysia invoked the idea of a regional free

trade zone with the East Asia Economic Group, which aimed to boost economic growth and

strengthen political cooperation. While this initiative received a great deal of pushback, Malaysia

was steadfast in its pursuit of ensuring greater regional cooperation. Malaysia, compared with

other ASEAN members, has also demonstrated its ability to progressively advance the ASEAN

charter and create a more inclusive alliance. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic,

Malaysia took the initiative to advance collaboration between ASEAN members and host critical

health and safety summits.[12] Malaysia has also positioned itself as an impartial assistor to other

ASEAN countries that have found themselves in need by, for example, providing humanitarian

aid in the aftermath of natural disasters in Indonesia and the Philippines.

---

[10] Siti Darwinda Mohamed Pero & Laila Suriya Ahmad Apandi, "Malaysia's Leadership Role in Asean: An Assessment," Journal of International Studies Vol. 14, (2018): 65.
[11] Ibid, 70.
[12] Harsh Mahaseth, "The Role of Malaysia in ASEAN," Modern Diplomacy, January 12, 2021, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/10/28/the-role-of-malaysia-in-asean/.

Involvement in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation - OIC

The organization of Islamic Cooperation was established in 1969 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The goal of organization is to represent the global muslim population to ensure their protection and safety and promote international peace and security. 57 countries are members of the OIC with 56 members also being United Nations members. The organization does not only have Muslim countries, but it also has countries with large Muslims populations, such as Russia and Thailand who sit as observer states. As a member of OIC, Malaysia has been working toward economic, political and technical development in the Muslim community.[13]

Malaysia plays an important role in maintaining peace and security in the Muslim world and was involved, as previously mentioned, in peace negotiations regarding the Israel and Palestine conflict. Their aim is to focus on the interest of the Islamic Ummah (Muslim Community) and pursue a peacekeeping strategy based on its beautiful form. They also seek to separate the Islamic Ummah from political issues based on self interest.[14] Malaysia has also made efforts in rejuvenating interest in the OIC as it has not always been used for its intended purpose. Previously, before Malaysia's intervention to reform the organization, developing countries were overshadowed by developed nations, causing the organizational agenda to be skewed with only a few powerful countries having their interests represented. With Malaysia's efforts to involve smaller developing countries in the formation of the OIC's agenda, a more cohesive OIC has come about .[15]

Furthermore, Malaysia has made multiple efforts in uniting the Islamic Ummah (Muslim community) by improving its generally weak economic systems. In 2002, Malaysia proposed the

---

[13] Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, "Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)," Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.

[14] Rizal Hamdan, "Malaysia Must Play Proactive Intermediary Role in OIC," New Straits Times, May 2021, https://www.nst.com.my/opinion/columnists/2021/05/689937/malaysia-must-play-proactive-intermediary-role-oic.

[15] Ibid.

use of the gold dinar to strengthen weak economies in the Muslim community. Similar to the

European Union's model, this system is supposed to be used in place of the U.S dollar. In

October 2002, Malaysia held an international seminar on the "Gold Dinar in Multilateral Trade."

The conference included other countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia

and led to the Islamic Development Bank establishing the Islamic Financial Services Board

(IFSB), which has since played a key role in Islmaic finance.[16]

Malaysia has shown over time that it is an active member in the international community

in promoting values of peace and maintaining security in the world. Their efforts in the

peacemaking process and peacekeeping missions have helped Malaysia to gain the legitimacy

and trust of bigger powers.

---

[16] Shaikh Mohd Saifuddeen B Shaikh Mohd Salleh, "Malaysia's Role in Revitalising OIC," Laman Web Rasmi: Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia (IKIM), September 26, 2003, https://www.ikim.gov.my/index.php/2003/09/26/malaysias-role-in-revitalising-oic/.

MALAYSIA AS A REGIONAL PEACEMAKER:

Malaysia as a Peacemaker in the Moro Conflict

The Moro population at 4.6 million makes up approximately 5% of the Philippine population and resides primarily in the Southern Philippines Sulu Archipelago. The struggle for self-determination by the Moro people in the Southern Philippines began in 1565 under Spanish colonial rule. They supported their claims for independence on the basis that the Sulu Archipelago was historically their homeland and that they had been socially marginalized by the ruling powers.[17] Although most Moro people are Sunni Muslims, there is still a great degree of fragmentation among them. For instance, there exists the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM), among others. The Moro people view having their own territory as their pathway to the solidification of their religious and cultural identity, but their leverage towards the government has been diminished due to a variety of conflicting interests.[18]

Over the years, the Filipino government has been forced to make concessions to the Moro people due to the increasingly violent, destabilizing nature of their armed efforts. For instance, the 1976 Tripoli Agreement established that the Moro people would hold the rights to an autonomous region, known officially as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Subsequent peace agreements, including the 1987 Jeddah Accord, further solidified the structure of these autonomous regions.[19] Although the Filipino government has ceded formal control over these territories through these peace agreements, it still seeks to maintain its control over the region informally through cash transfers and the purposeful turning of rebel groups against each

---

[17] CISAC, "MMP: Moro National Liberation Front," (CISAC, 2019), 1-4.
[18] Global Initiative, "Insecurity in Mindanao ," (Global Initiative , 2020).
[19] UCA, "University of Central Arkansas: UCA," (Political Science, 2022).

other. Currently, 95% of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao's revenues are received

through in-kind cash transfers from the Filipino government.[20]

The current government has up taken a strategy with three clear goals: strike a peace

agreement with the MILF, reform the dysfunctional government of the ARMM, and review the

1996 final peace agreement with the MNLF.[21] A key driver of the government's desire to

facilitate a quick resolution to the conflict is international concerns that continued tensions could

lead to the area becoming a hub for widespread terrorism. Since the conflict began 40 years ago,

it has resulted in 120,000 deaths and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.

With the conflict's in Mindanao's close proximity to Sabah in Northern Borneo, Malaysia

has had a demonstrated a vested interest in stepping in as a peacemaker. However, before

discussing Malaysia's efforts to create peace, its role in shaping the instability in Mindanao must

be explored. As the Philippines sought to forcefully enforce their claims over the Sabah territory,

Malaysia retaliated by supporting the MNLF to destabilize Mindanao. After peace talks occurred

in the 1970s between the Filipino government and the MNLF, the Filipino government dropped

their claims over Sabah in an effort to foster greater regional peace.[22] Malaysia reciprocated this

turn towards peace by distancing itself from its support of the MNLF. However, as described

previously, due to factionalism among the Moro population, not all groups accepted the new

settlement. This included the MILF, which had expanded its operations and now had links to

Al-Qaeda. Instead of simply backing the Filipino governments all-out war policy against the

---

[20] Benjamin Crost, Joseph H. Felter, and Patrick B. Johnston, "Conditional Cash Transfers, Civil Conflict and Insurgent Influence: Experimental Evidence from the Philippines," (*Journal of Development Economics* 118, 2016), 171–82.
[21] Global Initiative, "Insecurity in Mindanao," 10-15
[22] Janica Mahinay Krizza, "Writing Malaysia and the Moro Identity: An Analysis of the Moro National Liberation Front's Foreign Policy," (Insight Turkey, December 21, 2018).

MILF, which it had adopted under President Joseph Estrada (1998-2001), the Malaysian government decided to pursue a policy of peace.[23]

In 2001, as the Moro conflict began to pose a greater security threat to Malaysia, the Malaysian government agreed to step-in as a peacemaker. As Libya under Muammar Gaddafi was a strong supporter of the MILF, Malaysia would be required to not just broker peace between the direct combatants to the conflict, but also their respective supporters. In 1976, after a series of difficult negotiations, Malaysia facilitated the signing of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace.[24] In addition to the agreement introducing an autonomous government and special forces on the island to enforce a ceasefire, it ensured that Libya would withdraw its financial support to the conflict in exchange for an exclusive oil deal on behalf of the Philippines.[25] By securing the last clause in this deal, Malaysia demonstrated its ability to introduce fresh frameworks to the negotiation table, as outlined in the Peacemakers Toolkit.[26] By sticking solely to an ideological framework in its negotiations, Malaysia would have been unable to strike a deal between Libya and the Philippines.[27] After the Tripoli Agreement on Peace was broken in 2003 and the government launched an offensive against the MLF, Malaysia led an International Monitoring Team to monitor the ceasefire agreement. Such monitoring is considered to be a final – and critical – part of the peacemaking process.[28] Through its monitoring process, the resumption of major conflict was evident in the early 2010s. Soon thereafter, Malaysia brought warring parties to the table with the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro in October 2012. In addition to

[23] Zachary Abuza, "The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution," (*Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28, no. 6 2005), 453–458

[24] Mohagher Iqbal, "PEACETALK: Malaysia and Its Role in the GPH-MILF Peace Process," MindaNews, July 18, 2018.

[25] The Tripoli Agreement of December 23, 1976 (1976).

[26] Amy L Smith, and David R Smock, "Managing a Mediation Process," (United States Institute of Peace, 2008), 37-51

[27] Smith and Smock, "Managing a Mediation Process," 37-51

[28] Naoyuki Ochiai, "PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT IN MINDANAO, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES," (JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development, December 2020), 25-27.

being the host of the peace process, Malaysia actively played a role in ensuring that all parties

understood each other's perspective and acted as a referee of sorts. It kept stringent minutes of

meetings, administered discussions and ensured that previous grievances were addressed.

Eventually, these discussions culminated in the signing of the Bangsamoro Basic Law, which

called for the decommissioning of 40,000 MILF fighters and the establishment of the

Bangsamoro Transition Authority.[29] As of 2022, the conflict is no longer considered to be an

active threat to peace and stability and the political transition is still underway.[30]

Malaysia as a Peace Maker in the Filipino Maoist Insurgency - Lessons Learned from the Moro Conflict/Peacemaking Process

Since World War II the Philippines has been unable to escape the lurking shadows of a

communist rebellion. After various communist guerilla forces supported an eventually successful

campaign against the invading Japanese forces in World War II, they continued to fight in the

hopes of establishing a communist government. The failed Hukbalahap Rebellion in 1954

appeared to be an indicator of communist influence slowly withering away, however, in the

1960s there was a resurgence of radical left-wing politics that was guided by Mao Zedong's

philosophy, in a departure from Marxist-Leninist ideology.[31] Since 1969, the New People's Army

has remained a persistent source of conflict for the Filipino government. Still pledging their

loyalty to the Maoist movement and renouncing their loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party

(CCP), the New People's Army has been a wrecking force in the Philippines, contributing to the

deaths of over 40,000 civilians and acting as a thorn for consecutive administrations.[32]

---

[29] Ochia, "PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT IN MINDANAO, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES," 65-67.
[30] Mary Arnado, "Philippines: Seizing the Opportunity Offered by the Bangsamoro Transition Extension," (United States Institute of Peace, August 5, 2022).
[31] Jacinto C. Ligot, "Communist Insurgency in the Philippines," Thesis, (Naval Postgraduate School, 1994), 1-28.
[32] William Norman Holden, "The Never Ending War in the Wounded Land: The New People's Army on Samar," (*Journal of Geography and Geology* 5, no. 4 2013), 29.

Having already solved the Moro conflict, Malaysia finds itself in a strategic position to also facilitate the end of the Maoist insurgency in the Philippines.

Firstly, Malaysia's identity allows it to be a credible peacemaker in the conflict. According to the Peacemaker's Toolkit, a mediators understanding of their own readiness to mediate – on the basis of their identity, past experiences, credibility etc. – is essential.[33] Not only does Malaysia enjoy strong historical ties with the Philippines – for instance both were founding members of ASEAN – but Malaysia has proven itself as an effective peacemaker with the Philippines with its efforts during the Moro conflict. Moreover, Malaysia has direct experience dealing with communist insurgencies on its own soil; Under British rule, the British government declared a state of emergency against the Malayan Communist Party and embarked on a low-intensity, 41-year conflict that culminated in the Malaysian government signing a peace agreement with the Malayan Communist Party in 1989. Since then, the communist insurgency in Malaysia has ceased to exist.[34]

Secondly, in Malaysia's role as a peacemaker, it must ensure that the conflict is 'ripe' for resolution; As the conflict is 'ripe', Malaysia is supremely positioned to step-in and facilitate negotiations. Although the Filipino government claims that it has made strong progress in defeating the insurgents, the conflict has continued on for 50 years and each subsequent administration has been forced to reassess its initial promises to end the conflict. Even the Duterte administration, which positioned itself as being uniquely placed to solve the conflict due to Duterte's past involvement in radical socialist organizations, routinely oscillated between holding peace talks which failed and declaring all-out war. On the other side, the New People's Army has been struggling with basic food and security needs, financial support, and growing

---

[33] Smith and Smock, "Managing a Mediation Process," 21-31

[34] Wen-Qing Ngoei. "The 'Lessons' of Britain's Counterinsurgency in Malaya," (Home, 2019).

ideological divisions. Neither party outwardly has stated that they have given up, but given the length of the conflict, the constant return to the negotiating table, and the inability for either side to truly achieve victory, the conflict is poised for an end through a peace agreement.[35] Given Malaysia's expertise in negotiating with non-state actors on protracted conflicts, it would be well positioned to intervene.

With respect to how Malaysia should carry out the peacemaking process, it should first ensure that each major side to the conflict has a unified position. As was the case in the Moro conflict, there are a number of splinter groups that exist on the side of the communists; As of 2022, the Filipino government has identified 16 different groups.[36] Without having these groups come to an internal resolution themselves regarding their positions, independent negotiations made with any group are likely to be unsustainable, as was the 1986 Mount Data Peace Accord which was struck primarily by the Cordillera People's Group.[37] Malaysia could hold peace talks in an independent location, such as Kuala Lumpur, and facilitate – but not necessarily direct – internal peace talks amongst the communist forces. After the communist forces develop a comprehensive plan that incorporates all of their respective wishes, Malaysia could bring the Filipino government to the table as well. Unlike with many types of conflict negotiations, only track I, not track II, diplomacy would work in this situation. As the communist insurgency is fairly underground and doesn't officially control any large swaths of territory, track II diplomacy involving civil society would be difficult. Additionally, given the protracted nature of the conflict and civil society's limited engagement with the communists, the issue isn't acute enough to warrant the use of track II diplomacy. While Malaysia suggesting that the Filipino government

[35] Jack Broome, "An End in Sight for the Philippines' Maoist Insurgency?," (The Diplomat, February 19, 2021).
[36] Camille Elemia, "Philippines Brands 16 Groups as Communist Party 'Terrorist' Affiliates," (Benar News, February 23, 2022).
[37] UNPO, "Cordillera: Mount Data Peace Accord Turns Twenty Five," (UNPO, December 14, 2022).

cede any territory to the communist insurgencies is unthinkable, given how contrary their ideology and system of governance runs to that of the current government, they should implore the Filipino government to cede economic benefits to the communists. As the communists have been struggling to financially maintain themselves, and their conflict is rooted in a class struggle, a form of economic guarantee within the existing system may be necessary. A system similar to the cash transfers the Filipino government provides the ARMM would be optimal. Moreover, the Malaysian government suggesting that the Filipino government provide legal immunity to decommissioned fighters, as it did during the Moro conflict, would incentivize the communists to come to the table as they wouldn't be motivated to continue the conflict in the fears of legal retribution.

As the communist insurgency in the Philippines continues, Malaysia stands as the optimal peacemaker between the Filipino government and the various communist groups. Using the Moro peacemaking process as a template, Malaysia can help bring an end to this protracted conflict.

MALAYSIA AS A GLOBAL PEACEMAKER:

Malaysia's history and expertise in peacemaking uniquely positions the state to get involved in several conflicts around the world. While credibility, or lack thereof, can inhibit the ability of states to get involved in the politics of other countries, Malaysia has developed an identity as a peacemaker. Malaysia's history of engagement in Asia and UN peacekeeping operations since the latter half of the 20th century highlight its willingness and interest in maintaining peace. Moreover, Malaysia's unique combination of expertise and credibility doesn't only make it suited for facilitating peacemaking in its home region. Malaysia can facilitate the peacemaking process among groups outside of its home region. Conflict in Darfur can act as a case study to explain Malaysia's potential to engage in peacemaking outside Asia.

Darfur, a region in Western Sudan, has been wrought by conflict, bloody violence, and ethnic and tribal divisions.[38] Historically, division and conflict has marred the region. Most notable, however, is the long-lasting clash between Dafurian farmers and Arab herders. Sudan has two predominant agricultural systems. Farmers in Darfur rely on rain-fed production, while herders are nomadic pastoralists.[39] In the past, the two groups maintained relatively peaceful relations via a mutual agreement.[40]

The adverse impacts of climate change created the perfect storm for unraveling the groups' peace agreement. Climate change has limited access to water and land, which has negatively impacted crop yields. As climate change worsens, the desert in northern Sudan has slowly crept southwards by 60 miles, rainfall has fallen by upwards of 30%, and yields in

---

[38] Sydney Kamen. "The World's First Climate Change Conflict Continues." Council on Foreign Relations, December 10, 2021. https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/worlds-first-climate-change-conflict-continues.
[39] Chase Sova. "The First Climate Change Conflict." World Food Program USA (blog), November 30, 2017. https://www.wfpusa.org/articles/the-first-climate-change-conflict/.
[40] Kamen, "The World's First Climate Change Conflict Continues."

sorghum have fallen.[41] These combined phenomena sparked conflict between herders and farmers by causing competition for access to water points, pastures, and grazing areas.[42] While other conflicts in Sudan have different explanatory factors, climate change is undoubtedly a driver for conflict between herders and farmers in Darfur.[43]

Facilitating talks between the involved parties is the most important step in peacemaking. Before talks can be facilitated, the facilitator must ensure that the involved parties are willing to approach the table and develop an agreed-upon solution. Drafurian farmers have taken a hard-line stance against herders in the region. They have asserted exclusive control over land and water that was once shared.[44] Land and water are finite in Darfur. As such, it is necessary to establish control over remaining resources to guarantee survival. Herders have responded by attacking farmers, crops, food stock, and cattle.[45] There have also been attempts to reach peaceful agreements in the interim.[46] While it appears that violence is the preferred tool of both parties, farmers and herders demonstrate a willingness to negotiate. The conflict is ripe for mediation and a facilitator can realistically bring both groups to the negotiating table.

Malaysia can bring them to the negotiating table. A potential pacemaker would need to adjust the cost-benefit analysis of elites. Readjustment of elites' thought processes can start with an emphasis on the costs of conflict.[47] While both parties believe that sustained violence is sufficient for securing their goals, they must realize that they'll continue to incur high costs in the

[41]Julian Borger, "Darfur Conflict Heralds Era of Wars Triggered by Climate Change, UN Report Warns," *The Guardian*, June 23, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2007/jun/23/sudan.climatechange.
[42] Kamen, "The World's First Climate Change Conflict Continues."
[43]Stephan Faris, "The Real Roots of Darfur," The Atlantic, April 1, 2007, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/04/the-real-roots-of-darfur/305701/.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Sudan Tribune, "43 People Killed in Fresh Tribal Clashes in West Darfur: OCHA," Sudan Tribune, November 25, 2021, https://sudantribune.com/article226404/.
[46] Dabanga, "Peace Negotiations: Darfur Almost Final, SPLM-N Make Demand," Radio Dabanga, August 24, 2020, https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/peace-negotiations-darfur-almost-final-splm-n-make-demand.
[47] Smith and Smock, "Managing a Mediation Process," 35-36.

process. No single party has been immune from costs in this turbulent conflict. Herders have been killed at the hands of farmers. Farmers have not only been killed but have also had their farms and villages ravaged.[48] If things continue on their current path, both sides will experience more intense violence as climate change further reduces the resources available to both parties.

Additionally, a potential peacemaker can leverage the legacy of previous negotiations to make involved parties more willing to negotiate.[49] In the past, successful negotiations have maintained peace between most herder and farmer groups in the region. These agreements were previously successful, but they didn't account for the multiplying factor that climate change would have on conflict by limiting available resources. By referencing these previously successful attempts and pushing farmer and herder groups to develop a peace framework that considers the effect of climate change, it may be possible to instill hope for a peaceful resolution in the parties.[50]

As stated, Malaysia is uniquely positioned to facilitate peace talks between farmers and herders in Darfur. While other African countries or groups in the region can intervene, Malaysia has a track record for peacemaking. That track record is foundational to its reputation and credibility.[51] The credibility cultivated by Malaysia can then be used to influence the decision-making rationale of competing parties without being hampered by suspicion. Specifically, Malaysian leaders can leverage the country's history which entails more than 50 years of experience in regional and international peacekeeping. Malaysia also possesses experience with African peacekeeping operations. It has contributed to 9 peacekeeping missions on the continent.[52] If actors suspect that a third party is attempting to intervene for wholly

[48] Sudan Tribune, "43 People Killed in Fresh Tribal Clashes in West Darfur: OCHA."
[49] Smith et al., "Managing a Mediation Process," 35-36.
[50] Ibid, 45-46.
[51] Ibid, 26-27.
[52] United Nations, "Troop and Police Contributors," United Nations Peacekeeping, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors.

self-serving reasons, they will be hesitant to trust the third party. However, Malaysia has the credibility needed to assuage fears.

Additionally, groups in the same region in Sudan may be viewed with suspicion because of potential bias. This isn't to say that there are no suitable third-party actors in the region that can facilitate peace talks in the conflict. Some groups in the region have assisted with peace talks in the past, such as the Sudanese government and the SRF rebel alliance.[53] Instead, it is to highlight that Malaysia's established reputation can make it a viable facilitator in peace talks between herders and farmers in Darfur by overcoming the aforementioned challenges other potential peacemakers might encounter.

The next important step will be facilitating vertical discussions among parties. Herders and farmers are not monoliths. They comprise multiple social groups along the lines of gender, ethnicity, religion, ideology, and much more. As such, these groups should discuss amongst themselves to develop a unified position representing their larger interests as a collective.[54] Each social group should identify leaders that can best speak to and advocate for their interests. After each group selects its own representatives, these representatives should discuss amongst themselves to develop a unified position. Herders and farmers both comprise numerous social groups. Therefore it's impossible to have the two groups develop a workable solution that satisfies everyone without developing a model of discussion that takes into account the concerns of the groups involved at every level.

Malaysia can assist as a peacemaker by facilitating this process of vertical negotiations. It's unlikely that every major herding and farming group will have the means to communicate amongst themselves. Therefore, a viable peacemaker must be able to provide the means for

---

[53] Dabanga, "Peace Negotiations: Darfur Almost Final, SPLM-N Make Demand."
[54] Smith et al., "Managing a Mediation Process," 41.

communication. A larger actor, such as Malaysia, can provide a venue for communication, provide transportation, coordinate communication, and facilitate the discussion process.[55] Not every group will have the means to be involved, but a viable peacemaker will have the capacity to support the involved parties and remove barriers to negotiation.[56]

Once farmers and herders have engaged in internal discussions, they can begin negotiating with one another. It must be emphasized that the job of a peacemaker should not be developing a solution for the involved parties but instead facilitating the parties' development of a solution. Some tactics a peacemaker such as Malaysia can employ is helping define the scope of negotiations.[57] While the groups may have a host of grievances they want to discuss, it's important to keep discussions focused. Malaysia can positively influence the discussions as a third-party peacemaker by narrowing the scope of talks to focus on territorial agreements and developing a strategy for accounting for the impact of climate change. While involved parties may attempt to use the forum to discuss issues related to ethnic division or religious conflicts, the effective third party can help the parties identify and focus discussions on key issues. Such a narrowing of scope will be especially important given the ethnic divisions that undergird conflict in Sudan. Climate change is undoubtedly the root cause of conflict between herders and farmers. However, certain groups among the farmers or herders may seek to derail the discussions by focusing on disagreements rooted in ethnicity. It's critical that a neutral third-party assists in focusing the scope of discussions.

By facilitating dialogues within and between groups, providing a framework for understanding conflict, and developing a solution, Malaysia can be an effective peacemaker in the conflict between farmers and herders in Darfur. Demonstrating Malaysia's suitability

---

[55] Ibid, 42.
[56] Ibid, 26-27.
[57] Ibid, 44.

provides vital insight for how Malaysia can get involved in peacekeeping missions outside of its own region. Peacekeepers play an important role in managing geopolitical tensions in their home region, but they also possess expertise and capabilities that can be applied outside of their region to help resolve conflict. Peacekeepers have a utility that spans the globe. Each possesses unique strengths that make it especially suited to facilitate the peacemaking process in various instances. Exploring Malaysia's suitability in facilitating the peacemaking process is only one example of this truth.

Bibliography

Abuza, Zachary. "The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28, no. 6 (2005): 453–79. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100500236881.

Arnado, Mary. "Philippines: Seizing the Opportunity Offered by the Bangsamoro Transition Extension." United States Institute of Peace, August 5, 2022. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/08/philippines-seizing-opportunity-offered-bangsa moro-transition-extension.

Borger, Julian. "Darfur Conflict Heralds Era of Wars Triggered by Climate Change, UN Report Warns." *The Guardian*, June 23, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2007/jun/23/sudan.climatechange.

Broome, Jack "An End in Sight for the Philippines' Maoist Insurgency?" – The Diplomat. for The Diplomat, February 19, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/an-end-in-sight-for-the-philippines-maoist-insurgency/.

CISAC Staff . "MMP: Moro National Liberation Front." CISAC, 2019. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/moro-national-liberation-front#text _block_20212.

Crost, Benjamin, Joseph H. Felter, and Patrick B. Johnston. "Conditional Cash Transfers, Civil Conflict and Insurgent Influence: Experimental Evidence from the Philippines." *Journal of Development Economics* 118 (2016): 171–82. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.08.005.

Dabanga. "Peace Negotiations: Darfur Almost Final, SPLM-N Make Demand." Radio Dabanga, August 24, 2020. https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/peace-negotiations-darfur-almost-final -splm-n-make-demand.

Elemia, Camille. "Philippines Brands 16 Groups as Communist Party 'Terrorist' Affiliates." Benar News, February 23, 2022. https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/philippine/philippines-brands-16-groups-as-com munist-party-terrorist-affiliates-02232022120312.html.

Faris, Stephan. "The Real Roots of Darfur." The Atlantic, April 1, 2007. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/04/the-real-roots-of-darfur/305701/.

Global Initiative. "Insecurity in Mindanao ." Global Initiative , 2020. https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Mindanao.PB_.10.02.webv1-1.pdf.

Gourtsilidou, Maria. "Ranked: Military Strength of Nations, 2020 (Comparing Global Armed Forces)." CEOWORLD magazine, March 3, 2020.

https://ceoworld.biz/2020/03/03/ranked-military-strength-of-nations-2020-comparing-global-armed-forces/.

Hamdan, Rizal. "Malaysia Must Play Proactive Intermediary Role in OIC," May 2021. https://www.nst.com.my/opinion/columnists/2021/05/689937/malaysia-must-play-proactive-intermediary-role-oic.

Holden, William Norman. "The Never Ending War in the Wounded Land: The New People's Army on Samar." *Journal of Geography and Geology* 5, no. 4 (2013). https://doi.org/10.5539/jgg.v5n4p29.

Iqbal, Minister Mohagher. "PEACETALK: Malaysia and Its Role in the GPH-MILF Peace Process." MindaNews, July 18, 2018. https://www.mindanews.com/mindaviews/2018/07/peacetalk-malaysia-and-its-role-in-the-gph-milf-peace-process/.

Kästle, Klaus. "Political and Administrative Map of Malaysia." Political Map of Malaysia - Nations Online Project, www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/malaysia_map.htm.

Kamen, Sydney. "The World's First Climate Change Conflict Continues." Council on Foreign Relations, December 10, 2021. https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/worlds-first-climate-change-conflict-continues.

Ligot, Jacinto C. "Communist Insurgency in the Philippines." Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1994.

Mahinay, Krizza Janica. "Writing Malaysia and the Moro Identity: An Analysis of the Moro National Liberation Front's Foreign Policy." Insight Turkey, December 21, 2018. https://www.insightturkey.com/articles/writing-malaysia-and-the-moro-identity-an-analysis-of-the-moro-national-liberation-fronts-foreign-policy.

"Malaysia." Malaysia - Place Explorer - Data Commons. Accessed December 7, 2022. https://datacommons.org/place/country/MYS?utm_medium=explore&mprop=amount&popt=EconomicActivity&cpv=activitySource%2CGrossDomesticProduction&hl=en.

Mahaseth, Harsh. "The Role of Malaysia in ASEAN." Modern Diplomacy, January 12, 2021. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/10/28/the-role-of-malaysia-in-asean/.

Nik, Ramli. "Indonesia-Malaysia's Strategic Contribution Towards International Peace and Security." The Journal of Defence and Security, Vol. 9, No.1 (2018): 69 - 75.

Ngoei, Wen-Qing. "The 'Lessons' of Britain's Counterinsurgency in Malaya." Home, 2019. https://www.historians.org/research-and-publications/perspectives-on-history/summer-2019/the-lessons-of-britains-counterinsurgency-in-malaya.

Ochiai, Naoyuki. "PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT IN MINDANAO, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES." JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development, December 2020.

"Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)." EEAS, Accessed December 8, 2022. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/organisation-islamic-cooperation-oic_en.

"Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations." Malaysia Permanent Mission to the United Nations, December 15, 2020. https://www.un.int/malaysia/.

Pero, Siti, and Laila Suriya Ahmad Apandi. "Malaysia's Leadership Role in Asean: An Assessment." Journal of International Studies Vol. 14, (2018).

Shaikh Mohd Saifuddeen B Shaikh Mohd Salleh. "Malaysia's Role in Revitalising OIC." Laman Web Rasmi: Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia (IKIM). Accessed December 8, 2022. https://www.ikim.gov.my/index.php/2003/09/26/malaysias-role-in-revitalising-oic/.

Smith, Amy, and David R. Smock. Managing a Mediation Process. Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2008.

Sova, Chase. "The First Climate Change Conflict." *World Food Program USA* (blog), November 30, 2017. https://www.wfpusa.org/articles/the-first-climate-change-conflict/.

Sudan Tribune. "43 People Killed in Fresh Tribal Clashes in West Darfur: OCHA." Sudan Tribune, November 25, 2021. https://sudantribune.com/article226404/.

The Tripoli Agreement of December 23, 1976 § (1976).

UCA Staff. "University of Central Arkansas: UCA." Political Science, 2022. https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/philippinesmoro-national-liberation-front-1968-present/.

United Nations. "Service and Sacrifice: Malaysian Peacekeepers in Lebanon Proud to Serve Their Homeland and the United Nations." United Nations, March 21, 2019. https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/03/1035131.

United Nations. "Troop and Police Contributors." United Nations Peacekeeping, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors.

UNPO. "Cordillera: Mount Data Peace Accord Turns Twenty Five." UNPO. Accessed December 14, 2022. https://www.unpo.org/article/13227.

NEW ZEALAND

Douglas Stuart-Brookes, Sang Nguyen, and Anita R. Vazquez

NEW ZEALAND'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON PEACEMAKING:

The colonized state of New Zealand was created in 1840 through the Treaty of Waitangi, yet Aotearoa (the Māori name of the islands, and now of the state) has been inhabited throughout its history as a Pacific Island. This history has left a shadow over how New Zealand has worked for peace, stability and security as a state with a dual identity. These factors have combined to give Aotearoa New Zealand a unique place in the global efforts of peacemaking and consensus-based peace creation as a state that engages deeply in the Pacific.

Independent Foriegn Policy and the Treaty of Waitangi

New Zealand has assisted peace processes within the Pacific, where it has a keen interest in ensuring state survival and stability, alongside ideological desires to uphold democracy and human rights. Aotearoa is a 'larger state' in the Pacific, was a founder of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and is a key supporter of the nations within the PIF through its relative economic size and population. King Charles III, as head of government and sovereign, is shared in personal union with the United Kingdom, along with 14 other Commonwealth realms such as Australia and Canada. Furthermore, Aotearoa has free associations through the King of New Zealand in Niue and the Cook Islands, which are smaller states in the PIF. These connections to the wider Pacific and significant smaller states serve as an anchor for work towards peace and stability creation globally for New Zealand.

New Zealander (Kiwi) Foreign Policy utilizes an independent and multilateral-led agenda, with special emphasis on the Pacific Islands Forum and the United Nations to engage regionally and globally. The 'independent foreign policy' is symbolic of national rhetoric to create a uniquely Kiwi approach of engagement between powerful states and multilateral fora.[1] The independent foreign policy is recognised as a feature of domestic rhetoric which is important for Aotearoa New Zealand, even if it shifts between governing parties and political posturing.[2] The Iraq War is a salient example of New Zealand threading its own path, rather than joining its close regional ally of Australia and strategic partner, the US in a conflict that may not be in Aotearoa's direct interest.[3] The independent foreign policy has been a political narrative, dating back to the 1930s in New Zealand, but comes to the fore when Kiwi actions differ from other Anglo states it might normally align with. This independence is coupled with multilateral ambitions, which fundamentally designates the difference in state stature that Aotearoa has, as a smaller state in the Pacific. New Zealand has engaged in significant partnerships with Latin American and Asian states, in recognition that further multilateral engagements are important to create like-minded coalitions of interests about the rule of law, trade and political stability.[4] This important reputation of independence gives New Zealand perceived flexibility in foreign actions, especially as a peacemaker 'less encumbered' by alliances.[5]

The Māori people began to settle in Aotearoa in the 14th century, as traditionally sea-faring Polynesian tribes. This has created a significant indigenous population who are afforded rights, protections and special privileges under the Treaty of Waitangi and the un-codified New Zealand Constitution. As a protected indigenous minority, the government of

---

[1] Yang, 2003, p.18.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] O'Brien, 2013, p. 21.
[5] *Ibid.*

Aotearoa New Zealand has fostered numerous peace making processes between the Pākehā (non-indigenous) and the Māori people to create equity and space.

The Treaty of Waitangi was created between the British Crown (now the Crown of New Zealand) and the Māori chiefs of the North Island in 1840, giving protection and rights to both peoples, with key privileges that have evolved over time. As a treaty that guides relations between colonizing peoples and those colonized, the Treaty of Waitangi was initially disregarded by the colonist government of New Zealand under the proviso of the Supreme Court of New Zealand.[6] This remained the main basis of legal understanding and legislation in Aotearoa until the 1970s, when Governments actively sought to improve Pākehā-Māori relations.[7] There have been indigenous title tribunals, Māori language promotion within society, and the granting of rights by the Pākehā government back to the Māori peoples in accordance with the 1840 Treaty.[8] This has created a significant change in the understanding of the laws operating in the state now officially named Aotearoa New Zealand, and how governments can operate to foster peace instead of continuing the violent injustices of colonialism. The Kiwi Government was given a mandate to create settlements between the Crown - which signed the treaty - and the Māori peoples, to address past injustices.[9] This has arisen out of the reconciliation process between people, and the text differences that have arisen out of the Treaty of Waitangi.[10]

Ultimately, history has created a unique peace process and policy creation within the domestic politics of Aotearoa New Zealand. Such domestic processes have been transposed to the Indo-Pacific region, where Kiwi foreign policy interests are most clear in the promotion of peace to end violent conflict.

---

[6] Morris, 2004.
[7] *Ibid*.
[8] Matson, 1991, pp. 343-4.
[9] Hayward, 2019, p. 399.
[10] *Ibid*, p. 402.

History as a Peacemaker

The Solomon Islands and the Bougainville peace processes demonstrate the importance of regional smaller actors in brokering or assisting sporadic and necessary efforts to create peace. These capabilities were spun up due to the deterioration of situations close to New Zealand, in states with a direct link to its security and regional interests. These peace processes are demonstrative of how Aotearoa responds to its own regional position as a support pillar for a variety of Polynesian, Melanesian and Micronesian states that are smaller than it in the global system.

In the Solomon Islands, New Zealand attempted to include Christian and other social organizations in the discussions and facilitated delegates attending through the Royal New Zealand Navy and Air Force.[11] Even as this failed, there were efforts from the Kiwi government to broaden engagement across Solomon Islander society on a wide range of issues that could be addressed through dialogue, especially safety concerns.[12] This was a process that highlighted the cross-societal institutional primacy in Aotearoa's foreign policy, through close alignment to key partners such as Australia and the wider PIF. These frameworks served the intervention in the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, rather than unilateral action from one state. In this regional partnership, the first phase of the peacemaking process to ensure the surrender of weapons to give the Islanders peace and security.

In similar stead, the role of New Zealand in the Bougainville peace process has been alliance-based consensus-backed peace building for regional stability. In 1997, New Zealand worked to diffuse the ability of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and the Papua New Guinean Defence Force (PNGDF) to attack each other, while holding major peace talks

---

[11] Maebuta, 2012, p. 95.
[12] *Id.*

incognito to establish critical dialogues.[13] The involvement of Sandline as mercenaries and the failed attempts by the Papua New Guinea Government to use their services created "unanimity" against further violence allowed for "aggressive diplomatic initiative" to be taken by Aotearoaʻs Foreign Minister Don McKinnon.[14] This created a society-wide effort to bridge gaps between the BRA, the government in Port Moresby and actors across society in Bougainville from the New Zealand Government. The use of Burnham on Aotearoaʻs South Island as a safe, third party and neutral place for talks is considered a breakthrough in the peace process by creating key dialogues between leaders who would not have formally engaged with each other.[15] These talks created wider understanding and "commit[ment]" from the parties, involving most if not all of the "key national players," which signifies the flexible and needs-based approach taken by New Zealand.[16] Through initiating innovative and highly useful talks, the Kiwi Government was able to directly ensure the promotion of peaceful outcomes within a safe and secure context for all parties involved in Bougainville. This reflects the policy goals of Aotearoa New Zealand, to ensure peace, safety and security through a uniquely independent methodology.

---

[13] Braithwaite et al, 2010, p. 44-45.
[14] Ibid, p. 46.
[15] Ibid, pp. 46-8.
[16] Ibid, p. 47.

NEW ZEALAND AS A REGIONAL PEACEMAKER:

Māori Identity in Foreign Policy:

New Zealand has an obligation to use its unique history to help foster peace in a destabilizing time in history. Unlike larger powers (i.e. U.S., France, Great Britain, Canada) who have a compromising record in which they uphold a racial order or human rights abuses in colonizing other regions, New Zealand has been able to incorporate the customs of the Māori people and work towards reconciliation.[17] The Kiwi experience repairing relations between Māori and Pākehā through the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975 are tributes to New Zealand's willingness to "achieve reconciliation domestically."[18] Furthermore, as put forth by the New Zealand Alternative Group, the Kiwi notion of peace is founded in Māori words of Te Tiriti o Waitangi.[19] Te Tiriti o Waitangi is the commitment to peace domestically and its transmission into the global sphere. The document refers to "te rongo ki a rātou me te Atanoho hoki" when translated means "lasting peace and ... tranquil living" that must be secured.[20] In order to honor both New Zealand's Māori heritage and reconcile with the wrongs committed by the Pākehā, Te Tiriti o Waitangi must be honored in New Zealand's foreign policy, especially when promoting peace mediation.[21] The incorporation of tikanga Māori in Aotearoa's nation-building can serve as an example for other countries struggling with multicultural identities.

New Zealand prides itself in recognising and centering Māori identity along with its established reputation of good global citizenship. Aotearoa has supported decolonization efforts

---

[17] O'Brien, 2016b.
[18] Harris et al. 2018, p. 12.
[19] *Ibid*, p. 12.
[20] *Ibid*, p. 12.
[21] *Ibid*, p. 12.

when it was unpopular to go against major powers like the French, U.S., and Britain. Domestic NGOs and grassroots organizing has influenced how New Zealand enacts its foreign policy. From anti-Vietnam protests, anti-apartheid, anti-nuclear proliferation and testing, "Women's and Maori groups, made their voices heard on issues such as peace, justice, indigenous rights, immigration, and investment, each with foreign policy implications".[22]

New Zealand's reputation for promoting peace efforts through "peacekeeping, the generosity of refugee quota, the levels of aid (overseas development assistance) for poverty reduction and contributions to the climate change negotiations and for environmental protections"; while also working as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council three times, can be credited to its practice of tikanga Māori promotion.[23]

Women, Peace, Bougainville, Maori Culture:

New Zealand's incorporation of Māori culture and traditions in its identity and foreign policy is done with the intent to promote one of its core beliefs of enhancing peace around its neighbors and international community through women's inclusion in government and peacemaking. This has helped New Zealand forge the path of becoming a peacemaking state. Founded on its history as a colony of the British Crown and its relationship with the indigenous Māori people, New Zealand has been able to utilize its own experience with conflict to help countries in the Pacific region. The successes of the Waitangi Tribunal, which promotes restorative justice at the national level by the government of New Zealand, has allowed New Zealand to replicate this effort of partnership, participation, protection of indigenous rights as part of its foreign policy and identity.

---

[22] Hoadley 1995, p. 4-5
[23] O'Brien 2016b, p. 10.

Specifically, the blending of Māori culture into New Zealand's national identity promotes furthering the role of women in political change and peace operations.[24] The use of indigenous culture and bolstering of women's participation helped promote peace in Bougainville. Māori culture is a matriarchal and matrilineal tradition where women are more active and equally respected to men. Upon realizing the shortfalls of armed intervention in creating the necessary space for peace and trust, commander Brigadier Roger Mortlock of the Kiwi contingent used the power of waiata to promote cultural exchange and relationship building as part of the Truce Monitoring Group in 1997.[25] Maori soldiers were able to relate to Bougainvilleans on account of their shared matrilineal identity. Navy Sailor Aaron Pau and Naval Officer Rata Wairama were a part of the Truce Monitoring Group under commander Mortlock. Aaron Pau believes the shared likeness in their indigenous culture with Bougainvilleans helped create a common ground.[26] Pau references that "women are tied to the land just as the Māori culture is" and both peoples share similar deities; Maori culture has Rangi and Papa, which is the Earth Mother and Sky Father and Bougainvilleans have similar figures they worship as well.[27]

On a similar note, Bougainvillean women have a vital role in family and clan life. They determine kinship, marriages, track and disseminate clan history, land rights, and the inheritance of land.[28] Although being dominant in social priorities, Bougainvillean politics was historically a man's sphere that women were not expected or at time even allowed to enter.[29]

The Bougainville civil war saw a breakdown of order. Bougainvillean women's groups and indigenous leaders entered the political arena to push for peace. They utilized "prayer

---

[24] Harris et al, 2018.
[25] New Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade, "A Risky Assignment-Bougainville."
[26] Perera, 2019.
[27] *Ibid*.
[28] Garasu, 2002.
[29] *Ibid*.

meetings, reconciliation ceremonies, peace marches and petitions" and the financial backing of the Australian and Kiwi government to push peace efforts.[30]

Along with the Kiwi government, NGOs such as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom formed connections with formal links with the Leitana Nehan Women's Development Agency on Buka Island and Bougainvillean women.[31] The assistance from the New Zealand branch of WILPF included humanitarian response workshops, trauma counseling for rape victims and war widows, actions to combat domestic violence due to the lack of stable law enforcement, and financial support for women and children.[32]

The Kiwi government financed Bougainvillean women's groups and hosted peace talks where women had their own space to discuss what peace entails and how to rebuild relationships.[33] The Bougainville Women's Summit in August 2001, funded by the New Zealand Government, fostered the promotion of women's rights and participation in politics and peace. Furthermore, the summit created "an opportunity for women to inform themselves of the content of the Peace Agreement, and to explore ways in which women could contribute to the socio-economic and political development of the new Bougainville".[34] The discussions solidified the need of establishing a woman's political body under the new Bougainville Autonomous Government to ensure that conflict never breaks out on such a large scale again.[35] New Zealand's ability to give a voice to Bougainvillean women in both formal peace process talks and supporting them on the ground has established them as peacebuilders and fostering peacemaking.[36] To this day, the peace process carved out women's inclusion in government. The

---

[30] *Ibid.*
[31] Saovana-Spriggs, 2007.
[32] Saovana-Spriggs, 2007.
[33] Garasu, 2002.
[34] *Ibid.*
[35] *Ibid.*
[36] New Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade, "A Risky Assignment-Bougainville".

Autonomous Bougainville Government parliament has three reserved seats for women and currently includes four women as MPs.[37]

New Zealand sponsored peace talks on two separate occasions: Burnham 1 Leaders Meeting held in the Burnham Military Barracks in New Zealand on 5-8 July 1997 and the Lincoln University in Christchurch, New Zealand on 15-23 January 1998. Each event gave Bougainvillean women space to consolidate their unity for peace and use this ""unity" as a force to continue to challenge and pressure their male counterparts to be open and be honest with each other, to think about people on the ground and not their own interests, and to forge unity amongst themselves for the good of everyone".[38]

New Zealand-style restorative justice principles and training helped Bougainville embrace peace. A vital detail is New Zealand's leadership in allowing the warring parties and natives to reach their own terms of peace. Rather than imposing and forcing intervention on peace talks, New Zealand provided a secure environment which allowed for peace talks to flourish on *Bougainvillean* terms.[39] The Kiwis created space for facilitation, while giving back power to the locals who were most affected by the conflict.

---

[37] *Ibid*.
[38] Saovana-Spriggs, 2007, p. 71-72.
[39] Braithwaite, 2010, p. 119.

NEW ZEALAND AS A GLOBAL PEACEMAKER:

New Zealand and Non-Proliferation

The efforts for New Zealand to become part of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone have become a key part of its peacemaking efforts through becoming a norm-setter within the global agenda. This is furthered today through the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which exemplifies the efforts of Aotearoa to create a more peaceful and safe world. New Zealand has observed the direct impact of Nuclear Weapons testing by both the UK and France. In multilateral partnership, New Zealand has become a key part of disarmament efforts to set global targets for action.

New Zealand's Parliament acted after the broader social pressure within Aotearoa, as there were widespread campaigns to remove the influence of nuclear weapons in the Pacific. These campaigns were predicated on the close experiences of Kiwis with Anglo-French testing, in South Australia and French Polynesia alongside the US's large-scale testing in its Pacific territories. The New Zealand Government acted against these tests in the 1960s and 1970s, setting norms of smaller states to act outright against the P5's nuclear ambitions.[40] These campaigns from 1962 were fierce and longstanding, becoming a key part of the independent foreign policy of New Zealand due to the concern for the environment and health by the Kiwi population.[41] Critical support for not only Aotearoa and its people, but for Samoa and Kiribati among others was given by Wellington - furthering its agenda setting movement against nuclear weapons.

---

[40] Capie, 2019, p. 381-2.
[41] *Ibid*, p. 382.

Combined with protests around the Vietnam War - which New Zealand participated in - the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) found significant assistance from the Labour Party (sic), which gave cross-societal support.[42] This created a social understanding for movements about peace within Aotearoa, as radical changes questioned existing defense relationships, the paradigm of Pākehā-Māori relations and the place of New Zealand within multilateral disarmament fora.[43] These domestic settings have become vitally important, as disarmament has become a key aspect of New Zealand's foreign policy and reputation as a peacemaker. The CND gained cross-societal approval, and assisted the change in public opinion away from opposition towards the banning of Nuclear Weapons in New Zealand, and then globally. In 1984-5, the Kiwi government legislated the Weapons Ban at the national level, which prompted an "extraordinarily vigorous and negative response" from P5 states, while smaller states in Pacific at the very least tacitly endorsed, if not supported the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.[44] This illustrates the security implications of Aotearoa's decision to go against the major powers, considering the Pacific superpower projection of the United States and the nuclear armed powers of France and UK.[45]

All of New Zealand's actions that have contributed towards global disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons happened in the face of the ANZUS Treaty which served as a defense pact between the close wartime allies of Australia, New Zealand and the United States. This key treaty was suspended for the Kiwis by President Reagan as Aotearoa continued its nuclear-free policy - in contrast to Australia, where ANZUS is regarded as central and operative to defense. Such relations with the US were thawed by the Fifth National Government, but are

---

[42] *Ibid*, p. 381-4.
[43] Clements, 1988, p. 400; Muhall, 1985, p. 75.
[44] *Ibid*, p. 401.
[45] Clements, 1988, p. 402

overshadowed by the AUKUS agreement, which has tied Australia closer to the US and its nuclear umbrella.[46]

This has led to New Zealand becoming further entrenched within global efforts to disarm, particularly as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has become a potent agenda to end these weapons. Aotearoa is a key mover of the TPNW, and NPT review conferences to ensure global efforts to disarm eventuate.[47] This is an evolving policy space, but a clear example of Aotearoa New Zealand's diplomatic outreach within multilateral forums. The push to disarm has become a key part of New Zealand's identity and diplomatic efforts, especially as global conflicts - hot and cold - threaten stability.[48] The efforts of New Zealand in disarmament and the promotion of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones demonstrates the peacemaking of New Zealand in a microcosm; as a state that moves innovative domestic solutions into the global stage through its multilateral peacemaking approaches.

Sustainable development as Kiwi Foreign Policy:

New Zealand's embrace of sustainable development serves as both a guiding notion in its domestic efforts to address climate change and an effective tool in its foreign policy strategy. Lacking the diplomatic and financial resources of larger nations, New Zealand's incorporation of the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in its foreign policy framework allows the island nation to gain an outsized amount of diplomatic clout, leveraging its image as a model of good governance and environmental stability in order to advance its strategic interests. New Zealand's approach to development aid and its involvement in global climate discussions

---

[46] Bristow, 2022.
[47] NZ MFAT, 2022.
[48] *Ibid*, 2022.

highlight the central role sustainable development serves in both maintaining Kiwi influence within the Oceania region and projecting soft power on the global stage.

New Zealand's development aid program, NZAID, is an outgrowth of the original official development assistance (ODA) program, an initiative intimately linked with Kiwi foreign policy in the post-colonial Pacific region. Unlike its predecessor, which was directly controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and used its resources to directly fund the governments of its fledgling neighbors, NZAID was a semi-autonomous program which initially dealt with eliminating poverty in its Oceanic and Asian neighbors.[49] Funding for NZAID efforts would be provided by MFAT; however, the program served as a wholly humanitarian effort divorced from the government's specific foreign policy agendas. The transition from eliminating poverty to promoting sustainable development began in 2008, when, under the leadership of Foreign Minister Murray McCully, MFAT assumed complete control over NZAID and aligned the program's mission with Kiwi foreign policy.[50] NZAID has subsequently served as a powerful component in New Zealand's foreign strategy, with $531 million being allocated to development aid projects in the 2020.[51]

NZAID's current focus on economic development is directly tied to the Kiwi desire to maintain strong political and economic ties with strategically important Pacific neighbors. Development projects are especially effective tools for soft power projection among the small Oceania nations, as these are the countries in most need of economic development due to their geographic isolation and limited economic resources. Among the freely associated states of Niue and the Cook Islands, New Zealand's heavy investment in infrastructure, education, and health services not only serves to bolster friendly relations, but also prevents these already

---

[49] Banks et al., 2012, p. 170
[50] Spratt and Wood, 2018, p. 25-7
[51] OECD, 2019

economically-dependent states from devolving into potential security risks.[52] New Zealand's strategy of allowing recipient countries to direct their own aid programs, in addition to their prioritization of practical, highly visible development projects, serves to strengthen their regional image and promotes solidarity among Pacific nations. While the smaller island nations of Oceania still recognize the vast disparity in resources between themselves and New Zealand, the latter's economic development strategy promotes NZAID as a form of economic partnership rather than international charity.

In addition to projecting regional power, NZAID's focus on sustainable development contributes to the nation's goal of becoming a model of effective climate policy. A leader in developing and implementing the concept of the "Blue Economy," New Zealand positions itself as a responsible global citizen in the fight against climate change.[53] While the nation's own record decreasing greenhouse emissions is mixed at best (it produces some of the highest rates of greenhouse gasses and mitigates its carbon footprint using controversial emission trading schemes), NZAID's focus on environmental sustainability in its development projects promote its image as an active combatant against climate change.[54] Focusing operations in the Global South, Kiwi development aid allows New Zealand to form close ties to those most affected by climate change. Similar to its regional projects, NZAID's global initiatives focus on developing practical infrastructure across Asia, Africa, and Central America. Instead of simply speaking for the small island nations of the Pacific, global NZAID programs, in addition to New Zealand's advocacy for climate refugees, enables Wellington to represent its partner countries when discussing matters of climate security.[55] New Zealand's development aid strategy is used to

---

[52] Bertram and Watters, 1984, p. 313-6
[53] Winder and Heron, 2017, p. 20-4
[54] Hopkins et al., 2015
[55] Stanley and Williamson, 2021, p. 1260

increase diplomatic clout in the political arena, allowing them to serve as the global voice for smaller nations and victims of climate change.

Taken together, New Zealand's investment in development aid may also support its foreign strategy by asserting its clout in a region fast becoming a key area of competition between larger powers. As the United States and Australia attempt to counter China's increasing influence in Oceania, New Zealand's ties with its NZAID collaborators provide it with the diplomatic power needed to maintain its independent foreign policy.[56] New Zealand's regional status, built by its relationships with Pacific development partners, allows New Zealand to remain somewhat neutral in the struggle between its main security partners and its largest trading affiliate.[57] Should tensions escalate, New Zealand may even utilize its position as an independent stakeholder to serve as a peacemaker between the two sides, leveraging its regional power and reputation to deescalate competition and protect its own political and economic interests.

Conclusion

Aotearoa New Zealand has shaped its international identity as one that is intrinsically linked to Māori culture, as a norm generator within the international agenda through responsible multilateral-forward global citizenship. The Kiwi Government and citizenry have created a capacity much larger than the size of New Zealand, through a multifaceted effort to create peace, anchored by the linkages of Aotearoa within the Pacific. In a multitude of peacebuilding efforts, Aotearoa New Zealand has emphasized women's involvement in politics and in the peacemaking processes after conflicts, as a bulwark for disarmament and the global elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and as a state that embraces sustainable development in both the domestic and international sphere to combat climate change.

[56] Kollner, 2019, p. 12
[57] O'Brien, 2016, p. 23

Bibliography

"A Risky Assignment - Bougainville." n.d. Www.mfat.govt.nz. Accessed November 15, 2022. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/cn/about-us/mfat75/bougainville-a-risky-assignment/.

Banks, Glenn, Warwick Murray, John Overton, and Regina Scheyvens. "Paddling on One Side of the Canoe? the Changing Nature of New Zealand's Development Assistance Programme." *Development Policy Review* 30, no. 2 (2012): 169–86. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2012.00570.x.

Bertram, Ivo Geoffrey, and Raymond Frederick Watters. *New Zealand and its small island neighbours: A review of New Zealand policy toward the Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, Kiribati and Tuvalu.* Canberra: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1984.

Braithwaite, John, Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy, and Leah Dunn. "Peacemaking on, off and Finally Back on Track." In *Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing Peace in Bougainville,* 35–50. ANU Press, 2010. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24h90c.10. Braithwaite, John, Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy, and Leah Dunn. 2010. "Interpreting the Conflict in Summary." JSTOR. ANU Press. 2010. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24h90c.15.

Bristow, Alex. "*Why the US Nuclear Umbrella Underpins Non-Proliferation,*" The Strategist at the ASPI. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 2022. Available at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-the-us-nuclear-umbrella-underpins-non-proliferation/.

Clements, Kevin P. "New Zealand's Role in Promoting a Nuclear-Free Pacific." *Journal of Peace Research* 25, no. 4 (1988): 395–410. http://www.jstor.org/stable/424007.

Capie, David. "Nuclear-Free New Zealand: Contingency, Contestation and Consensus in Public Policymaking." In *Successful Public Policy: Lessons from Australia and New Zealand*, edited by Joannah Luetjens, Michael Mintrom, and Paul 't Hart, 379–98. ANU Press, 2019. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvh4zj6k.23.

Garasu, Sister Lorraine. 2002. "The Role of Women in Promoting Peace and Reconciliation." PeaceWomen. January 1, 2002. https://www.peacewomen.org/node/89897.

Harris, Max, Thomas Nash, Nina Hall, and Fairlie Chappuis. 2018. "A REPORT by NEW ZEALAND ALTERNATIVE AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND and CONFLICT PREVENTION: BUILDING A TRULY INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY." https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5bbbade20b77bd44e47a61b4/t/5bccc7607817f7df509e4c78/1540147042623%20/nza+conflict+prevention+report_web.pdf.

Hayward, Janine. "Treaty of Waitangi Settlements: Successful Symbolic Reparation." In *Successful Public Policy: Lessons from Australia and New Zealand*, edited by Joannah

Luetjens, Michael Mintrom, and Paul 't Hart, 399–422. ANU Press, 2019.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvh4zj6k.24.

Hoadley, Steve. "New Zealand's Foreign Policy 1976-1995: Consolidation and
Elaboration." *New Zealand International Review* 20, no. 6 (1995): 4–6.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/45234483.

Hopkins, Debbie, Colin Campbell- Hunt, Lynette Carter, James ES Higham, and Chris Rosin.
"Climate change and Aotearoa New Zealand." *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate
Change* 6, no. 6 (2015): 559–583.

Hutching, Megan. 1993. "Women's International League for Peace and Freedom | NZHistory,
New Zealand History Online." Nzhistory.govt.nz. 1993.
https://nzhistory.govt.nz/women-together/womens-international-league-peace-and-freedo
M.

Köllner, Patrick. "Walking a Tightrope: New Zealand Revises its China policy." (2019): 12.

Maebuta, Jack. "Peace Education and Peace-Building in the Solomon Islands: Disconnected
Layers." *Security Challenges* 8, no. 4 (2012): 93–104.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/26462894.

Matson, J. N. "THE LANGUAGE, THE LAW AND THE TREATY OF WAITANGI." The
Journal of the Polynesian Society 100, no. 4 (1991): 343–63.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20706416.

Morris, Grant. "James Prendergast and the Treaty of Waitangi: Judicial Attitudes to the Treaty
During the Latter Half of the Nineteenth Century." *Victoria University of Wellington Law
Review* 35, no. 1 (2004): http://www.nzlii.org/nz/journals/VUWLawRw/2004/4.html.
Mulhall, Daniel. "New Zealand and the Demise of ANZUS: Alliance Politics and
Small-Power Idealism." *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 2, no. 3 (1987): 61–77.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30002014.

NZ MFAT. "Disarmament - The New Zealand Strategy 2021/2." New Zealand Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2022.
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/peace-rights-and-security/disarmament/.

O'Brien, Terence. 2013. "New Zealand Foreign Policy: The Importance of Reputation." *New
Zealand International Review* 38 (5): 20–23. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48551408.
———. 2016a. "Looking to an Uncertain Future." *New Zealand International Review* 41
(6): 22–27. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48551956.
———. 2016b. "Should War Define New Zealand's Self-View?" *New Zealand
International Review* 41 (1): 6–10. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48551871.

OECD. "Development Cooperation Profiles: New Zealand." OECD iLibrary. *OECD* (2019).
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/2dcf1367-en/index.html?itemId=%2Fcontent%2Fpub

ication%2F2dcf1367-en.

Perera, Ruwani. 2019. "Soldiers without Guns: How Māori Culture Helped End a Civil War."
    Newshub, July 4, 2019, sec. Shows.
    https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/shows/2019/04/soldiers-without-guns-how-m-ori-cultu
    re-helped-end-a-civil-war.html.

Saovana-Spriggs, Ruth Vatoa. 2007. "Gender and Peace : Bougainvillean Women, Matriliny, and
    the Peace Process." *Openresearch-Repository.anu.edu.au*.
    https://doi.org/10.25911/5d76395eafb11.

Spratt, Jo, and Terence Wood. "Change and resilience in New Zealand aid under Minister
    McCully." *Policy Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (2018).

Stanley, Samantha K., and Jessica Williamson. "Attitudes towards climate change aid and
    climate refugees in New Zealand: an exploration of policy support and ideological
    barriers." *Environmental Politics* 30, no. 7 (2021): 1259-1280.

Winder, Gordon M., and Richard Le Heron. "Assembling a Blue Economy moment? Geographic
    engagement with globalizing biological-economic relations in multi-use marine
    environments." *Dialogues in Human Geography* 7, no. 1 (2017): 3-26.

CANADA

Maude Peters, Nadim Oubenali, and Carolyn Ren

CANADA'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON PEACEMAKING

Canada is uniquely positioned to be an effective peace maker. Long recognized as a "multilateralist, an effective mediator, a diplomat, and a pragmatist with particular expertise in peacekeeping, international criminal justice and human rights," Canada has cultivated these reputations abroad.[1] Lester B. Pearson, former Canadian Prime Minister, is revered as the founder of peacekeeping, a staunch ally of the UN, and a skilled practitioner of international diplomacy. Pearson's contribution has allowed Canada to continue its reputation as a tolerant, multilateral, peace-loving nation.

Consistent participation in peacekeeping gradually affected Canada's foreign policy. Overtime, various Canadian policies developed and initiated the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. The R2P doctrine "introduced a new way that characterized the longstanding desire to minimize the impact of conflict on civilians."[2] In 2001, the United Nations formally adopted R2P. The introduction of Canada's R2P doctrine helped to shift the peacemaking narrative from "right to intervene" to "responsibility to protect."[3]

---

[1] Gabriela Monica Lucuta, "Canada as a Peacemaker in Action," Peace Insight, September 30, 2014, https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/articles/canada-as-a-peacemaker-in-action/?location=&theme=v.
[2] Gabriela Monica Lucuta, "Canada as a Peacemaker in Action," Peace Insight.
[3] Gabriela Monica Lucuta, "Canada as a Peacemaker in Action," Peace Insight.

"Freedom from fear" was chosen as the Human Security Agenda's central theme. This was an idea by former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy for an action-based peacebuilding approach.[4] Its introduction into Canadian foreign policy was in line with the duty to protect, as well as other relevant international commitments. This idea was strengthened by successfully uniting the UN and its member states in the pursuit of a common objective of lessening the suffering brought on by conflict.

Canadian peacemaking values are enshrined in "a better applicability of the international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee compliance, a commitment to the ICC by integrating the Rome Statute into the national laws, addressing impunity by introducing ad hoc tribunals for justice-related processes, improving access for the safety of humanitarian personnel, and addressing the impact of certain conventional armaments."[5] These commitments are demonstrated through Canada's actions on the ground. The Canadian Armed Forces slogan is "to protect our country, its values and its interests, while also supporting international peace and security."[6] Throughout history, Canadian service members have taken part in United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other multinational peace operations.

In 1956, amidst the Cold War, the international community was faced with the Suez Crisis.[7] Recognizing the mounting conflict as well as its international ramifications, Lester B. Pearson, Canada's then Minister of External Affairs, appealed to the UN for the creation of a multinational armed force to mitigate the situation in Egypt and quell confrontation.[8] After

---

[4] "First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)," United Nations (United Nations), accessed December 9, 2022, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unef1backgr1.html.
[5] Gabriela Monica Lucuta, "Canada as a Peacemaker in Action," Peace Insight.
[6] "The Faces of Peace – Canadian Peacekeepers," Government of Canada, March 30, 2022, https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/classroom/faces-of-peace.
[7] "Suez Crisis," History.com (A&E Television Networks, November 9, 2009), https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/suez-crisis.
[8] "The Canadian Armed Forces in Egypt," Government of Canada, June 7, 2022, https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/wars-and-conflicts/caf-operations/egypt.

approval by UN member states, the plan went into effect under the command of Canadian Lieutenant General E.L.M. Burns. The creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the brainchild of Pearson, signified an important innovation in the UN; "It was not a peace-enforcement operation, as envisaged in Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, but a peacekeeping operation to be carried out with the consent and the cooperation of the parties to the conflict."[9]

Pearson's creation of the UNEF won him the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize Prize and helped shape Canada's future in peacemaking.[10] For Canada, peacemaking is a form of influence and a way to gain power, and Pearson's example showed that. Being an international peacemaker increases Canada's influence. Through displays of Canadian soft power, the nation proves its relevance and importance to the rest of the world.

In the wake of Canada's involvement in the Suez Crisis, Canadians recognized peacemaking as a valuable way for Canada to assist countries in conflict. Up until the 1990s, Canada engaged in peacemaking efforts with great regularity. However, after unsuccessful and unfulfilling efforts in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda in the 1990's, their position towards peacemaking shifted.[11] From 2001 to 2014, Canada's foreign policy focused on the war in Afghanistan. Concurrently, Canada participated in several UN missions, but each time only sending a handful of military and advisors.[12] On the whole, Canadian peacekeeping has declined in frequency and scope. Today, Canada should be taking a more active role in peacemaking as they have the capabilities and knowledge to excel.

[9] "First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) ," United Nations (United Nations), accessed December 9, 2022, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unef1backgr1.html.
[10] "Canada and Peacekeeping Operations," Canadian War Museum, accessed December 9, 2022, https://www.warmuseum.ca/learn/canada-and-peacekeeping-operations/.
[11] "First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) ," United Nations.
[12] "First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) ," United Nations.

Peacemaking with Nations

The Arctic is of primary strategic significance to the five littoral Arctic Ocean states—the U.S., Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark. With the continued sea ice loss, the Arctic is becoming more accessible. The Arctic presents the new "El Dorado" of accessible natural resources as significant minerals and fossil fuel deposits emerge.[13] The effects of climate change expose the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, previously impassable due to Arctic ice. These new routes will shift the global economy as states will no longer depend on choke points like the Suez and Panama Canal for maritime trade.[14] Protecting and controlling these routes and resources creates intense global competition between the Arctic and near-Arctic powers to solidify their presence and territorial claims. Russia, which invests tens of billions of dollars in its northern infrastructure, is arguably the most dominant state player in the Arctic.[15] Canada, through its work in the creation and leadership of the Arctic Council, has successfully minimized such international competition so each state can safely access the opportunities within the Arctic and preserve regional stability.[16]

On September 19, 1996, Ottawa, Canada, played a central role in the foundation of the Arctic Council. As Canada's ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs, Mary Simon negotiated the creation of the Arctic Council as a high-level intergovernmental forum to enhance cooperation and coordination among the Arctic States, helping to pass the 1996 Ottawa Declaration, which

---

[13] Edith Allison, "Oil and Gas in the U.S. Arctic," American Geosciences Institute, June 1, 2018, https://www.americangeosciences.org/geoscience-currents/oil-and-gas-us-arctic#:~:text=Undiscovered%20but%20recoverable%20"conventional"%20resources,84%25%20of%20this%20is%20offshore.
[14] Jessica Murphy, "Is the Arctic Set to Become a Main Shipping Route?" BBC News, BBC, November 1, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45527531.
[15] Murray Brewster, "Canada's 'Tenuous Hold' in Arctic Could Be Challenged by Russia, China, Says Top Soldier | CBC News," CBCnews, CBC/Radio Canada, October 18, 2022. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/wayne-eyre-arctic-russia-china-defence-1.6621040.
[16] Alan Dowd, and Alexander Moens, "Meeting Russia's Arctic Aggression: Op-Ed." Fraser Institute, April 23, 2018, https://www.fraserinstitute.org/article/meeting-russias-arctic-aggression.

established the Council.[17] Canada was the first Chair of the Arctic Council from 1996 to 1998

and 2013-2015. Canada's primary priorities related to the Arctic include addressing

socio-economic and cultural development, environmental protection and climate change, and

strengthening relations with Indigenous peoples.[18] Since 1996, the Arctic Council has become a

rare forum for regional Arctic cooperation. While expectations for the forum may have been

initially modest, the Arctic Council has grown far beyond that. In 2018, the University of the

Arctic Thematic Network on Geopolitics and Security nominated the Arctic Council for the

Nobel Peace Prize as "a model for regional governance."[19] This Arctic exceptionalism is seen in

the fact that whether it be about the Law of the Seas or issues about the continental shelf, the

Arctic states maintain close cooperation and seek to engage in closer cooperation with one

another. The Arctic Council is a model for peacemaking, one that Canada has helped shape in

various ways.

The success of the Arctic Council comes from the distinctive features of its charter. The

Ottawa Declaration excludes military security from its agenda, and as such, there is generally

little impact on Arctic Council activities, even amid tense global politics. There is a clause within

the Ottawa Declaration that the Council must operate by the consensus of the states.[20] This

requirement is the basis of peacemaking in the Arctic because each state is equal in its voice.

One of the most critical aspects of the Council is how agreements build upon the successes of

those prior. Canada pushed for the passage of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, an organization

---

[17] Arctic Council, Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa, Canada, 1996) § (1996).
[18] Heidi Kutz, "Canada," Arctic Council, Accessed December 13, 2022,
https://www.arctic-council.org/about/states/canada/.
[19] Eilís Quinn, "International Academics Nominate Arctic Council for Nobel Peace Prize," Eye on the Arctic,
January 19, 2018,
https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2018/01/16/arctic-council-nobel-peace-prize-academics-nomination/.
[20] Heather Exner-Pirot, and Maria Ackrén, "Form and Function: The Future of the Arctic Council," The Arctic
Institute - Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, February 5, 2019.
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/form-function-future-arctic-council/.

uniting the coast guards of eight Arctic states under one entity to more efficiently "foster safe,

secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic."[21] The Arctic Coast

Guard Forum is built upon the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime

Search and Rescue in the Arctic and the 2013 Agreement on Arctic marine oil pollution.[22] The

hope behind these two agreements is that they will work as a vital instrument to help swiftly save

lives in the Arctic and, more importantly, help to forge further cooperation among Arctic states.[23]

The government of Canada is the depositary for the treaty, which means it keeps and facilitates

all instruments relating to the treaty, such as signatures and ratifications. Canada was an active

and constructive participant in each of these negotiation procedures.[24] Canada is the Chair of the

Arctic Council's Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Working Group (EPPR)

and the Marine Environmental Response (MER) Expert Group.[25] In these groups, Canadian

officials meet with their counterparts to advance shared objectives on environmental practices

and discuss collaborative projects.[26] Canadian officials created and led these meetings, councils,

and task forces. Canadian diplomats adopt a steward leadership model, focusing on others within

the Arctic, the community, and society at large rather than unilateral interests. As such, each state

[21] "The Arctic Coast Guard Forum," About the ACGF, Accessed December 13, 2022,
https://www.arcticcoastguardforum.com/.
[22] Arctic Council, "Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic," AC
Archive Home, Arctic Council Secretariat, January 1, 2011, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/531.
Environment and Climate Change Canada, "Agreement on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution," Canada.ca, Government of
Canada, September 2, 2022,
https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/corporate/international-affairs/partnerships-organizations/arc
tic-marine-oil-pollution.html.
[23] "Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement," Arctic Portal, May 23, 2011,
https://arcticportal.org/ap-library/yar-features/421-arctic-search-and-rescue-agreement.
[24] Treaty Law Division, "Welcome to the Treaty Law Division," Canada.ca, Government of Canada, March 1, 2019,
https://treaty-accord.gc.ca/section.aspx?lang=eng.
[25] Arctic Council Staff, "Introducing the New EPPR Chair: 'Emergencies Do Not Recognize Boundaries on a
Map,'" Arctic Council, Arctic Council, July 15, 2021.
https://www.arctic-council.org/news/introducing-new-eppr-chair-emergencies-do-not-recognize-boundaries-on-a-ma
p/.
[26] Environment and Climate Change Canada, "Agreement on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution," Canada.ca, Government
of Canada, September 2, 2022,
https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/corporate/international-affairs/partnerships-organizations/arc
tic-marine-oil-pollution.html.

and individual feels respected and included, reducing alienation and creating a synergy between the collective that helps to promote the Arctic Council's mission and values under a Canadian vision.

Black carbon and methane are the materials emitted from gas and diesel engines or coal-fired power plants that burn fossil fuels. It is one of the most significant air pollutants in the world, contributing to atmospheric warming.[27] Black carbon that falls onto the sheets of snow and ice in the Arctic accelerates the melting of these surfaces, thereby also accelerating the impacts of global warming. Not only is it harmful to the environment, but also to the health of Northerners who inhale it. The Arctic States generate ten percent of global black carbon emissions but are responsible for 30% of its warming effects because of their impact on the Arctic.[28]

During its most recent tenure as Chair of the Arctic Council in 2013-15, Canada placed environmental protections at the top of its agenda. Canada accomplished such a goal in two ways.[29] The Canadians were responsible for drafting an Arctic Council Framework that detailed the problems and solutions for enhanced black carbon and methane emission reductions. There are many reasons why states refuse to acknowledge climate change or change their ways to curb it, whether for economic or geopolitical reasons. Some states believe it is the responsibility of industrialized states to combat climate change and allow smaller states to grow. Recognizing climate change may require states to recognize their contributions and adjust domestic policies accordingly, which may harm the economy. Other states like the U.S. are willing to recognize

[27] World Health Organization, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Black Carbon," Climate & Clean Air Coalition, 2022, https://www.ccacoalition.org/en/slcps/black-carbon.
[28] Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), "AMAP Assessment 2015: Black Carbon and Ozone as Arctic Climate Forcers," AC Archive Home, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), November 1, 2015, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1607.
[29] Heidi Kutz, "Canada," Arctic Council, Accessed December 13, 2022. https://www.arctic-council.org/about/states/canada/.

and adjust, but only if competing states like China agree to do the same. Canada had a solution. The Canadians assisted in establishing an open-access archive which enhances public access to the Arctic Councils' work and increases the transparency of information each member state provides. Under this push, the Canadians could get the Ministers of the Arctic Council to adopt "Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions: An Arctic Council Framework for Action" by the end of their chairmanship tenure in 2015.[30] Each state agreed to submit biennial national reports on the countries' existing and planned actions to reduce such pollutants and share projections of future state emissions.[31]

Peacemaking with Indigenous Peoples

The Arctic is crucial to humanity's continued survival, yet it is the most vulnerable ocean on Earth. Whether it be climate change, technological advances, or the rise in globalization, the Arctic presents one of the last untouched frontiers on Earth. The record melting of Arctic sea ice has turned the international community's attention onto the Arctic, each vying to tap the economic potential of the Circumpolar North. Indigenous peoples have lived in the Arctic for thousands of years.

Of the four million people who call the Arctic home today, 10% are indigenous. Arctic indigenous peoples include the Evenk and Chukchi in Russia, Aleut, Yupik Inuit (Iñupiat) in Alaska, Inuit (Inuvialuit) in Canada, and Inuit (Kalaallit) in Greenland. Iceland is the only state that does not have an indigenous population within their Arctic territory.[32] However, as the Arctic changes, so do the livelihoods and cultures of Indigenous Peoples and their communities. Inuit in

[30] Arctic Council, "Annex 4. Iqaluit 2015 SAO Report to Ministers. Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions an Arctic Council Framework for Action," AC Archive Home, Arctic Council Secretariat, April 25, 2015, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/610.
[31] Veronika Ginzburg, "Black Carbon and Methane," Arctic Council, 2019, https://www.arctic-council.org/about/task-expert/egbcm/.
[32] Heidi Kutz, "Canada," Arctic Council, Accessed December 13, 2022, https://www.arctic-council.org/about/states/canada/.

Canada live in fifty-three communities across Inuit Nunangat, another name for the northern regions of Canada. Canadian Arctic Indigenous peoples are represented in the Arctic Council through three Permanent Participants organizations: Arctic Athabaskan Council, Inuit Circumpolar Council, and Gwich'in Council International.[33] The Inuit High Arctic relocations represent a dark chapter in Canadian history. It is argued that the Canadian government forced the relocations of the Inuit peoples to the North to establish Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. The Inuit people were promised better living conditions yet were misled and for generations suffered hardships since relocation.[34] On June 13, 1977, with the creation of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, its founder, Eben Hopson, stated that the "security of our long municipal coastline depends upon the strength of home rule government in Canada and Greenland."[35] The livelihood of the indigenous peoples in the North has long been tied to Canadian rule. In recent years, Canada has sought to right its wrongs and reconcile with its history.

The Arctic Council is a distinctively collaborative and inclusive diplomatic forum where indigenous peoples and states meet to deliberate and collectively govern. Canada played a vital role on promoting indigenous voices and values to the Arctic order. Thus, reflecting unity as the proper way to govern within the Council. Canada paved the way for reconciling with its historical wrongs, and setting forth a doctrine of inclusion.[36] The Council does not *de jure* address matters of national security. However, it does *de facto* redefine Arctic security to include

---

[33] Loprespub, "The Arctic Council: The Involvement of Indigenous Peoples," HillNotes, June 14, 2022, https://hillnotes.ca/2022/06/14/the-arctic-council-the-involvement-of-indigenous-peoples/.

[34] Samia Madwar, "Inuit High Arctic Relocations in Canada," The Canadian Encyclopedia, July 25, 2018, https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/inuit-high-arctic-relocations.

[35] Rep. Sean Peterson, *The Inuit Circumpolar Council: Reconceptualizing Regional Governance*, April 13, 2019, http://libjournals.unca.edu/ncur/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/2767-Peterson-Sean-FNAL.pdf.

[36] Loprespub, "The Arctic Council: The Involvement of Indigenous Peoples," HillNotes, June 14, 2022, https://hillnotes.ca/2022/06/14/the-arctic-council-the-involvement-of-indigenous-peoples/.

environmental, cultural, and human security as core security pillars of the Arctic.[37] Canada

played a vital role in founding the Arctic Council, with Aboriginal leaders like Mary Simon, who

is currently the Governor-General of Canada, helping negotiate the creation of the Arctic Council

as Canadian ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs. During her tenure, she helped push for the

inclusion of Indigenous peoples on the Council by voting in favor of the three IPOs to be

permanent members. In addition, Canada's first term as chair of the Arctic Council focused on

addressing issues affecting youth development in the North. Its second term prioritized the

wellness of Arctic communities and their inhabitants.[38] During each chairmanship, Canada

focused on developing closer relationships with Indigenous peoples, facilitating cooperation

between Indigenous peoples and the Arctic states, and integrating Indigenous knowledge into the

Arctic Council's work.[39]

The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) was formed in 1991 as a

framework for intergovernmental cooperation on environmental protection initiatives in the

Arctic. The AEPS is crucial because it intends to engage Arctic indigenous peoples and

recognize their right to be consulted regarding the stewardship of their homelands.[40] This

strategy is the culmination of the efforts of the eight Arctic countries, but Canada, in particular,

helped push for a voice for the indigenous peoples. In September 1989, on the initiative of the

government of Finland, officials from the eight Arctic countries met in Rovaniemi, Finland, to

discuss cooperative measures to protect the Arctic environment. Prior to this meeting, the eight

[37] Barry Scott Zellen, The Arctic Council Pause: The Importance of Indigenous Participation and the Ottawa Declaration, Arctic Circle, June 14, 2022,
https://www.arcticcircle.org/journal/the-importance-of-indigenous-participation-and-the-ottawa-declaration.
[38] Loprespub, "The Arctic Council: The Involvement of Indigenous Peoples," HillNotes, June 14, 2022,
https://hillnotes.ca/2022/06/14/the-arctic-council-the-involvement-of-indigenous-peoples/.
[39] Heidi Kutz, "Canada," Arctic Council, Accessed December 13, 2022,
https://www.arctic-council.org/about/states/canada/.
[40] Erik Gant, "History of the Arctic Council Permanent Participants," Arctic Council, Arctic Council, August 28,
2015, https://www.arctic-council.org/news/history-of-the-arctic-council-permanent-participants/.

Arctic countries entered into preparatory meetings in Yellowknife, Canada, in April 1990.[41]

These meetings in Canada helped recognize the indigenous peoples of the North as essential

players in the North. As such, three Indigenous Peoples Organizations (IPOs) were welcomed as

observers in the AEPS. Soon after, the Arctic countries assigned Permanent Participants (PPs)

special status to these IPOs.[42]

Canadians have sought peace and ensured prosperity by focusing on economic

development for the people of the North. Through the creation of the Canadian Northern

Economic Development Agency (CanNor), Canada seeks to promote economic development and

protect Canadian sovereignty in the North. CanNor works with Northerners and Indigenous

peoples to help build up the Nunavut, Northwest Territories, and Yuko economies.[43] The

Canadian government created the Task Force on Northern Post-Secondary Education, which

sought to provide recommendations to help close the divide in education outcomes and

opportunities between the North and South of Canada. The federal task force highlighted a failed

kindergarten to Grade 12 education system in a report titled *An Urgent Need: Post-Secondary

Education in the North, by the North, for the North*.[44] Canada created the Harvesters Support

Grant to improve food security in Inuit Nunangat. It increases access to country foods by

subsidizing traditional hunting and harvesting in isolated communities. Canada worked with its

Indigenous partners to provide $40 million over five years and $8 million annually to Indigenous

---

[41] "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," In *Declaration on the Protection of Arctic Environment*, Rovaniemi: Arctic Portal, 1991, http://library.arcticportal.org/1542/1/artic_environment.pdf.

[42] Arctic Council Secretariat, "Permanent Participants," Arctic Council, Accessed December 13, 2022, https://www.arctic-council.org/about/permanent-participants/.

[43] Government of Canada; Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency, "Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency," Canada.ca, October 17, 2022, https://www.cannor.gc.ca/eng/1351104567432/1351104589057.

[44] Government of Canada; Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, "Task Force on Northern Post-Secondary Education," Canada.ca, September 22, 2022, https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1603480211800/1603480251430.

governments and organizations in Canada's North.[45] Canada also worked with the Inuit and the

Government of Nunavut to finalize the Nunavut Devolution Final Agreement. Canada agreed to

transfer some of its responsibilities in Northern governance to the territories. Devolution in

Nunavut is recognized as a necessary step toward the political and economic development of the

territory. Since the 1960s, Canada has gradually transferred responsibility for health, education,

social services, and housing to territorial governments. Canada aims to give Nunavummiut

greater control over their lands and resources, strengthening economic development

opportunities.[46] Sometimes actions are more meaningful than words. By amending its wrongs,

Canada highlights its commitment to living up to its values at home and abroad. By doing the

right thing, others view Canada as having legitimacy and moral authority in its engagements with

others. Were Canada to criticize the human rights abuses of another country against its

indigenous population, it would be hypocritical if Canada did the same to its own. States aspiring

to make amends with their indigenous populace can learn and seek assistance from Canada.

Canadian soft power rises as a result.

　　　The record melting of Arctic sea ice has prompted many states to reassess their interests

in combating climate change and the Arctic. As the frontlines against a changing climate, the

Arctic is essential to regulating the Earth's ecosystem. Canada has proven itself to be a

peacemaker in the Arctic. Whether by supporting Indigenous peoples in the Arctic Council and

funding development projects in the North or by fostering cooperation among Arctic nations and

leading the push for environmental regulation, Canada successfully facilitates peace in the Arctic

that has lasted since the end of the Cold War. However, Canada need not stop at regional issues.

---

[45] Nutrition North Canada, Publication, *Support for Traditional Hunting and Harvesting*. Government of Canada, November 2022, https://caid.ca/GovHarSupGrant2020.pdf.
[46] Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, "Nunavut Devolution," Canada.ca, Government of Canada, August 19, 2019,
https://www.canada.ca/en/crown-indigenous-relations-northern-affairs/news/2019/08/nunavut-devolution.html.

Canadian peacemaking extends beyond Canadian and Arctic territory into international waters and territory.

CANADA AS A GLOBAL PEACEMAKER:

Climate change has been adversely impacting the environment, biological diversity, food security, migration patterns, and community health, posing immense threats to both global stability and international peace as a result. Collective action thus is required in order to holistically advance climate action. Since Environment and Climate Change Canada was established 50 years ago, Canada has led and participated in decades of domestic and international progress on climate change, being committed to achieving net-zero emissions by the year 2050, providing disaster relief to countries and regions impacted by climate-induced disasters, and even offering refuge to climate migrants. The following section thus aims to examine how Canada has historically served and will continue to perform as a global peacemaker in the context of climate change and climate security.

Green Economy

Canada has always been committed to working with national, provincial, territorial, and municipal governments, Indigenous Peoples, and other key partners when it comes to addressing climate change risks. As early as in 2007, Canada announced the Turning the Corner Action Plan on Climate Change and Air Pollution. The plan provided a framework for regulations and other measures to reduce air emissions from transportation, industrial sectors, consumers and commercial products, and to improve the quality of indoor air. In 2018, Canada hosted G7 environment Ministers as well as the Climate Leaders' Summit: Women Kicking it on Climate, in Ottawa, Ontario[47]. Moving into March 2022, Canada adopted the 2030 Emissions Reduction Plan, which provides a roadmap for the Canadian economy to achieve 40-45% emissions

---

[47]Environment and Climate Change Canada, "Government of Canada," Canada.ca (/ Gouvernement du Canada, December 15, 2021),
https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/campaigns/50-years-environmental-action/eccc-timeline/climate-change.html.

reductions below 2005 levels by 2030. The government is also introducing a mandate that 60%

of light-duty vehicles sold in 2030 must be zero-emissions, rising to 100% by 2035[48]. These

targets collectively put Canada among the pack of leading jurisdictions in terms of zero-emission

vehicle mandates. Furthermore, Canada also contributed to global climate action by leading

transnational partnership programs, making Canada a qualified climate peacemaker. For

instance, at the Summit of the Americas, Canada partnered with Californiasigned a

Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) reducing pollution, cutting back on plastic waste, and

building climate resilience[49]. Therefore, taken as a whole, Canada is well positioned to continue

its efforts in building a green domestic and global economy, contributing to creating a more

sustainable and peaceful future.

Humanitarian Relief

In the context of climate change, Canada also supports human dignity and advances its

global peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts by helping countries that are facing natural

disasters, conflicts, and acute food insecurity. Global Affairs Canada is the department of the

Government of Canada that manages Canada's diplomatic and consular relations, not only

promoting Canadian international trade, but also, more importantly, leading Canada's

international development and humanitarian assistance. Specifically, Global Affairs Canada

supports humanitarian relief both financially and physically. In terms of monetary assistance, the

Emergency Disaster Assistance Fund (EDAF)-- a draw-down fund administered by the Canadian

Red Cross Society— allows for immediate Canadian support to International Federation of Red

Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) emergency operations in response to sudden-onset

---

[48]Service Canada, "Government of Canada," Canada.ca (/ Gouvernement du Canada, March 29, 2022),
https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/climate-plan/climate-plan-overview.html.
[49] Person and Ismail Shakil Nia Williams, "Canada Lays out C$9.1 Bln Roadmap to Meet 2030 Climate Targets,"
Reuters (Thomson Reuters, March 29, 2022),
https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/canadas-releases-emissions-reduction-plan-mapping-out-path-2030-climate-targets-2022-03-29/.

small- and medium-scale humanitarian situations. These situations entail natural disasters, non-recurrent health epidemics, and conflicts. For instance, in the year 2022 alone, through the Canadian Red Cross Society, Canada directly supported and aided crisis-affected people during the Saint Lucia flash floods, the earthquake in Nepal, the severe tropical storm Paeng in the Philippines, the tropical storm Lisa in Belize, the tropical storm Julia in Guatemala and El Salvador, and etc[50]. Furthermore, from a more practical perspective, Canada also significantly contributes to global peacemaking efforts and international humanitarian relief efforts through its naval operations. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is made up of approximately 8,400 Regular Force personnel, 4,100 Reservists and 3,800 civilian employees[51]. The RCN is not only in charge of protecting Canadian sovereignty and interests at sea, but also responsible for promoting and enforcing global stability, international peacekeeping, and international law during times of conflict or crisis[52]. Particularly, one of the roles that the RCN has played in recent years is humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR). For example, the RCN provide fundamental assistance to the US Gulf Coast in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, to the Bahamas and Florida after hurricanes.

A more specific example of an RCN HADR operation is Operation Hestia, the Canadian response to the earthquake that struck Haiti in January 2010. It is worthy to note that the naval task group comprising HMCS Athabaskan, with a helicopter air detachment, and HMCS Halifax – with approximately 500 sailors, soldiers and airmen/women in total – was sent very quickly and effectively out of Halifax[53]. Therefore, taken as a whole, Canada is well equipped both

[50]Global Affairs Canada, "Government of Canada," GAC (Government of Canada, December 12, 2022), https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_confl ict-reponse_conflits/emergency_disaster-urgence_desastre.aspx?lang=eng.
[51] Ibid
[52]"Government of Canada," Canada.ca (/ Gouvernement du Canada, May 27, 2021), https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/our-organization/leadership.html.
[53]"The RCN and Hadr Operations," Canadian Naval Review, November 23, 2020, https://www.navalreview.ca/2020/11/the-rcn-and-hadr-operations/.

financially and militarily to not only be part of the global peacemaking efforts, but also, as a matter of fact, lead in disaster relief operations on a global scale as climate-related crises continue to affect countries and regions in the future.

Climate Migration and Climate Refugees

Last but not the least, an emergent global challenge that has been affecting both developing and developed nations is climate-induced migration and refugee crisis. Indeed, under international law, climate refugees have not been formally recognized as a subgroup of the refugee population, which means that people who are forced to migrate due to climate-induced crises and disasters are particularly susceptible to harms and dangers ranging from a lack of safe housing and food to sometimes human rights abuses. Thus, Canada, given its aforementioned military and financial resources as well as its international prestige and bargaining power, can play a significant, if not determinant, role in regulating climate migration and even potentially codifying new legal norms and conventions surrounding the status of "climate refugees".

Indeed, Canada currently does not recognize climate migrants under itsimmigration law, but the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers points to past disasters – like the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami - as examples of times when the government offered special directives to persons seeking refuge. As a result, we have reasons to believe that, given these precedents, it is very likely for Canada to be the international sponsor of the term "climate refugee" and the global spokesperson for people who are forced to leave their homeland behind because of environmental factors and climate-induced crimes. Canada will most likely accomplish this goal through working with its Minister of Immigration and Refugees and Citizenship, planning for attainable migrant protections. Canada will also likely use the Canadian Humanitarian Assistance Fund (CHAF) to provide direct assistance, such as

emergency food, water, emergency health care, and shelter[54]. This is also particularly possible because domestically, Canada's own populations are feeling the impacts of climate change as well. Indigenous communities like the First Nations, Inuit, and Métis often become displaced as a result of wildfires and floods that are often attributed to climate change[55]. Therefore, taken as a whole, Canada not only has the potential, but also the drive to become a global leader in resolving the current policy debacle surrounding the status of "climate refugees" and in helping push for international reform on amending the Refugee Convention, granting voices to the climate refugees.

---

[54]Matt Raulerson, "Advocates Push For Canada To Protect Climate Migrants," Climate Refugees, March 22, 2022, https://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2022/3/22/canadianpolicy.
[55] Ibid

Bibliography

Allison, Edith. "Oil and Gas in the U.S. Arctic." American Geosciences Institute, June 1, 2018. https://www.americangeosciences.org/geoscience-currents/oil-and-gas-us-arctic#:~:text=Undisco vered%20but%20recoverable%20"conventional"%20resources,84%25%20of%20this%20is%20 offshore.

"The Arctic Coast Guard Forum." About the ACGF. Accessed December 13, 2022. https://www.arcticcoastguardforum.com/.

Arctic Council Secretariat. "Permanent Participants." Arctic Council. Accessed December 13, 2022. https://www.arctic-council.org/about/permanent-participants/.

Arctic Council Staff. "Introducing the New EPPR Chair: 'Emergencies Do Not Recognize Boundaries on a Map.'" Arctic Council. Arctic Council, July 15, 2021. https://www.arctic-council.org/news/introducing-new-eppr-chair-emergencies-do-not-recognize-boundaries-on-a-map/.

Arctic Council, Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa, Canada, 1996) § (1996).

Arctic Council. "Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic." AC Archive Home. Arctic Council Secretariat, January 1, 2011. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/531.

Arctic Council. "Annex 4. Iqaluit 2015 SAO Report to Ministers. Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions an Arctic Council Framework for Action." AC Archive Home. Arctic Council Secretariat, April 25, 2015. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/610.

"Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy." In *Declaration on the Protection of Arctic Environment*. Rovaniemi: Arctic Portal, 1991. http://library.arcticportal.org/1542/1/artic_environment.pdf.

Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP). "AMAP Assessment 2015: Black Carbon and Ozone as Arctic Climate Forcers." AC Archive Home. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), November 1, 2015. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1607.

"Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement." Arctic Portal, May 23, 2011. https://arcticportal.org/ap-library/yar-features/421-arctic-search-and-rescue-agreement.

Brewster, Murray. "Canada's 'Tenuous Hold' in Arctic Could Be Challenged by Russia, China, Says Top Soldier | CBC News." CBCnews. CBC/Radio Canada, October 18, 2022. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/wayne-eyre-arctic-russia-china-defence-1.6621040.

"Canada and Peacekeeping Operations." Canadian War Museum. Accessed December 9, 2022. https://www.warmuseum.ca/learn/canada-and-peacekeeping-operations/.

"Canada, Environment and Climate Change." Government of Canada. Accessed December 9, 2022. https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/campaigns/50-years-environmental-action/eccc-timeline/climate-change.html.

Canada, Global Affairs. "Government of Canada." GAC. Government of Canada, December 12, 2022. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/emergency_disaster-urgence_desastre.aspx?lang=eng.

"Government of Canada." Canada.ca. / Gouvernement du Canada, May 27, 2021. https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/our-organization/leadership.html.

Canada, Service. "Government of Canada." Canada.ca. / Gouvernement du Canada, March 29, 2022. https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/climate-plan/climate-plan-overview.html.

"The Canadian Armed Forces in Egypt." Government of Canada, June 7, 2022. https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/wars-and-conflicts/caf-operations/egypt.

"The RCN and Hadr Operations." Canadian Naval Review, November 23, 2020. https://www.navalreview.ca/2020/11/the-rcn-and-hadr-operations/.

Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada. "Nunavut Devolution." Canada.ca. Government of Canada, August 19, 2019. https://www.canada.ca/en/crown-indigenous-relations-northern-affairs/news/2019/08/nunavut-devolution.html.

Dowd, Alan, and Alexander Moens. "Meeting Russia's Arctic Aggression: Op-Ed." Fraser Institute, April 23, 2018. https://www.fraserinstitute.org/article/meeting-russias-arctic-aggression.

Environment and Climate Change Canada. "Agreement on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution." Canada.ca. Government of Canada, September 2, 2022. https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/corporate/international-affairs/partnerships-organizations/arctic-marine-oil-pollution.html.

Exner-Pirot, Heather, and Maria Ackrén. "Form and Function: The Future of the Arctic Council." The Arctic Institute - Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, February 5, 2019. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/form-function-future-arctic-council/.

"First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) ." United Nations. United Nations. Accessed December 9, 2022. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unef1backgr1.html.

Gant, Erik. "History of the Arctic Council Permanent Participants." Arctic Council. Arctic Council, August 28, 2015. https://www.arctic-council.org/news/history-of-the-arctic-council-permanent-participants/.

Ginzburg, Veronika. "Black Carbon and Methane." Arctic Council, 2019. https://www.arctic-council.org/about/task-expert/egbcm/.

Government of Canada; Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency. "Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency." Canada.ca, October 17, 2022. https://www.cannor.gc.ca/eng/1351104567432/1351104589057.

Government of Canada; Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada. "Task Force on Northern Post-Secondary Education." Canada.ca, September 22, 2022. https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1603480211800/1603480251430.

Granatstein, J I. "Canada and Peacekeeping." The Canadian Encyclopedia, September 27, 2021. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/peacekeeping.

Kutz, Heidi. "Canada." Arctic Council. Accessed December 13, 2022. https://www.arctic-council.org/about/states/canada/.

Loprespub. "The Arctic Council: The Involvement of Indigenous Peoples." HillNotes, June 14, 2022. https://hillnotes.ca/2022/06/14/the-arctic-council-the-involvement-of-indigenous-peoples/.

Lucuta, Gabriela Monica. "Canada as a Peacemaker in Action." Peace Insight, September 30, 2014. https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/articles/canada-as-a-peacemaker-in-action/?location=&theme=v .

Madwar, Samia. "Inuit High Arctic Relocations in Canada." The Canadian Encyclopedia, July 25, 2018. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/inuit-high-arctic-relocations.

Murphy, Jessica. "Is the Arctic Set to Become a Main Shipping Route?" BBC News. BBC, November 1, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45527531.

Nutrition North Canada. Publication. *Support for Traditional Hunting and Harvesting*. Government of Canada, November 2022. https://caid.ca/GovHarSupGrant2020.pdf.

Person, and Ismail Shakil Nia Williams. "Canada Lays out C$9.1 Bln Roadmap to Meet 2030 Climate Targets." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, March 29, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/canadas-releases-emissions-reduction-plan-mapping-out-path-2030-climate-targets-2022-03-29/.

Peterson, Sean. Rep. *The Inuit Circumpolar Council: Reconceptualizing Regional Governance*, April 13, 2019. http://libjournals.unca.edu/ncur/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/2767-Peterson-Sean-FNAL.pdf.

Quinn, Eilís. "International Academics Nominate Arctic Council for Nobel Peace Prize." Eye on the Arctic, January 19, 2018. https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2018/01/16/arctic-council-nobel-peace-prize-academics-nomination/.

Raulerson , Matt. "Advocates Push For Canada To Protect Climate Migrants." Climate Refugees, March 22, 2022. https://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2022/3/22/canadianpolicy.

"Suez Crisis." History.com. A&E Television Networks, November 9, 2009. https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/suez-crisis.

"The Faces of Peace – Canadian Peacekeepers." Government of Canada, March 30, 2022. https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/classroom/faces-of-peace.

Treaty Law Division. "Welcome to the Treaty Law Division." Canada.ca. Government of Canada, March 1, 2019. https://treaty-accord.gc.ca/section.aspx?lang=eng.

World Health Organization, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "Black Carbon." Climate & Clean Air Coalition, 2022. https://www.ccacoalition.org/en/slcps/black-carbon.

Zellen, Barry Scott. The Arctic Council Pause: The Importance of Indigenous Participation and the Ottawa Declaration. Arctic Circle, June 14, 2022. https://www.arcticcircle.org/journal/the-importance-of-indigenous-participation-and-the-ottawa-declaration.

CONCLUSION

Douglas Stuart-Brookes, Melody Stainbrook, and Emily Hardy

At first glance, it may seem that smaller states do not have the capacity to exert meaningful influence within the international order. Nevertheless, despite their limited resources, size, population, and typically small-scale economies, smaller states can use various methods to create and maintain influence. For instance, smaller states can partake in regional peacemaking, spearhead international coalitions, occupy valuable niches, and act as norm entrepreneurs to advance their self-interests. In addition to those routes, this book has put forth several other ways smaller states can build their influence, by closely examining applications in regional peacemaking and global environmental issues.

Informed by the work of smaller-state scholars, our class has examined eight smaller states — Costa Rica, Panama, Cuba, Malaysia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, and Rwanda — discussing their historical backgrounds and potential as regional and global peacemakers. These smaller states, informed by their respective histories and peacemaking experience, have the potential to be valuable regional and global peacemakers. For instance, looking at regional issues, we discussed Malaysia's potential as a peacemaker in the Moro Conflict, South Africa's peacemaking engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Panama as a potential peacemaker in Haiti, and Cuba's peacemaking history with the FARC-Colombian crisis. On a global scale, we took an environmental lens to peacemaking potential, examining Costa Rica's potential as a global norm entrepreneur for ecotourism, Canada as a global leader in green

growth and the acceptance of climate refugees, Aotearoa[1] as a promoter of sustainable development, and the Rwandan response to increasing droughts.

The chapters of this handbook highlight the ways in which smaller states can successfully create international norms through unique contributions to global peacemaking efforts. As actors that address needs in respective regions or spearhead global efforts on multiple fronts, smaller-state peacemakers have been able to occupy unique niches and play important global roles in the international community. These eight states, aided by their distinct identities and backgrounds, have significant capacity to act as regional peacemakers and global changemakers.

In resolving regional conflict, smaller states are well positioned to utilize the lessons of their own history to assist others. Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the Kigali principles outlining a civilian-centered peace keeping framework has gained traction amongst the international community. Rwanda's history of violence, colonialism, as well as its past truth and reconciliation processes can help the state facilitate a peaceful transition away from violence in the Tigray conflict. Additionally, states like South Africa with acute histories of racism and apartheid have robust experience in promoting sustained peace talks and negotiations that has informed talks in the DRC. As evidenced by Cuba's role in negotiating the 2012 Colombia-FARC conflict, regional states are acutely positioned to facilitate productive peace dialogues as they do not possess colonial histories and have long-term vested interest in promoting sustainable peace.

The capacity of smaller states to exert influence in the international system is of great importance to the most significant challenges of our time, especially amid the growing climate crisis, and we posit that all states can promote environmental peace and sustainability in distinct ways. For instance, a smaller tropical state with beautiful protected areas, such as Costa Rica,

---

[1] The Māori name of New Zealand.

can globally encourage sustainable economic development through the niche role of ecotourism. On the other hand, a state with a larger economy, such as Canada, can lead divestment from fossil fuels efforts as a middle power. Together, Canada and Costa Rica showcase how smaller states can use their different resources to position themselves as global environmental leaders capable of creating a more resilient international system.

Promoting global peace is no easy task, yet through targeting niche issue areas smaller states have been able to uniquely address complex needs. In leveraging their regional capacities, smaller states are able to facilitate peace talks, resolve conflict, and champion environmental stewardship. While smaller states may lack the hard power traditionally associated with international strength, it would be a grave error to discount their changemaking abilities. As evidenced by this brief, smaller states have a clearly demonstrated history of promoting positive peacemaking norms and are well-equipped to enact long-lasting global change.