The background of the slide features a large, light gray watermark of the Georgetown University seal. The seal is circular and contains an eagle with wings spread, holding a shield on its chest and a scroll in its beak. Above the eagle is a lyre. The seal is surrounded by a laurel wreath. The Latin text around the seal reads "SIGILLUM UNIVERSITATIS GEORGIOPOLITANAE" and "1789".

The Do's and Don'ts of Peacemaking:

A Guide for Smaller States

Georgetown University

Center for Australian, New Zealand & Pacific Studies

The Handbook on Smaller States and Peacemaking: Do's and Don'ts

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
Introduction

Despite their lack of status in conventional terms of power, smaller states have the potential to serve as successful peacemakers. By examining several aspects of peacemaking, this handbook will discuss topics that are important to consider for those wishing to play an important role in mediation and negotiations. Smaller states that follow the “do’s and don’ts” laid out in this handbook will be better equipped to facilitate successful peace processes, through which they can gain respect, recognition, and better standing in the international arena. Each chapter will focus on a different topic relevant to understanding smaller states and peacemaking and will utilize case studies to prescribe best practices.

The handbook begins by analyzing the role of a state’s identity in peacemaking. The first chapter highlights how smaller states can construct a narrative, based on their histories and identities, that will help them be respected and successful during mediations. Moreover, in the second chapter, an analysis of the different types of conflicts will show how the histories and identities of smaller states may make them more suited to handle a certain type of conflict.

The middle of the handbook will deal with the fundamental logistics of peacemaking. The third chapter advises states on what to think about when considering whether to go about peacemaking as a solo actor or as part of a larger institution. The fourth chapter will highlight the importance of the actual individuals that states assign to act as mediators and how smaller states can leverage those selections to their advantage. Finances are crucial to running any successful mission—the fifth chapter will outline how smaller states can estimate and plan for the costs of peacemaking.

The final portion of this handbook will discuss crucial topics smaller states should consider in order to maximize their success in peacemaking. The sixth chapter analyzes the role of national security in peacemaking so that smaller states can understand how peacemaking interacts with their strategic interests. The seventh chapter discusses how smaller states should deal with the role of arms on the operational and tactical levels. Finally, by discussing the role of women in peacemaking, the eighth chapter of this handbook emphasizes the importance of including the perspectives of everyone affected by a given conflict in its resulting peace agreement.



The Perks of Being Yourself: The “Identity Narrative” in Peacemaking

Chapter 1

Introduction

Nelson Mandela had been imprisoned for more than 10,000 days—nearly thirty years—in various South African prisons for sabotage and conspiracy against the government. Eventually, he was released on February 11, 1990, marking a massive shift in the relationship between Mandela’s African National Congress and the ruling white apartheid government. On that day, Mandela received international acclaim, even being invited to the White House. Mandela also spoke, proclaiming to a massive, multi-racial crowd in Cape Town, “We call on our white compatriots to join us in the shaping of a new South Africa. The freedom movement is a political home for you too.”¹ Once Mandela was elected as South Africa’s first Black president in 1994, it was the end of an era and time for Mandela to, in his words, shape a new South Africa. This effort revolved around completely changing the way South Africa sold itself on an international stage, going from a war-maker to a potential peacemaker.

Efforts to redefine one’s identity in an attempt to be a peacemaker did not begin with Mandela. In fact, there is a long tradition of states using their country’s identity to shape their value proposition. The writing of what we will call an “identity narrative” is an active effort by a prospective peacemaker to sell itself to those in conflict and potential partners in peacemaking. While this can manifest in many different ways on the personal, community-wide, and national level, for this chapter, we chose to focus on the impact of colonialism and Indigenous populations on the crafting of this identity narrative for smaller states. Smaller states, characterized by having less international influence, require a more unique value proposition; we argue that an anti-colonial and Indigenous-aware identity narrative can serve as an important bonus for peacemaking.

Our chosen cases represent three distinct combinations of identities. First, we consider the case of New Zealand, a white-majority, settler colony that has still managed to leverage Indigenous Maori identity in its peacemaking across Polynesia. From there, we return to the case of South Africa, in both its apartheid and post-apartheid forms. Under apartheid, South Africa was a settler colony run by its white minority with a foreign policy that actively supported war-making and instability. In contrast, post-apartheid South Africa was able to use its identity as a new, Black state emerging from a liberatory struggle to engage in peacemaking across the African continent, no longer held back by the policies of prior white-led governments. Finally, we consider the case of Norway, which as a non-colonial, relatively homogenous state has been able to benefit from its identity in crafting its value proposition, allowing Norway to be one of the world’s most prominent peacemakers.

Pacific Peacemaking: New Zealand’s Maori Culture in the Bougainville Peace Process

New Zealand has a unique position as a settler colonial state that uses its Indigenous population’s culture to further its peacemaking efforts. This is especially evident in New Zealand’s work in the Bougainville peace mediation of the 1990s.² As they are all Indigenous populations of the Pacific, the Maori people, the native Bougainvilleans, and the people of Papua New Guinea share cultural commonalities. New Zealand used this to its advantage in the peacemaking process through the

(1) Nelson Mandela, “Nelson Mandela’s address to rally in Cape Town on his release from prison,” (speech, Cape Town, South Africa, February 11, 1990), Nelson Mandela Foundation, http://db.nelsonmandela.org/speeches/pub_view.asp?pg=item&ItemID=NMS016&txtstr.

(2) “New Zealand - Peacemakers of the Pacific?” RNZ (Radio New Zealand, February 18, 2019), <https://www.rnz.co.nz/national/programmes/nights/audio/2018683057/new-zealand-peacemakers-of-the-pacific>.

use of both Maori conflict resolution methods and ceremony.³

Throughout the 1990s, Bougainville, a small island in the Pacific under the rule of Papua New Guinea, was ravaged by conflict. What began as local opposition to the environmental and social damage caused by the Panguna copper mine grew into a full-blown civil war. By May 1990, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) established the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) and declared independence from Papua New Guinea, leading to years of bloody conflict.⁴ By 1994, both sides were tired of fighting. However, these initial calls for peace were foiled when the PNG Army and Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF) began to kill surrendered BRA combatants, causing them to go back to fighting.⁵ The peace talks that were ultimately successful began in 1997, hosted by New Zealand because of the state's neutrality in the dispute.⁶

Upon arrival in New Zealand for both the first and second of the Burnham Peace Talks, leaders of Bougainville were greeted with a Maori pōwhiri welcoming ceremony. Included in the pōwhiri is the hongi—a ceremonial touching of noses and sharing of breath.⁷ The Maori people also performed the traditional haka ceremonial dance for the Bougainvilleans. One participant from Papua New Guinea told a New Zealand official, “the ‘Pacific’ style of welcome had allowed PNG officials at the meeting ‘to shake hands, touch noses and exchange breath’ with Bougainvilleans with whom they had been fighting for 10 years. The Pacific Way enabled participants to walk through glass walls without thinking about what they were doing.”⁸ The Burnham talks ended with many local leaders signing truce agreements.⁹ This identity-conscious beginning of the talks built trust between the Bougainvilleans and the Papua New Guineans, making them physically touch noses after a decade of being at war with each other. It also helped to build faith in New Zealand's role as a mediator, demonstrating the state's respect for Pacific culture and Indigenous perspectives on peacemaking processes.

The Maori perspective was crucial not only to building trust in the beginning, but to the methodology of peacebuilding itself during the talks. There was Maori influence in forming the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) in Bougainville. Each TMG team had Maori members, to help demonstrate the TMG's respect for Indigenous Pacific culture, which made the groups more effective.¹⁰ Moreover, a year after the Lincoln talks, which took place after the Burnham talks, local leaders reached a standstill in further internal discussions. At this point, New Zealand once again hosted the Bougainvilleans. The Bougainvillean leaders were put in a Maori village, made to interact and cooperate, and taught lessons from the Maori population on existing as an independent nation within a colonial settler state.¹¹ Through the use of Maori peacemaking methods, New Zealand was able to use its Indigenous roots to build and maintain peace in Bougainville.

Cultural understanding from a shared Indigenous perspective was crucial to the Bougainville peace process. By demonstrating respect and understanding for Indigenous culture through its Maori roots, New Zealand used its identity narrative to become an effective peacebuilding force in

(3) Tom Stayner, “‘Soldiers without Guns’: How Unarmed Anzacs Brought Peace to War-Ravaged Bougainville,” SBS News (SBS News, April 24, 2019), <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/soldiers-without-guns-how-unarmed-anzacs-brought-peace-to-war-ravaged-bougainville/6355466f-fde7-4011-b7a8-9f8aad9840b0>.

(4) Rebecca Adams, *Peace on Bougainville: Truce Monitoring Group: Gudpela Nius Bilong Peace*, (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2001), 25-26.

(5) Pat Howley, *Breaking Spears and Mending Hearts: Peacemakers and Restorative Justice in Bougainville*, (London: Zed, 2002), 55.

(6) Adams, *Peace on Bougainville*, 30.

(7) Jim Rolfe, “Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville,” *International Peacekeeping* 8, no. 4 (2001), 48, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310108413919>.

(8) *Ibid.*

(9) Stayner, “‘Soldiers without Guns.’”

(10) Rolfe, “Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville,” 50.

(11) *Ibid.*, 49.

the Bougainville peace process. This makes New Zealand a crucial example for other small settler colonial states hoping to become peacemakers. When a state highlights its Indigenous community's perspective, it can greatly assist peacemaking within its region, since regional Indigenous populations will likely value the peacemaking methods and practical advice of other Indigenous populations. A definite "do" of smaller state peacemaking is to honor the advice of Indigenous groups, as an outside Indigenous perspective can act as a bridge between regional native populations in conflict. Another "do" is to demonstrate respect for Indigenous culture, as it can build trust between peacebuilding states and the native populations they are attempting to assist.

Narrative Evolution: South African Identity in Conflict and Coexistence with Peacemaking

Moving beyond the Maori identity in New Zealand, we can consider South Africa's evolution over time from the the war-making of apartheid South Africa to the peacemaking of post-apartheid South Africa. By contrasting these two periods, we can see the importance of leveraging identity to make peacemaking possible.

Apartheid, an Afrikaaner word meaning separation, refers to the period of South African history from the entrenchment of white minority rule in the late 1940s and early 1950s through the establishment of a new constitution in 1994 and the 1995 election of Nelson Mandela as South Africa's first Black president. This system was characterized by its separation: Black South Africans were systematically excluded from public and political life and banished to "native reserves," which were overcrowded and underserved.¹² The system never functioned well, as the Black and white populations had been intermingling for centuries, but the flaws in the established order began to appear in the late 1970s. At this time, Nelson Mandela was in prison, but Umkhonto we Sizwe, the African National Congress's paramilitary organization, was beginning to make South Africa ungovernable while the South African government's international reputation plummeted.¹³

The white government responded by domestic militarization under the rule of the Afrikaaner-dominated National Party. This militarization took place with "conscripted whites fighting a civil war in the townships" against the Black population.¹⁴ While this was occurring, South Africa was interfering in the internal affairs of other countries such as Mozambique and Angola, including with direct military intervention.¹⁵ This was part of a wider "Total Strategy" aimed at promoting regional instability to make South Africa important as a regional power and thus forcing the world to give up on diplomatically isolating South Africa due to apartheid.¹⁶ At the same time, South Africa was occupying and colonizing Namibia, which would last through 1990.¹⁷

South Africa's blatant war-making was defined by an ability of outsider actors to change the status quo or end these conflicts as efforts at peacemaking required the dismantling of the apartheid system that fed these conflicts, both domestically and internationally. When apartheid collapsed under its own weight after decades in protests in the 1990s, the new, fairly elected, Black

(12) Nigel Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy*, (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2012), 80-88, <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=822664>

(13) Simon Stevens, "The Turn to Sabotage by The Congress Movement in South Africa," *Past & Present* 245, no. 1, (November 2019), 221-255, <https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtz030>.

(14) Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa*, 141.

(15) Metz, Steven, "The Mozambique National Resistance and South African Foreign Policy," *African Affairs* 85, no. 341 (1986), 491-507, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/722294>.

(16) Davies, Robert, and Dan O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy Since 1978," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 11, no. 2 (1985), XX, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2636524>.

(17) Chris Saunders, "South Africa and Namibia: Aspects of a relationship, historical and contemporary," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 23, no. 3 (2016), 347-364, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2016.1243073>; Paul Rich, "United States Containment Policy, South Africa and the Apartheid Dilemma," *Review of International Studies* 14, no. 3 (1988), 179-194, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097143>.

government of South Africa saw the chance to change their domestic and international narrative and emphasize peacemaking.

This change represented a shift in South Africa's identity narrative. Following the change in governance, South Africa undertook an effort of truth and reconciliation to heal the wounds of the apartheid era domestically.¹⁸ Almost immediately, post-apartheid South Africa began to engage in peacemaking, starting first with Lesotho in late 1994. At the time, South Africa was only months into the term of Nelson Mandela, the country's first Black, post-apartheid president, but it had no choice but to respond to the situation in Lesotho, a country entirely enclosed within its borders, especially since the roots of this conflict date back to early in the apartheid period when a group backed by South Africa overthrew the tiny country's government.¹⁹

After Lesotho returned to multipartism and constitutional democracy, tensions continued as the state readjusted to democratic processes with weak institutions. These tensions boiled over in the 1994 crisis when King Letsie III dissolved the government and ordered new elections, an unpopular move that led to strikes and bloody protests. South Africa, along with Zimbabwe and Botswana, called for the restoration of the government with the threat of sanctions or even military intervention.²⁰ Mandela's influence prevented a military intervention, and eventually the situation was resolved. A later crisis in 1998, however, would require military intervention. In the aftermath of the 1998 intervention by South Africa and Botswana, scholars have concluded that the invasion was necessary to prevent bloodshed. However, South Africa's prior actions—both in the 1994 crisis and before—helped fuel the 1998 tension even if South Africa was involved in the peace-making process.²¹

This effort is one of many South African peacemaking efforts post-1994, which include Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and more.²² This ability to successfully and legitimately carry out peacemaking efforts in Africa is directly related to their new, post-liberation identity.

Norway: A Case of Purposeful Narrative Design

The case of Norway best illustrates the process of purposeful narrative construction for a small state as a peacemaker. Its reputation as a global leader in peacemaking, norm entrepreneurship, and human rights advocacy is built on a lengthy track of involvement in international mediation and development projects. Norway's foreign policy is directed towards international development; its projects align with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in climate and clean energy, hunger, inequality, women's rights, and infectious disease. Norway is the ninth largest donor country and second most generous donor per capita, allocating approximately one percent of its gross national income towards official development assistance.²³ It is a world leader in clean energy, harvesting the majority of its own energy from hydro and solar sources. Norway has successfully engaged in a number of peace processes, the most significant being the 1990s Oslo Accords be-

(18) Lyn Graybill, "Afterword: Miracle or Evil Compromise?" in *South Africa: Miracle or Model?* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 194, https://search.alexanderstreet.com/view/work/bibliographic_entity%7Cdocument%7C3264045.

(19) Nthakang Selinyane, "Lost between Stability and Democracy: South Africa and Lesotho's Constitutional Crises of the 1990s," in *South Africa's role in conflict resolution and peacemaking in Africa*, ed. Roger Southall, (Houghton: Nelson Mandela Foundation, 1987), 61-63.

(20) Selinyane, "Lost between Stability and Democracy" 66

(21) Ibid. 68-70

(22) Roger Southall, "South Africa's Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa," (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2006), 3-18.

(23) Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations, "Norwegian Aid to Developing Countries Hits Record High," Norgesportalen, April 2020, <https://www.norway.no/en/missions/UN/news/news-on-development-and-humanitarian-efforts/norwegian-aid-to-developing-countries-hits-record-high/>.

tween Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, along with other well-known operations in Guatemala, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and the Philippines. Due to its small size and lack of hard power, Norway can make a credible claim of a neutral third party with no ulterior motives. Norway is also a relatively young state, thus free from the guilt of European colonization. All of these factors contribute to its image as an ideal small state peacemaker.

While the Norwegian peace tradition can be traced back as far as the 1890s, the turning point in foreign policy occurred in the 1990s.²⁴ As the Cold War drew to an end, Norway's long coastline and shared border with the USSR diminished in value, and the state found itself in need of a new value proposition. To this end, it capitalized on its history of norm entrepreneurship in what became known as the policy of engagement—pouring unprecedented energy and investment into the promotion of peace, democracy, and human rights abroad—at the same time gaining unprecedented access to the foreign ministries of powerful allies.²⁵ The uptick of intrastate conflict in the aftermath of the Cold War provided the opportunity for Norway to grow into this niche, venturing into mediation into places such as Guatemala, Israel, Palestine, and Sri Lanka. The most well-known of these endeavors is the Oslo Accords, where Norway proved that its identity narrative would allow it to succeed in mediation where superpowers such as the United States had failed.

At the same time that Norway was incorporating peacemaking into its foreign policy, leaders in Oslo concerned themselves with distinguishing the Norwegian identity narrative from the broader “Scandinavian Humanitarian Brand.”²⁶ Norway, Sweden, and Denmark have all been among the most generous donors to the OECD Development Assistance Committee since the 1970s—and of the three, Sweden was the most active in the Cold War era. Swedish-Norwegian competition over peacemaking became obvious during the Guatemalan civil war. When a bodyguard was killed outside the Swedish embassy, Sweden rejected the mediator role; Norway took advantage of the opportunity. News media and politicians back home began to speak of the mediation process as a very brave and Norwegian thing to do, whereas Sweden was presented ‘as having “failed to realize the potential of the peace process.”’²⁷ They deemphasized the fact that Sweden had been the first choice.

In the 1990s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs formalized the Norwegian Peace Model into a systemic approach expressing a uniquely Norwegian approach to peacemaking, one based on its small state status, lack of colonial history, close cooperation with nonstate actors, and peace brokering with humanitarian aid.²⁸ The promotion of this model served the national identity narrative in demonstrating that these variables, along with specific events and icons such as the Nansen Passport and the Nobel Peace Prize, made Norway a valuable ally and mediator. This post-hoc narrative became self-reinforcing; the more it was advocated, the more that policy-makers and the public would come to embrace it and, thus, invest more into international development and peacemaking. Most reports on Norwegian international projects would be commissioned by the state itself and written by state or state-affiliated institutions.²⁹

Norway's identity narrative is noteworthy as much for what it promotes as for what it omits.

(24) Oystein Skanland, “‘Norway is a peace nation’: A discourse analytic reading of the Norwegian peace engagement,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 45, no. 1 (2010), 37, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836709347212>.

(25) Nissen, Ada. “A Historical View on the Nordic ‘Peace Brand’: Norway and Sweden: Partners and Competitors in Peace.” Chapter. In *Do-Gooders at the End of Aid: Scandinavian Humanitarianism in the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Antoine de Bengy Puyvallée and Kristian Bjørkdahl, 80–100. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. doi:10.1017/9781108772129.005

(26) *Ibid.*, 85.

(27) *Ibid.*, 90.

(28) Asoka Bandarage, “The ‘Norwegian Model’: Political Economy of NGO Peacemaking,” *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 17, no. 2 (2011), 223, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24590809>.

(29) Skanland, 35.

Here is the picture: Norway is an environmentally-conscious, human rights-oriented, peace-loving state. Not included: the Norwegian oil and gas industries, historical oppression of the Sami people, and arms exports.

Norway generates most of its domestic power supplies through hydro plants. It is among the greenest countries in the world. On the other hand, its economic prowess has been built off oil and gas reserves since 1969. These industries are responsible for 14 percent of Norwegian GDP and 40 percent of its exports and are projected to develop, contrary to Norway's commitment to climate change and clean energy activism.³⁰ The Norwegian state is directly invested in its oil companies, owning two-thirds of Equinor, the largest offshore oil and gas company in the world. These companies operate in corrupt, undemocratic countries, regardless of the official stance of the Norwegian government.³¹ As Norway's own reserves dwindle, the state has turned to its Oil for Development program, which would partner with developing countries to manage their reserves despite clear modeling that further fossil fuel expansion would sabotage global climate change goals.³²

Norway often plays up its non-colonial status, being a young country that only gained statehood in 1905. At the same time, it is home to the Indigenous Sami people, who suffered re-education programs throughout the 19th century when Norwegian authorities sought to systematically oppress and erase Sami culture and language. Today, the Sami are among the most liberated and self-determined Indigenous groups in the world. However, criticism remains against the discrimination that they face. In April 2020, the government authorized use of traditional Sami land for the construction of wind plants, disrupting their livelihoods and violating their land rights in a development that critics are calling "green" colonialism.³³

Norway is also an arms exporter. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Norway was the 19th largest arms exporter over 2015-2020, punching far above its weight in comparison to Australia, Denmark, or Portugal, which are of similar size.³⁴ The largest defense companies are also partially state-owned. Norwegian-manufactured arms have been suspected of use in the Yemen conflict in sales to the UAE from 2014-2017. In May 2021, Aftenposten posted the story, having allegedly accessed leaked documents. On the same day, Norwegian Foreign Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide argued that the state had not suspected the UAE of using those weapons in the Yemen war zone and that the suspension of weapons sales was only a precautionary measure.

As one of the leading peacemaking powers of today, Norway has utilized its status as a smaller state to great effect. Its crafted identity promotes certain helpful characteristics while omitting others, presenting a classic example of narrative construction.

Conclusion

Smaller states face unique challenges in becoming peacemakers. Nevertheless, through strategically tailoring their identity narratives to be anti-colonial and Indigenous-aware, smaller states can be successful in peacemaking. This is evident through the examples of South Africa, New Zealand, and Norway. South Africa's case can be split into two historical examples: that of a conflict-creating

(30) "Norway's Oil and Gas Sector Will Not Be Dismantled, New Government Says," BBC, October 13, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-58896850>.

(31) Lunde, Leiv, and Henrik Thune. "Eight Dilemmas in Norwegian Foreign Policy." Essay. In *National Interest*, 261-274. Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Refleks Project, n.d.

(32) *Ibid.*, 271-272.

(33) Eva Fjellheim and Florian Carl, "'Green' Colonialism Is Ruining Indigenous Lives in Norway," Al Jazeera, August 1, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/8/1/green-colonialism-is-ruining-indigenous-lives-in-norway>.

(34) Irene Peroni, "Norway's Reputation as a Force for Peace and Good Has Come into Question," Open Democracy, June 8, 2021, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/norways-reputation-as-a-force-for-peace-and-good-has-come-into-question/>.

apartheid state, and that of a peacemaking post-apartheid state. New Zealand gives an example of a settler colonial state which found success in peacemaking with the help of its Indigenous Maori culture. Norway yields a classic example of a largely non-colonial peacemaker. While each of the three example states has a vastly different history with colonialism and Indigenous empowerment, each uses its respective history to craft an identity narrative that helps in peacemaking.

This begs the question: what are the “dos and don’ts” of using a smaller state’s identity in peacemaking? These three states leave us with some crucial lessons. First, the crafting of a smaller state’s identity narrative is crucial to creating a convincing value proposition as a peacemaker. Smaller states inherently have less power and influence than their larger counterparts, so they must use every advantage in their toolkit to be successful. Second, it is crucial to leverage a state’s identity narrative for peacemaking by being anti-colonial and Indigenous-aware. In a world where so much destruction was caused by violent settler colonialism, rectifying colonial wrongdoing is crucial to building international trust in smaller states striving to become peacemakers, especially given the prevalence of conflict in post-colonial states. States that never participated in colonization of other states, such as Norway, have an inherent advantage in building trust as a peacemaker. Nonetheless, not all hope is lost for states with a more violent colonial past. Both New Zealand and South Africa participated in settler colonialism. However, through government and policy changes, the states shifted to work towards empowering their Indigenous populations. Because of this, both states are successful peacemakers that use their Indigenous histories as tools for peacemaking and should be a model for other states to emulate.

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
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Greed vs. Grievance: Leveraging Cultural Identity in Resource-Based and Ideational Conflict

Chapter 2

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Introduction

In international affairs, the nature of the conflict—ideational or resource-based—often determines which state is best suited to function as a peacemaker. Ideational conflicts, such as religious wars, arise from an identity clash between two or more parties; resource-based conflict stems from a dispute between two or more parties over an economic good, such as land. Depending on their experience and expertise, states tend to act as better facilitators for one of the two forms of conflict. Nevertheless, the world of international conflict will never be black and white. Although classified as greed (resource) or grievance (ideational), disputes have mixed motives; they reside on a spectrum and never reach the extreme of absolute greed or absolute grievance. All conflicts contain some form of ideational and resource-based disagreement. Therefore, when looking at a conflict, one must examine the distribution of each party's motives. For simplicity, we assume conflicts are either entirely ideational or resource-based in this paper.

Using the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which has both ideational and resource-based dimensions, this chapter explores how two different states—Norway and Egypt—conducted peacemaking efforts. By comparing each state's progress in resolving the conflict, this chapter discusses why each state is either well-suited or not suited to operate as a peacemaker for each form of conflict.

In 1947, the UN partitioned the British mandated Palestinian territory, which ended in 1948, to create a state for the dislocated Jews. The 1948 establishment of Israeli sovereignty in the region led to decades of war between Israel and its Arab neighbors, thus prompting peacemaking efforts.³⁵ The Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which has not resulted in a lasting peace agreement, represents one of the most challenging issues to resolve. The Oslo Accords of 1993 marked one of the first steps towards peacemaking. The Oslo Accords encompass two distinct parts—Oslo I and Oslo II. Oslo I codified the Oslo negotiations while Oslo II created the momentum to come to an agreement and the environment to build confidence and trust between Israel and Palestine.³⁶ The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel formally recognized each other for the first time when they signed the Declaration of Principles, or Oslo I, in 1993.

The Oslo Accords, facilitated by Norway, were designed to establish an interim governance strategy and facilitate peace negotiations. Thus, Oslo I established the Palestinian Authority (PA), an interim administrative structure. In 1995, the Israelis and Palestinians signed Oslo II, which divided the Gaza Strip, a Palestinian enclave bordering Israel and Egypt, into three regions—Areas A, B, and C. The PA governs Area A, currently encompassing more than 18 percent of the land, and Area B, containing 21 percent.³⁷ Under the Oslo Accords, Israel should have given control of Area C, encompassing 60 percent of the land, to the PA. However, Israel refuses to do so.

Egypt was the first Arab country to craft a peace agreement with Israel, known as the Camp David Accords. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed the accords in September 1978, laying the foundation for peace. The United States played a significant role in facilitating peace talks, pressuring Egypt and Israel to come to consensus.³⁸ However, the Camp David Accords failed to create a formal peace agreement, instead producing a framework to achieve Egyptian-Israeli peace. Moreover, the Accords purposefully neglected to address the territorial dispute between Israel and Palestine. Given Egypt's status as one of the dominant powers in the region, scholars believed the Arab states would follow Egypt's decision regarding the treatment of Israel. Thus, if Egypt chose peace, other Arab states would follow their exam-

(35) Jill Allison Weiner, "Israel, Palestine, and the Oslo Accords," *Fordham International Law Journal* 23, no. 1 (November 1999), 232.

(36) *Ibid.*, 246.

(37) "Oslo Accords," HISTORY, February 16, 2018, <https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/oslo-accords>.

(38) William B. Quandt, "Camp David and Peacemaking in the Middle East," *Political Science Quarterly* 101, no. 3, (1986), 357.

ple. On the other hand, if Egypt chose war, the Arab states would ally themselves against Israel.³⁹

In July 2014, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a seven-week operation, including air and ground assaults against the Palestinians in Gaza.⁴⁰ Israelis claimed the operation's goals were to stop organizations in Gaza from firing rockets at Israel and to destroy the tunnels that Hamas, a Palestinian militant movement, had used to attack Israel.⁴¹ The conflict, also known as the 2014 Gaza War, resulted in 2,100 Palestinian deaths, 70 Israeli deaths, and the demolition of 17,000 homes in Gaza. A similar clash regarding Gaza occurred again in May 2021 after Palestinian protests turned violent. Israeli security forces had been refusing Palestinians entry into the Al-Aqsa Mosque during the month of Ramadan.⁴² After a few weeks of protests, the Israeli police raided the Al-Aqsa compound while firing rubber bullets and stun grenades at Palestinians throwing rocks.⁴³ The intrusion on the third holiest site in Islam sparked outrage and incited Hamas to launch a counterattack. The conflict resulted in Israel retaliating with an 11-day operation that included firing rockets at the Gaza Strip. The 2021 Gaza Conflict sparked many peacemaking concerns about the effectiveness of Egyptian intervention.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict offers smaller states many lessons in the art of peacemaking. By exploring how Norway and Egypt handle both the ideational and resource-based issues underlying the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, this chapter will summarize the different techniques smaller states should avoid and adopt when facilitating peace.

Norway

Norway has become internationally recognized as a peacemaker due to its efforts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Sri Lankan Civil War. With an emphasis on conflict resolution and reconciliation in its foreign policy, Norway brokers negotiations between warring parties to enable fruitful and coherent communication.⁴⁴ Furthermore, Norway does not have a past as a colonizer, making it a trustworthy and respectable arbitrator in conflicts involving formerly colonized countries. With a high peacemaking to combative operations ratio, Norway has earned a humanitarian reputation on the international stage. This reputation, coupled with its financial resources, makes Norway an attractive peacemaker.⁴⁵

Norway has extended its peacemaking efforts to the Middle East. In its “White Paper” report to the Storting, Norway describes the Middle East as a fragile and unstable environment that requires international support to achieve political stability. Moreover, Norway outlined its position on many critical regional disputes while also prescribing ways to settle them. It deemed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the most important in the region because if the conflict went unresolved, it could exacerbate other conflicts in the Middle East. Thus, to ensure stability in the Middle East, Norway launched a peacemaking effort for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 1989.⁴⁶ Norway's Min-

(39) Ibid., 358.

(40) Yuval Feinstein, “One Flag, Two Rallies: Mechanisms of Public Opinion in Israel during the 2014 Gaza War,” *Social Science Research* 69, (January 2018), 65.

(41) Ibid.

(42) Robert Barron, “What Sparked the Latest Israeli-Palestinian Confrontations?” United States Institute of Peace, May 12, 2021, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/05/what-sparked-latest-israeli-palestinian-confrontations>.

(43) Ibid.

(44) Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Peace and Reconciliation Efforts,” Government.no, 2021, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/id1158/>.

(45) Sam Seitz, “Tracing the Path of the Viking Peacemaker: An Examination of Norwegian Peacemaking,” *Politics in Theory and Practice*, January 23, 2018, <https://politicstheorypractice.wordpress.com/2018/01/23/tracing-the-path-of-the-viking-peacemaker-an-examination-of-norwegian-peacemaking/>.

(46) Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Meld. St. 36 (2016–2017) Report to the Storting (white paper): Setting the Course for

istry of Foreign Affairs asserted its goal was to establish a two-state solution with secure and internationally recognized borders; however, Norway's goal was not accomplished.⁴⁷

To achieve such an ambitious goal, Norway participated in many peacemaking initiatives, including Norway's coordination of the civilian observer force in Hebron—TIPH Temporary International Presence in Hebron—and the Oslo Accords, that aided to reconcile the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As noted in the introduction, the Oslo I Accord, signed on September 13, 1993, represented a breakthrough in the conflict. It marked the first time Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), shook hands with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Moreover, the Accords represented significant progress for the PLO, which had been excluded from the negotiation table and denied the right to represent Palestine under the 1991 Madrid Conference. Oslo I, the product of eight months of negotiation under Norwegian facilitation, represented a temporarily successful peace negotiation in which Norway played a central role.⁴⁸

The negotiation revolved around a resource-based conflict—the partition of Palestinian territory. Following the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948, tensions between Israelis and Arabs emerged from land and resources disputes. Due to the endless number of local and international actors attempting to gain influence within the region, the early resolutions were unproductive. As a result, Israelis and Palestinians alike were skeptical of any global power's interference and peace-making efforts. However, the failure of the Madrid Conference reopened the negotiation table and set the stage for the emergence of a new facilitator—Norway. In 1991, Norway recognized its potential to mediate negotiations due to its neutral perspective, making it a trustworthy facilitator to both Israel and Palestine.⁴⁹

Norway was a prime candidate for this peacemaking mission for several reasons. First, Norway's main interest was to gain international influence and prestige by acting as a peacemaker. Thus, Norway had an incentive to craft an effective and beneficial peace agreement for all the parties involved. Second, before its involvement in the conflict, Norway institutionalized its engagement policy through UN peacekeeping missions and by allying with NATO and the United States, who both played crucial roles in Middle Eastern peace efforts. Lastly, Israeli forces and the PLO perceived Norway as an acceptable facilitator. Norway, one of the Jewish state's strongest supporters in Western Europe and the UN, was traditionally considered a close friend of Israel. Nevertheless, the PLO appreciated Norway's reputation of decency and neutrality, especially considering Yasir Arafat proposed the use of Norway as a channel for negotiation in 1979.⁵⁰

When analyzing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a resource-based conflict, Norway successfully led the negotiations that led to a peace agreement. On September 11, 1992, Norway opened a secret communication channel between Israel and the PLO. As an impartial outsider, Norway recognized the importance of secrecy and the security measures needed to safeguard the sincerity of the discussions. As a small country with considerable institutional and economic resources, Norway was able to implement these security measures by renting out private spaces, not disclosing the true purposes of the meetings, and allowing participants to remain anonymous.

Although it historically had close relations with Israel, Norway never failed to condemn

Norwegian Foreign and Security Policy," Government.no, (2017), 1-47.

(47) Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israel – Palestine: A Negotiated Two-State Solution," Government.no, February 12, 2019, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/norways_engagement/israel_palestine/id2522237/.

(48) Seitz, "Tracing the Path of the Viking Peacemaker: An Examination of Norwegian Peacemaking."

(49) Ibid.

(50) Hilde Henriksen Waage, "Norway's Role in the Middle East Peace Talks: Between a Strong State and a Weak Belligerent," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 34, no. 4, (Summer 2005), 7.

Israeli human rights breaches, demonstrating its neutral ethical and moral standing. In addition, the use of Norwegian NGOs to bring relevant figures to the negotiation table enabled Norway to facilitate communication more freely than other countries such as the United States, which had categorized the PLO as a terrorist organization.⁵¹ Such a noticeable difference in the Norwegian and U.S. treatment of the PLO caused the PLO to be more willing to engage in talks. Thus, Norway's role as a facilitator was beneficial for resource-based conflict, considering its lack of historical knowledge did not prevent it from organizing productive meetings.⁵²

Despite Norway's unbiased mediation of the resource-based conflict, its neutrality did not extend to the ideational issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. With the appointment of Johan Jørgen Holst as the new Norwegian Foreign Minister in April 1993, Norway shifted from being a passive facilitator to an active negotiator. Holst attended all the meetings that followed his appointment and actively engaged with both sides through informal and formal conversations. Thus, Norway gradually involved itself in the communication process and swiftly became the Israeli-Palestinian middleman. Holst became the messenger to both parties, which allowed him to craft a narrative that would ensure the viability and success of the agreement.

However, the lack of regional knowledge that had benefited them in the resource-based issue now plagued Norway. Norway could not account for the power asymmetry between the Palestinians and Israelis, resulting in an Israeli advantage. For example, the Accord required the Palestinians to concede the demand for international acceptance of Palestinian national rights and the demand for the UN to elaborate on Resolutions 242 and 338. Simultaneously, Israel willingly withdrew their concessions to portray themselves as cooperative negotiators, earning them more favor with Norway. Thus, Norway unconsciously played into the power disparity between Israel and Palestine, instead of creating an equal playing field.

Moreover, due to Norway's lack of international presence and regional knowledge, it unconsciously conceded to Israeli demands. As Dennis Ross remarked, "Norway had to embrace the Israeli position. It would be no deal otherwise." Thus, focused on completing the negotiations, Norway conformed to Israeli demands because of its lack of political influence in the region, resulting in the underappreciation of Palestinians' needs.⁵³

Therefore, the Oslo Accords of 1993 demonstrate how Norway's inexperience with Middle Eastern history allowed for neutrality in resource-based issues but resulted in biased agreements for ideational issues.

Egypt

As a Middle Eastern powerhouse, Egypt has the largest population among the Arab states, with approximately 105 million people recorded in 2021.⁵⁴ By being the first Arab state to sign a peace treaty with Israel, Egypt has also become a significant peacemaker in the region. The 1979 Camp David Accords were an essential stepping stone for establishing peace within the Middle East and declaring Egypt as an innovative leader among its counterparts. The agreement heightened tensions between Egypt and other Arab states, leading those states to push Egypt out of critical regional dialogues. Nevertheless, Egypt was able to resume diplomatic relations with some

(51) Seitz, "Tracing the Path of the Viking Peacemaker: An Examination of Norwegian Peacemaking."

(52) Waage, "Norway's Role in the Middle East Peace Talks," 10.

(53) Waage, "Norway's Role in the Middle East Peace Talks," 12.

(54) "Egypt Population," Worldometer, 2021, <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/egypt-population/>.

Arab states in the mid-1980s without renouncing the peace agreement with Israel.⁵⁵ Egypt's ability to continue facilitating conversation with its neighbors despite their differences demonstrated its ability to mediate the tensions of the differing ideologies between Israel and other Arab states. Additionally, Egypt's military provided the country with a strengthened political position. Egypt, which has received \$1.3 billion in U.S. military assistance per year since 1987, had a powerful presence due to its relationship with a well-respected superpower and its guaranteed military security in an unstable region.⁵⁶

These traits permitted Egypt to assert itself as an arbitrator in resource-based conflict between Israel and Palestine. Its history with peace, such as the Camp David Accords, not only gave Egypt the credibility to be a respected peacemaker, but further peace endeavors allowed Egypt to garner international support. Consequently, Egypt became an influential peacemaker, enhancing its voice in the global community despite being a smaller state. Nevertheless, despite its abilities in mediating the Israeli-Palestinian resource-based conflict, Egypt may be more suited for peacemaking in the ideational Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to its background knowledge of being an Arab state and living within the region.

The international community feared Egypt could not be neutral due to its perceived U.S. influence. To many Arab states, Egypt's friendly relations with Israel further demonstrated Egypt's biased nature toward the conflict. For example, during the 2014 Gaza War, although Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israel supported Egypt's cease-fire proposal, Hamas did not accept it. Egypt's original proposal only required Israel to loosen its blockade of Gaza's borders and economy, thus allowing Israel to retain its hold of Gaza.⁵⁷ Although the proposal favored Israel, the Arab states compelled Hamas to accept it.

However, in the 2021 Gaza Conflict, Egypt shifted toward a more unbiased stance to resolve the conflict between Israel and Palestine. The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned Israeli authorities for raiding the Al-Aqsa Mosque, demonstrating Egypt's willingness to fight injustice regardless of the perpetrator.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the Egyptian government insisted on Israel stopping practices that violated the mosque's sanctity while denouncing illegal Israeli actions that undermined Palestinian rights.⁵⁹ These examples illustrate how Egypt can be a neutral arbitrator for resource-based conflicts.

However, Egypt may better address Israeli-Palestinian ideational conflicts because it personally understands them. As an Arab state located near Israel and Palestine, Egypt understands the issue's nuances because of its cultural and political similarities to the two warring parties. Unlike Egypt, an outsider country, such as Norway, may not comprehend the underlying political imbalances or cultural restrictions that shape the conflict. An outsider state attempting to make peace between Israel and Palestine may overlook or be unable to decipher phrases, attitudes, and actions unique to Middle Eastern culture and politics, such as the importance of Mahmoud Abbas' cult of personality and charisma and Netanyahu's stern frame of mind. Therefore, Egypt's cultural awareness allows it to provide practical advice as a peacemaker. Egypt's proximity, physically and ideationally, to the conflict renders it efficient and effective in directing peace negotiations between the two conflicting states. Due to its experience in the Camp David Accords, Egypt comprehends the

(55) Quandt, "Camp David and Peacemaking in the Middle East," 357.

(56) Stephen Taniel, "Egypt and Algeria: The Revolutionary Heartland," In *With Us And Against Us*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 268.

(57) Elizabeth Peabody, "The Real Reasons Egypt is Playing Peacemaker," Glimpse from the Globe, September 5, 2014, <https://www.glimpsefromtheglobe.com/topics/defense-and-security/real-reasons-egypt-playing-peacemaker/>.

(58) Khalil Al-Anani, "Explaining Egypt's Role during the Gaza War," *Arab Center Washington, D.C.*, June 3, 2021, <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/explaining-egypts-role-during-the-gaza-war/>.

(59) Ibid.

formula necessary to develop a stable treaty regarding security negotiations in a notoriously insecure region.

Nonetheless, one must question if Egypt can separate its national interest from mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Other Arab states may lose trust in Egypt if Egypt shows any signs of favoritism towards Israel. Labeling Egypt as a traitor would weaken Egypt's ties with other Arab countries, thus ruining important alliances that reinforce Egypt's international significance. Furthermore, Egypt would lose interest in acting as a mediator between Israel and Palestine for the sake of self-preservation. As observed after the Camp David Accords, the Arab states could sever ties with Egypt, alliances that could take decades to rebuild.⁶⁰

Despite Egyptian claims to remain unbiased, Egypt's impartiality comes into question, especially considering the Egyptian public has a deeply rooted dislike of Israel. The Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research conducted a poll in 2015 on Egyptian public opinion of Israel, finding that the Egyptian public perceived Israel as a hostile state with a rating of (-88) on a scale from (-100) to (100).⁶¹ However, the Egyptian public opinion of Hamas is also becoming more hostile. As of 2021, approximately seventy percent of Egyptians disapproved of Hamas.⁶²

This resentment towards Israel and the Palestinian movement reflects Egyptians' desire to avoid international conflicts.⁶³ Despite the Egyptian public's preference to remain isolated from foreign affairs, the Egyptian government continues to involve itself in peacemaking efforts within the region in hopes of gaining international recognition.

Conclusion

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict acts as a guide for smaller states on how to approach ideational and resource-based conflict as peacemakers. Both case studies illustrate the dos and don'ts of peacemaking as a smaller state for the different variations of conflict. Regarding resource-based conflict, both Norway and Egypt demonstrated how a good peacemaker does not have stakes in the resource being fought over. For this reason, Norway acted as a better peacemaker in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than Egypt when discussing land disputes. Regarding ideational conflict, both Norway and Egypt illustrated how a good peacemaker has an in-depth knowledge of the identity and power politics of the warring parties. Thus, Egypt was a better peacemaker in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than Norway when examining issues of identity rights. Despite Norway's and Egypt's efforts, the peace agreements between Israel and Palestine continue to fail. However, smaller states are still able to learn from these failures. Although this paper only explores cultural relevance and geopolitical proximity, there are many factors that could contribute to being a good or poor peacemaker for either resource-based or ideational conflicts.

(60) Quandt, "Camp David and Peacemaking in the Middle East," 357.

(61) "A Review of Relations Between Israel and Egypt," *Teachmideast*, 2021, <https://teachmideast.org/articles/review-relations-israel-egypt/>.


(62) Mohamed Abdelaziz and David Pollock, "Half of Egyptians Value U.S. Ties, But Few Want Normalization with Israel," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, January 15, 2021, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/half-egyptians-value-us-ties-few-want-normalization-israel>.

(63) *Ibid.*

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Acting Solo or Finding Friends: Comparing the Role of States and Regional Organizations as Peacemakers

Chapter 3

Introduction

States and multilateral institutions have differing tools and characteristics from individual state actors that influence and inform their peacemaking efforts and techniques. Smaller states interested in peacemaking should look at the case studies below to see how to navigate relationships with regional institutions while attempting to facilitate peace processes. Institutions bring greater funding, prestige, and legitimacy to peacemaking that individual—especially smaller—states likely do not have. Comparatively, individual states acting as peacemakers can act without reaching consensus with large multilateral institutions. Through analysis of different regional organizations—the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the European Union (EU)—and their different approaches to peacekeeping, this chapter will look at the successes, failures, advantages, and disadvantages of regional organizations and individual states leading peacemaking processes.

Africa, the AU, and ECOWAS

The African continent has seen a plethora of conflicts and peacemaking efforts—“eight out of the fifteen complex emergencies declared by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs in the late 20th and 21st centuries were in Africa.”⁶⁴ Its regional organizations have played an integral role in African peacemaking efforts, often filling a void left by the United Nations’ (UN) failure to facilitate peace on the continent. Though the African Union has struggled to meet the resource and capacity costs of successful peacemaking interventions given the complexity and prevalence of conflict, regional organizations have played major roles in peacemaking on the continent.⁶⁵

The African Union was crucial in brokering a peace agreement in Kenya in the midst of civil violence in 2008; the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediated an end to civil war in Sudan in 2005; the AU’s precursor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), brokered the Algiers agreement of 2000, which ended the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.⁶⁶ Similarly, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has played a significant role in West African peacemaking “in Liberia (1989—1996, 1999—2003), Sierra Leone (1997—2001), and Guinea-Bissau (1998) and has focused regional efforts on preventive diplomacy in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, and other flashpoints.”⁶⁷ These examples illustrate that regional organizations can play an important role in peacemaking. Examining the role these organizations played in peace processes shows that regional organizations are particularly important peacemaking actors—they allow smaller states in the region affected by conflicts to share the burden of costs and access peacemaking expertise and global support while also preventing individual states from commandeering peacemaking processes in service of their agendas. Regional organizations involved in peacemaking have to juggle a variety of actors’ input and gain approval from a wider audience throughout the process. However, as individual African states struggle to have the necessary resources and authority to act as a peacemaking force on their own, it seems that the benefits of working through these regional groups outweigh the challenges.

The financial cost of peacemaking is enormous and beyond the reach of most small states. Furthermore, it requires human capital—often military personnel—and the risk of humanitarian

(64) Chika Njideka Oguonu and Christian Chukwuebuka Ezeibe, “African Union and Conflict Resolution in Africa,” *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* 5, no. 27 (December 1, 2014), 325, <https://doi.org/10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n27p325>.

(65) Ibid.

(66) Laurie Nathan, “The Peacemaking Effectiveness of Regional Organisations,” UKAID, *Crisis States Research Centre*, October 2010, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/123449/WP81.2.pdf>.

(67) Kehinde A. Bolaji, “Adapting Traditional Peacemaking Principles to Contemporary Conflicts: the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework,” *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review* 1, no. 2 (2011), 183, <https://doi.org/10.2979/africonfpeacrevi.1.2.183>.

catastrophe makes it particularly difficult for smaller states to act as sole peacemakers in conflicts. The AU struggles to obtain funding, and due to the socio-economic and political instability of the region's economy, the organization relies heavily on its relationships with other regional institutions and the international community for support. Through these relationships, the AU is able to garner financial support and resources for peacemaking efforts that small individual states would struggle to obtain. Even when individual states do have the capacity to act independently, there are still downfalls. For example, while "Nigeria shouldered virtually all the costs of intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone during military rule," the country's transition to a civilian government put into question whether its huge commitment in human and financial resources would continue, now that such decisions require parliamentary authorization.⁶⁸ A state acting individually can bring a certain level of uncertainty to peacemaking because it can so easily withdraw its efforts, making it difficult for the conflicting parties to truly trust and commit to the mediation efforts. As many small states in Africa struggle to even meet their financial contributions to the AU, it would be impossible for them to pursue peacemaking efforts individually. Therefore, regional organizations make it possible for smaller states to still contribute their expertise and voice to the process without the high cost.

Peacemaking efforts in Kenya highlight the access that multilateral organizations have to peacemaking expertise, the role that regional organizations can play in maintaining impartiality and legitimacy among conflicting parties, and the platform that regional organizations can give to smaller states. After a series of false starts in early January, the mediation process stabilized around an AU "panel of eminent African personalities, comprising former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa, and Mozambican luminary Graça Machel."⁶⁹ The AU was able to bring leaders together and provide expertise and legitimacy to the peace talks. In contrast, Ugandan leader Yoweri Museveni was rejected by the parties after he attempted to intervene alone as a mediator.⁷⁰ Multilateral organizations' ability to pull together greater expertise adds legitimacy and trust to the peacemaking process. Their ability to act impartially, favoring peace above either party, diminishes any potential conflict of interest for the mediators and is a crucial component of being an effective peacemaker.

Working through institutions in Africa allows actors to share the costs of peacemaking efforts, helps assuage the divisive tone that an individual peacemaking state might strike, and enables the institutionalization of African traditional methodologies of conflict management.⁷¹ ECOWAS highlights the ability of regional organizations to include the peacemaking expertise of smaller states in their established Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF). The ECPF outlines an effort to utilize strategies and mediation techniques on the local level rooted in African traditional methods of formal conflict resolution. The framework articulates three critical features of traditional conflict resolution: "1.) it is holistic and consensus-based; 2.) it focuses on restoration of order and relationships; and 3.) the emphasis is on group and collective efforts."⁷² These features are derived from local groups; for example, the Ewe people in Ghana highlight "the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques that draw on traditional problem-solving and mediation in chieftaincy and communal conflicts."⁷³ ECOWAS' framework highlights an effort to bring forward these techniques on the regional level to apply to future peacemaking efforts, and it shows how smaller states can contribute to peacemaking by sharing their own expertise regarding internal conflict resolution.

(68) *Ibid.*, 188.

(69) Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "Forty Days and Nights of Peacemaking in Kenya," *Journal of African elections* 7, no. 2 (October 1, 2008), 4, <https://doi.org/10.20940/jae/2008/v7i2a1>.

(70) *Ibid.*, 7.

(71) Bolaji, "Adapting Traditional Peacemaking Principles to Contemporary Conflicts," 188.

(72) *Ibid.*, 195.

(73) *Ibid.*, 196.

Within Africa, institutions such as the AU and ECOWAS have served as successful facilitators of peacemaking by working between state-driven peacemaking efforts and larger global multilateral organizations, which often have access to greater funding—a necessity for facilitating peace processes. The AU has played the role as a lead peacemaking force in conflicts within the continent, but it has also used its network to raise awareness of conflicts in order to gain the necessary resources. Smaller states should utilize the strength of their advocacy within a regional organization on the international stage, and they should utilize their individual expertise based on internal histories of conflict resolution to aid peace processes. Working through regional institutions in Africa better allows burden-sharing of the high costs of peacemaking efforts, enables the institutionalization of African traditional methodologies of conflict management, and helps assuage the divisive tone that an individual peacemaking state might give by making the peace process a regional project.

Southeast Asia, ASEAN, and Malaysia

When considering the prominence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Southeast Asia and the scope of conflicts that have manifested within the region, Southeast Asia poses an interesting medium to examine the role of institutions and individuals in peacemaking. ASEAN is a regional multilateral organization made up of ten Southeast Asian countries. ASEAN's role in regional peacemaking has—at times—been effective, yet it has also been subject to criticism for being slow to act and lacking cohesive, standardized norms.⁷⁴ Examining the Thai-Cambodian border conflict and the Philippine-Moro conflict as examples, it is evident that there are differences in peacemaking styles and abilities between ASEAN and individual actors like Malaysia.

The Thai-Cambodian border dispute—rooted in century-long tensions over the area surrounding the Preah Vihear Temple—escalated to a bilateral armed conflict in 2011,⁷⁵ prompting the need for international and regional intervention and mediation. Before ASEAN intervention in 2011, the dispute began to escalate in 2008 when UNESCO accepted Cambodia's request to register the temple as a World Heritage Site,⁷⁶ suggesting the territory was part of Cambodia. Despite warning signs of conflict and increasing militarization around the Temple, ASEAN remained passive until the escalation in 2011 forced them to intervene. Taking on the border conflict as one of their peacemaking missions, ASEAN reinitiated negotiations between Cambodia and Thailand and helped establish a ceasefire.⁷⁷

ASEAN's approach to peacemaking is commonly referred to as preventative diplomacy: the use of diplomatic initiatives and actions aimed at mitigating or preventing disputes or conflicts that threaten regional stability. In theory, ASEAN's preventative diplomatic efforts use peaceful methods like negotiations and mediation that are timely, non-coercive, and voluntary, and that directly address an issue in a manner that respects international laws and sovereignty.⁷⁸ The escalation of the Thai-Cambodian border dispute required ASEAN to employ their vague, abstract preventative diplomatic approach into tangible, concrete measures.⁷⁹ While ASEAN's passive involvement in the

(74) Victor Bernard, "Is It Time for a Peacekeeping Force for ASEAN?" *The Asia Foundation*, February 2016, <https://asiafoundation.org/2016/02/03/is-it-time-for-a-peacekeeping-force-for-asean/>; "Preventive Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: Redefining the ASEAN Way," Crisis Group, December 31, 2011, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/preventive-diplomacy-southeast-asia-redefining-asean-way>.

(75) "Waging Peace: ASEAN and the Thai-Cambodian Border Conflict," *Crisis Group*, December 6, 2011, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/waging-peace-asean-and-thai-cambodian-border-conflict>.

(76) *Ibid.*

(77) *Ibid.*

(78) "Preventive Diplomacy in Southeast Asia."

(79) *Ibid.*

dispute failed to prevent escalation, their preventative diplomatic efforts beginning in 2011 consisted of setting up spaces for re-negotiations, establishing a team of independent observers to monitor the conflict, and encouraging agreement on a temporary verbal ceasefire.⁸⁰

While ASEAN was successful in some capacity as a regional peacemaker, its efforts were not without failures. Firstly, ASEAN's direct involvement in the peacemaking process in 2011 was overdue when warning signs of the border dispute's escalation surfaced in 2008. A more effective peacemaking process would have occurred if ASEAN reacted sooner and utilized preventative measures to discourage an escalation of the dispute to an armed conflict rather than using these measures to mitigate an already-existing armed conflict. Additionally, ASEAN's peacemaking abilities were hindered by its voluntary, non-binding nature as an institution. Lastly, as a member organization, ASEAN's effectiveness and the quality of its diplomatic initiatives are contingent on the concerted, collective efforts of member countries, which was not necessarily the case in the Thai-Cambodian border dispute. Indonesia, as the chair of ASEAN at the time of the conflict, carried much of the burden and responsibility of ASEAN's response to the dispute. In other words, ASEAN's peacemaking efforts were entirely contingent "upon the energy and dynamism of one member."⁸¹

When considering Indonesia's prominent role in ASEAN's response to the border dispute, there is the question of whether ASEAN's efforts as an institution were any different or more effective than those of a single actor. As exemplified by Malaysia's involvement in peace negotiations during the Moro insurgency, smaller states—despite limited resources and regional supremacy—are important actors in peacemaking processes. Ongoing since 1972, the conflict between the Philippine government (GRP) and Moro insurgents began after the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)—a secessionist group in the southern Philippines—initiated an armed conflict.⁸² Eventually, the MNLF splintered into two groups: one that remained the MNLF and The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). While both groups engaged in peace negotiations with the Philippine government, only the GRP-MILF peace negotiations were mediated by Malaysia.⁸³

While Malaysia was able to take up the position of the 'lead facilitator,' its peacemaking abilities were restricted because of its limited resources, low-standing regional status, and the establishment of an International Contact Group (ICG).⁸⁴ When considering these restrictions, Malaysia was not entirely able to assert influence and persuasion during negotiations. Regardless of the difficulties it faced as lead negotiator, Malaysia was still able to facilitate important strides in peacemaking, specifically in the construction of The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro—a final peace agreement signed between the GRP and MILF.⁸⁵ In comparison to a regional institution like ASEAN, Malaysia is not significantly disadvantaged in peacemaking despite being a smaller state and operating independently; however, Malaysia did not have the same backing, prestige, financial resources, or authority that accompanies ASEAN. While ASEAN is not always credited with operating effectively or cohesively, the regional authority it possesses in Southeast Asia is not without value. This level of perceived authority and prestige is important in effective peacemaking initiatives.

(80) "Waging Peace: ASEAN and the Thai-Cambodian Border Conflict."

(81) "Preventive Diplomacy in Southeast Asia."

(82) Donna Fitrah, "Multiparty Mediation in the Southern Philippines Conflict," Masters thesis, (Leiden University, 2012), 2, <https://studenttheses.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item%3A2607465/view>.

(83) Ibid.

(84) Ibid., 28.

(85) "Malaysia: Southeast Asian Peacemaker?" *Australian Institute of International Affairs*, accessed December 8, 2021, <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/malaysia-peacemaker/>.

Comparing Swiss- and EU-led Peacemaking

The longstanding role that European states and organizations have played in addressing conflict through entities like the European Union and via domestic policy decisions provides a means for studying the role of multilateral institutions and individual states in peacemaking. The European Union (EU) is a multilateral organization of 27 European countries originally formed to establish a unified economic system and now takes on several functions like regional security and governance of social policies like the promotion of peace. While the EU is often associated with being a prominent actor for conflict resolution and peacemaking in the region, its effectiveness can often be lacking due to its failure to reach consensus among member states and to uphold its interests as a supranational entity. Peacemaking capabilities and influence vary between multilateral organizations and individual states. This section will discuss such differences through the cases of the EU and Switzerland.

The European Union is structured into a system of governance that requires unanimous consensus among member states to advance policy. This is difficult to achieve due to the varying domestic interests of member states and influence within the union. The Israel-Palestine conflict illustrates this difficulty. Among the EU's priorities is its peacemaking efforts between Israel and Palestine. The EU views economic and humanitarian assistance to Israel and Palestine as key factors in its policy objectives to achieve a two-state solution to the conflict. But the EU has voiced its disapproval of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank as violations of international law, which Israel has denied.⁸⁶ The EU, Israel's largest trading partner, is against using its economic leverage against Israel due to the dangers that such an approach would pose for a two-state solution.⁸⁷ Additionally, the Israel-Palestine conflict of May 2021 has demonstrated a failed unified EU response in calling for a ceasefire, with Hungary's Viktor Orbán blocking the unanimity required.⁸⁸ Peacemaking for the EU is complicated because of member states' domestic interests and approaches to the conflict, with some favoring to side with either Israel or Palestine.⁸⁹

The European Union has led mediation efforts in many conflicts, and therefore, played a more neutral role for producing peacemaking.⁹⁰ The EU's involvement in the Balkans since the conflict of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s has proved to have its failures and successes. The European Community (EC) facilitated ceasefires between conflicting parties which achieved short-lived success after the parties violated the agreement and conflict ensued once more.⁹¹ In the following years, internal differences among member states complicated a peace plan such as Germany's unilateral recognition of the states of Slovenia and Croatia, which the EU recognized after pressure to act.⁹² Internal changes within the union and past failure encouraged the EU to seek a different approach. Peace talks were to resume but with the assistance of the United Nations and United States.⁹³ The Balkans conflict of the 1990s could be said to have achieved some level of success for the EU after the involvement of other organizations and states. On the other hand, EU peacemaking

(86) Muriel Asseburg, Nimrod Goren, Eyal Ronen, and Nicolai von Ondarza, "Divided and Divisive," May 2019, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/fachpublikationen/Asseburg_PAX_REPORT_Divided_Divisive.pdf.

(87) Khalil Shikaki, "The Limits of European Influence in Palestine and Israel," *Carnegie Europe*, June 27, 2019, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/79390>.

(88) Sabine Siebold and Robin Emmott, "EU - Minus Hungary - Calls for Israeli-Palestinian Ceasefire," *Reuters*, May 18, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/divisions-curb-eu-peacemaking-role-israel-gaza-violence-2021-05-18/>.

(89) *Ibid.*

(90) Steven Blockmans, "Peacemaking: Can the EU Meet Expectations?" *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*, 2014, <https://nupi.braege.unit.no/nupi-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/277615/NUPI%2BWorking%2BPaper-840-Blockmans.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y>

(91) *Ibid.*, 15.

(92) *Ibid.*

(93) Erik Plänitz and Sonja S. Gajic, "Report on Impact of EU Engagement on Mediation and local level dialogue initiatives in Western Balkans," November 30, 2017, https://eucivcap.files.wordpress.com/2017/12/eu-civcap_deliverable_5-2.pdf.

ing has had its successes like with the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo in 2013. The EU facilitated the “First Agreement on Principle Governing the Normalization of Relations,” which initiated the end to conflict between the two countries, partly on the basis of improved EU relations for both countries.⁹⁴ Despite its many economic and political crises over the years, the EU stands as a force capable of producing peace, especially because of countries’ desires to benefit from relations with the EU and begin a path towards membership in the union.⁹⁵ EU attractiveness for producing successful mediation and peacemaking is mostly regional, however. The EU’s inner periphery is where success should most be expected, at least when acting independently of other international actors.⁹⁶

While the EU has often played a neutral role in the conduct of mediation and facilitation, Switzerland prides itself on its use of smaller-state neutrality to advance and promote peacemaking as a key element of its foreign and domestic policy objectives. Swiss peacemaking is heavily carried out through humanitarian assistance and aid and the state’s role as a mediator and facilitator. The Swiss approach to peacemaking is unique in that it involves a high level of autonomy when forming its peacemaking strategies.⁹⁷ Switzerland is neither a member of the EU nor NATO, and its participation in the United Nations has recently developed because the nation was limited to that of an observer state for several decades.⁹⁸ Swiss policy for neutrality has developed a level of attractiveness enough for Switzerland to be home to and host many top international organizations and United Nations agencies.

Switzerland’s role in peacemaking is often achieved by states reaching out for assistance in mediation. With the growing demand in conflict resolution, the Swiss have limited capacity to directly mediate or facilitate conflicts, but they now professionalize it by training and assisting professionals in conflict resolution.⁹⁹ Switzerland has conflicting parties and interested actors reach out to the country for assistance in structuring the mediation process, conducting negotiations, and structuring dialogue for mutual understanding.¹⁰⁰ They have produced support for Syria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and between the Colombian government and FARC.¹⁰¹ The Swiss’ ability to legally talk to many groups gives the European country an advantage that many states and organizations like the EU do not have because of policies that restrict interaction with armed non-state actors and terrorist organizations.

Peacemaking develops differently for multilateral institutions when compared to individual state actors. As the EU case demonstrates, limited institutional capacity, distinct priorities and interests among member states, and failure to be viewed as a reliable mediator are factors that contribute to the challenges posed by multilateral institutions to be effective peacemakers. The Switzerland case proves that small-state peacemaking often requires qualities not associated with economic and political power. The Swiss approach has been effective on several occasions because the conduct of peacemaking by means of neutrality and commitment to human rights is deeply ingrained in Swiss

(94) Julian Bergmann and Arne Niemann, “Mediating International Conflicts: The European Union as an Effective Peacemaker?” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 53, no. 5 (May 2015), 15

(95) Ibid.

(96) Steven Blockmans, “Peacemaking: Can the EU Meet Expectations?” *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*, 2014, <https://nupi.braege.unit.no/nupi-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/277615/NUPI%2BWorking%2BPaper-840-Blockmans.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y>.

(97) Andreas Graf and David Lanz, “Conclusions: Switzerland as a Paradigmatic Case of Small-State Peace Policy?” *Swiss Political Science Review* 19, no. 3 (2013), 420, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/spsr.12048>.

(98) Luzius Wildhaber, “Switzerland, Neutrality and the United Nations,” *Malaya Law Review* 12, no. 1 (July 1970), 142, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24862646>.

(99) “Mediation,” Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten EDA, *FDFA*, 2021, <https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/human-rights/peace/switzerland-s-good-offices/facilitation-and-mediation.html>.

(100) Ibid.

(101) Ibid.

values and foreign policy objectives. A Swiss peacemaking approach focused on civilian instruments ensures it upholds its conceptions of neutrality and promotion of peace anywhere. Switzerland's approach as a constant player in mediation is not without its flaws and risk, but it is by this constant role that the Swiss have specialized in peacemaking and attracted other states and organizations.


Conclusion

In comparing the role of regional institutions and individual states in peacemaking, it is clear that each actor's approach carries different strengths and weaknesses. Smaller states are often forced to look towards regional organizations to play a role in peacemaking due to their lack of resources. Some regional organizations, such as the AU and ECOWAS, have proven to be effective in acting as a peacemaker by including the voices of smaller member states. In other spheres, the difficulties of working through the bureaucracy of multilateral institutions make it beneficial for some states to act as a solo peacemaking force if they are in possession of sufficient resources, expertise, and human capital to facilitate such a process. Furthermore, some individual states, such as Switzerland, have such a well-established reputation, which gives them unique legitimacy to act as solo peacemakers. Smaller states must reflect on these factors and their own identity when deciding whether to pursue peacemaking through regional organizations or develop their individual capabilities.

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On the Ground: The Role of Individuals in Peacemaking

Chapter 4

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Introduction

In the past three decades, more armed conflicts have ended through mediation than in the previous two centuries.¹⁰² Successful mediations depend on a wide array of factors, over many of which the mediator has little control. Examples include the comparative strengths between parties, the perception of how the conflict evolves, the state of exhaustion or motivation, the support of external actors, and even plain luck.¹⁰³ Yet having a skillful mediator can make a crucial difference in conducting successful peacemaking. Mediators work behind the scenes, knowing that the successes of their work will bring praise to the parties but the failures will be blamed on them.¹⁰⁴ The daily routine of mediators can consist of endless rounds of fruitless meetings, yet their efforts have life-or-death consequences.¹⁰⁵

Transforming sworn enemies into peace-deal partners entails a number of historical and political nuances particular to each conflict, yet they all share one common element: The essential role of the mediator.¹⁰⁶ In pushing warring parties toward peace, mediators can be considered the protagonists of peacemaking, but at the same time bystanders to it. Mediators bring parties to the table in order to sway them away from armed conflict, yet they are oftentimes powerless. Their only leverage is neutrality and a commitment to cease violence. This paradoxical position means that mediators must be both “leaders and pleaders,” as Harriet Martin describes them in *Kings of Peace, Pawns of War*.¹⁰⁷ Hence, peacemaking is a field that attracts individuals with fascinating personalities—from risk-takers to seductors, the personal character of mediators plays a key role in understanding how peacemaking is conducted.¹⁰⁸

Research on international mediation has shown that a mediator’s style has an influence on whether, and even how, conflicts are resolved.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, mediation style is deeply related to the personality of the mediator. Not only is personality often assumed to guide the mediator’s style, but it has also been shown to be related to different methods of conflict resolution.¹¹⁰ Therefore, it is in the interest of future mediators, and those who study or benefit from their work, to analyze how the individual personalities of mediators impact the processes of peacemaking.¹¹¹

In this chapter, we will look at studies of five individual mediators who have sought to resolve armed conflicts across the world in order to examine how their individual personalities impacted the process of peacemaking. The first and second case studies of Lakhdar Brahimi and Kofi Annan regard two mediators of a similar background whose distinct personalities resulted in different approaches to the process of mediation. The third case study of Martti Ahtisaari presents an example of how a former leader of a smaller state can leverage their experience and combine it with a strong and forthright personality to influence the peace processes. The fourth and fifth cases compare Vidar Helgesen and Erik Solheim, two mediators possessing different personalities who worked side by side in the same conflict.

All five mediators are nationals of smaller states. When it comes down to international

(102) Kofi Annan, foreword to *Kings of Peace, Pawns of War: The Untold Story of Peace-Making*, by Harriet Martin (London: Continuum, 2006).

(103) *Ibid.*, ix.

(104) *Ibid.*, x.

(105) *Ibid.*, x.

(106) *Ibid.*, xi.

(107) Harriet Martin, *Kings of Peace, Pawns of War: The Untold Story of Peace-Making*, (London: Continuum, 2006), 2.

(108) Annan, foreword to *Kings of Peace, Pawns of War*, xiii.

(109) Mathilda Lindgren, “Peacemaking up Close: Explaining Mediator Styles of International Mediators,” Dissertation, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2016, 12.

(110) *Ibid.*, 38.

(111) Annan, foreword to *Kings of Peace, Pawns of War*, x.

negotiations, smaller states tend to punch above their weight because they possess fewer financial resources and less political leverage. Nonetheless, by being selective in the negotiations they engage in, concentrating their capacities on the most important issues, and engaging in capacity-building for a select cohort of highly-specialized negotiators, smaller states can maximize their resources and gain influence over peacemaking outcomes.¹¹² By examining the contributions of these five mediators, we can undertake a greater understanding of the *practice* of peacemaking from the perspective of smaller states, therefore deepening the body of knowledge needed to sustain the life-saving work of peacemakers.¹¹³

Lakhdar Brahimi & Kofi Annan

Once an insurgent fighter of Algeria's National Liberation Front, Lakhdar Brahimi rose to become the United Nations' most senior mediator.¹¹⁴ How did a freedom fighter in the fight against French colonialism become a peace-broker? Brahimi had served as a diplomatic representative for the National Liberation Front with the assigned task of searching for support across Southeast Asia. When Algeria achieved its independence, he became the country's Foreign Minister and, later on, Ambassador to the United Nations—all positions giving him a wealth of experience in conducting negotiations that led him to become a veteran United Nations mediator and peacekeeping expert.¹¹⁵

In his peacemaking career, Brahimi was in charge of brokering the 1989 Taif Agreement, which ended the Lebanese Civil War, and cutting deals with Afghanistan after 9/11. When the United States invaded Iraq in 2004, Brahimi strongly opposed the invasion. Yet the United States was adamant in having Brahimi mediate the establishment of an interim government in Iraq. Brahimi was an Arab nationalist and, further than being against the Iraq War, he felt unease about being in an occupied Arab country under the perception of being in bed with the occupiers.¹¹⁶ Beyond recognizing Brahimi as an extraordinary mediator, the United States saw in Brahimi two characteristics of great value—he was Arab and a Sunni Muslim. Therefore, President George Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice all personally met with Brahimi in efforts to persuade him to reconsider his position. Brahimi has mentioned that the United States “practically begged him to say yes,” and he did say yes, but only reluctantly.¹¹⁷

Brahimi was known for his calm and humble personality. He approached negotiations with an open mind and would reportedly meet with more than 200 people per day, listening to all of them and even admitting at moments that he was not familiar enough with the issue. His collected personality and transparent negotiation style allowed Brahimi to pass neutral judgments of the situation in Iraq. Furthermore, he understood that assessing the issue fairly would not be possible if he were seen as a pawn of the United States. Therefore, Brahimi distanced himself from the United States' agenda by publicly denouncing the Bush administration's foreign policy. Brahimi's honest personality further allowed him to broker an interim Iraqi government composed of technocrats that counted the approval in Iraq, United States, and United Nations.¹¹⁸

Brahimi was a seasoned diplomat who, through his decades of experience, cultivated a com-

(112) Diana Panke, “Small States in Multilateral Negotiations. What Have We Learned?” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 25, no. 3 (2012), 395.

(113) Annan, foreword to *Kings of Peace, Pawns of War*, x.

(114) Martin, *Kings of Peace, Pawns of War*, 1.

(115) *Ibid.*, 3.

(116) *Ibid.*, 3.

(117) *Ibid.*, 2-3.

(118) *Ibid.*, 5-7.

posed, sincere, and frank negotiation style that yielded results. Brahimi was notorious for calculating his moves, being open to change when receiving new information, demonstrating receptiveness to different perspectives of conflicts, and passing neutral judgements even in instances where that meant going against the institutions he had to answer to. His forthright negotiation style and the diplomatic showmanship with which he carried out his peacemaking processes successfully restored sovereignty and independence to Iraq. Brahimi's work in Iraq serves as an example of how a mediator can achieve success by expending significant efforts in understanding the complexities of the issue and complementing such efforts with an adequate character that makes the parties feel heard.

After Iraq, Brahimi moved to conduct peacemaking in the Syrian Civil War in 2012, along with former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.¹¹⁹ They were both handpicked by the UN and the Arab League for this challenging task because of their remarkable peacemaking career, even though their personalities were drastically different. Annan was a hard-line mediator with a cunning mind and a stern demeanor. In Syria, he imposed strict norms in the negotiation process that differed from Brahimi's more neutral stance.¹²⁰ Annan focused on developing guidelines and deadlines for the parties to negotiate an end to the violence.¹²¹ He also publicly shamed the parties for their lack of commitment to ceasefires and prioritized the involvement of regional and international actors.¹²² Brahimi, on the contrary, refrained from all such things and emphasized the role of the UN Security Council in brokering deals.¹²³ When examining how their characters correlate to their mediation style, Annan was more directive and settlement-oriented than Brahimi, focusing almost exclusively on achieving ceasefires and prescribing hard rules for these negotiations.¹²⁴ Brahimi, on the other hand, focused not only on ending violence but also on improving relations among the parties.¹²⁵ In the end, negotiations failed because of the parties' unwillingness to reach a compromise and abide by their word. Still, the case of Syria demonstrates that addressing a conflict with more than one mediation style does not necessarily guarantee that either will lead to successful peacemaking.

Martii Ahtisaari

This case examines the role of former Finnish President Martii Ahtisaari in the Aceh peace process. The conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (also known as the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM, in Indonesian) and the Indonesian government was long-standing, taking place over the course of almost four decades, and had involved multiple aborted peace agreements before the non-governmental organization Crisis Management Initiative—which Ahtisaari represented—publicly announced that peace talks would begin once again in 2005.¹²⁶ The GAM sought to gain independence for the Indonesian province of Aceh, driven by cultural and religious differences between the province and the rest of the Indonesian archipelago, as well as a history of violence that created “suspicion, hostility, and mutual recrimination.”¹²⁷ However, the tide in the failed history of peace in Aceh turned around with the introduction of Ahtisaari as the chair of negotiations for the peace process.¹²⁸

(119) Raymond Hinnebusch, William Zartman, Elizabeth Parker-Magyar, and Omar Imady, “UN Mediation in the Syrian Crisis: From Kofi Annan to Lakhdar Brahimi,” *International Peace Institute*, 2016, 3-6.

(120) *Ibid.*, 4.

(121) *Ibid.*, 4.

(122) *Ibid.*, 7.

(123) *Ibid.*, 8.

(124) *Ibid.*, 19-21.

(125) *Ibid.*, 24.

(126) Michael Morfit, “The Road to Helsinki: The Aceh Agreement and Indonesia's Democratic Development,” *International Negotiation* 12, no. 1 (2007), 115.

(127) *Ibid.*, 117.

(128) *Ibid.*, 137.

Ahtisaari's personal role was influential in moving the peace process forward. First, he brought with him an "international stature and credibility" that gave him and the parties involved access to outside resources and expertise during the negotiations.¹²⁹ While individuals playing the role of peacemakers can influence the nature of negotiations with their personalities and mediation style, Ahtisaari's case exemplifies how they can also influence negotiations with their position, power, resources, and organizational affiliations. Ahtisaari was able to leverage his position as a former head of state and a credible peacemaker to enhance the peace process and access resources that would have been much more difficult to access had he not been involved in the process.¹³⁰

Furthermore, his impressive resumé not only aided the process materially but also gave him many mediation skills that proved integral for eventually reaching a peace agreement.¹³¹ By combining the respect he commanded due to his reputation with his direct and forceful personality, Ahtisaari maintained a tough and no-nonsense approach to mediating discussions between the GAM and the Indonesian government.¹³² At the negotiating table, Ahtisaari consistently pushed members of both parties to come prepared and to legitimately pursue real efforts for peace, even criticizing them when he thought they failed to do so.¹³³ In this way, while Ahtisaari still maintained the impartial role as mediator, he was able to have an active and prominent role in the negotiations to great effect.

Ahtisaari was also extremely transparent throughout the negotiations process about the "scope and ground rules of the discussions" and, early on in talks, established the principle of "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed."¹³⁴ Setting expectations about the limits and basic understandings of where the negotiations could go created the ability to guide the negotiation towards the goal while avoiding extraneous issues that could hinder it. While it is perhaps not as much of a personal trait than a sort of mediation policy, it is clear that Ahtisaari's own individual traits and background gave him a greater ability to hold firm in setting these expectations and to set them in the first place without condemnation.

Ahtisaari's background as a head of state and his forceful personality were inextricably linked. Without having the reputation and credibility that his resumé provided, he either would not have been as comfortable with taking a straightforward and blunt approach to mediation, or his doing so would not have carried the same effective weight. Ultimately, by leveraging his position and personal traits to play a significant and important role in the negotiation process, Ahtisaari was able to push GAM and Indonesia to sign the Helsinki peace deal, a move toward peace in a decades-long conflict. Members of both parties praised Ahtisaari's role in the process and credited his skills as an "experienced diplomat, shrewd politician, and forceful personality for pushing them past difficult moments and towards final agreement."¹³⁵ Through this praise, we understand how Ahtisaari as an individual combined his background, reputation, and personality to push the involved parties towards success in establishing peace.

Vidar Helgesen & Erik Solheim

The next case study focuses on the Norwegian government's efforts to mediate the conflict

(129) Ibid, 137-138.

(130) Ibid., 138.

(131) Ibid., 137.

(132) Ibid.

(133) Ibid., 137-138.

(134) Ibid., 138.

(135) Ibid., 137.

between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (also known as the Tamil Tigers and LTTE). The LTTE was a separatist group that sought to establish an independent state for the Tamil minority of Sri Lanka. Their tactics for doing so involved systematic attacks on Sri Lankan government officials, civilians, and even other Tamil groups and leaders who strived for independence yet challenged the LTTE's position as sole representative of the Tamil people and independence movement. The Sri Lankan government also engaged in consistent violence against the separatist group, perpetrating several human rights abuses and discrimination against the Tamil people. Thus, after years of conflict, Norway was asked to step in to become the official facilitator of the peace process between the two groups in 1999, following a period of secret talks between Norwegian Ambassador to Sri Lanka Jon Westborg, Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga, and Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgama to facilitate the evacuation of LTTE Senior Advisor Anton Balasingham from Sri Lanka for health reasons. These talks, conducted behind closed doors and without any outside interference or input from other members of the Norwegian or Sri Lankan governments, established personal contacts that positioned Norway as a clear choice for the role of facilitator.¹³⁶ From the start, it was clear that the actions and personalities of individuals within the framework of their organizations would have a large impact on the peace process. These two case studies will focus on the peacemaking efforts of two Norwegian diplomats—Vidar Helgesen and Erik Solheim—to examine how their mediation styles and personality traits lent themselves to both success and failure in the Sri Lankan peace process.

As Norway's State Secretary and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs from 2001 to 2005, Vidar Helgesen played a leading role in the negotiations process. Helgesen was considered by many to be an extremely blunt and honest man, something that fell in line with common perceptions about the Norwegian delegation more generally.¹³⁷ This kind of bluntness can greatly improve the peace process; by remaining entirely and consistently honest, there could be no accusations of the Norwegians of lying or withholding the truth. In a peacemaking process wherein a third party must remain completely impartial and cannot be seen to have its own agenda beyond the reaching of a peace agreement, this uncensored style is crucial for maintaining integrity and trust.¹³⁸

Following this institutional value of impartiality, Helgesen stressed the importance of avoiding relationships with individuals representing the parties involved in the peace process that went beyond the realm of professional into that of friendship; he said that “one shouldn't establish friendship-like relations because you might become too close [...] and if you were to establish friendships you would need to do it in a politically balanced way.”¹³⁹ Therefore, Helgesen's mediation style was founded upon maintaining the Norwegian ideology of best practices for peacemaking—impartiality and honesty—in the realm of individual interactions. In this way, although he may have been operating as an individual in the process with a certain degree of autonomy, he also strictly adhered to the principle of being a representative of the Norwegian government in his capacity as an individual.

Erik Solheim was another main Norwegian negotiator who worked on the ground in Sri Lanka, serving as a Special Advisor and peace envoy for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While Helgesen was known for his impartiality, straightforwardness, and aversion to forming close personal relationships with whom he was facilitating negotiations, Solheim's style of mediation anchored itself in building personal relationships. Solheim had a “shiny warmth and informality not common among diplomats” and soon became extremely close with many individuals rep-

(136) Martin, *Kings of Peace, Pawns of War*, 102.

(137) *Ibid.*, 121.

(138) *Ibid.*, 122.

(139) *Ibid.*, 114.

representing the LTTE early in the process, leveraging his knowledge of Tamil history and culture, as well as his personal ability to form natural relationships with others.¹⁴⁰ While Solheim defended his approach because to him “the benefits of having friendships clearly outweighs the disadvantages,” he fell under heavy criticism from members of the Sri Lankan government, which nearly led to his dismissal from his role in the peace process.¹⁴¹ While his close proximity to members of the LTTE may have caused political issues with the Sri Lankan government, it ultimately worked to the Norwegians’ advantage: they “emerged with an enhanced role to play” and were able to negotiate an agreement including a military ceasefire in 2002.¹⁴²

Ultimately, Norway’s efforts to secure peace between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE failed due to a number of factors, including irreconcilable differences, internal domestic political complications in the Sri Lankan government, and the media’s outsized role in creating narratives harmful to Norway’s ability to facilitate the peace process. However, by examining Helgesen and Solheim’s roles in the process and how their individual traits influenced their success as facilitators, we can learn about the ways in which the personalities of those involved in peacemaking can affect the process. Solheim and Helgesen were members of the same team, but they operated very differently on an individual level. Both were honest individuals and certainly embodied Norway’s blunt approach to peacemaking, but they certainly had differing approaches to and opinions on the formation and value of personal relationships. Although Helgesen saw the value of forming personal relationships with both involved parties, his mediation style was more structured around being a straightforward, impartial facilitator than using personal relationships to create leverage. This is evident in assessments of Helgesen such as that given by senior Sri Lankan government official Milinda Moragoda, who credited Helgesen with a “fine capacity to smooth ruffled feathers” and lauded his ability to “give the discussion focus without himself becoming one of the egos in the process.”¹⁴³ Through such descriptions, Helgesen appears as the no-nonsense epitome of professionalism. He clearly understood his role in the process, strove to represent Norway and its traditional foreign policy style of impartiality and honesty, and avoided forming personal relationships that bordered on friendship to retain impartiality. This was valuable in a process that involved facilitating discussions between two groups with a long history of hatred for one another and in which the Sri Lankan and international media constantly sought to create narratives that positioned Norway as too friendly toward the LTTE.

Alternatively, Solheim’s mediation style rooted itself in the personal relationships that he formed with members of the involved parties. For him, conversations with members of the LTTE who became friends enhanced his understanding of the issues—a valuable ability to have in a complicated ethnically- and historically-motivated conflict.¹⁴⁴ Additionally, he believed that “a personal relationship may help in finding a way round difficult issues at the negotiating table.”¹⁴⁵ Solheim may have frustrated many members of the parties with his willingness to push his personal relationships into the realm of friendship, seemingly violating the principle of impartiality, but there was certainly value in doing so.

Through our examination of Solheim and Helgesen’s differing styles, we come to the conclusion that both have value in their own way, and, when brought together on the same team, can complement each other. Maragoda explained that Helgesen “is able to focus on issues and keeps

(140) *Ibid.*, 106.

(141) *Ibid.*

(142) *Ibid.*, 107.

(143) *Ibid.*, 114.

(144) *Ibid.*, 106.

(145) *Ibid.*

the structure going” while Solheim “performs a complementary role in being able to handle the networks well and being confident with the people concerned.”¹⁴⁶ Helgesen also supported the idea of the value of mixed skills by saying that “the varying relations different members have with each side ‘enables you to play out different cards,’” which he identified as “quite essential.”¹⁴⁷ This case study ultimately suggests that there is a balance to strike between informality and formality in the peacemaking process. Furthermore, it also suggests that a mix of skills and personalities on the same mediation team can prove valuable for deploying different negotiation tactics to fit specific situations.

Conclusion

Peacemaking is a process that involves mediation between political, social, and ethnic organizations in order to solve violent conflicts that have a far reaching impact on vast numbers of people. It is often done by state or superstate delegations that must constantly represent their country or organization. With this in mind, it may be difficult to consider the significant role of the individual in a process that so often involves greater forces. However, the peacemaking process is one that is propelled by conversations between individuals; it is these conversations that give rise to negotiation, trust, and the ultimate goal of peace.

In the world of peacemaking, the mediator and their team must bring many skills to the table. These skills range from being able to carefully plan the steps in negotiation and facilitate their implementation to understanding every aspect of the conflict and its history and suggesting solutions to work toward.¹⁴⁸ These skills are prerequisites for third-party involvement in a peace process.¹⁴⁹ All of the individuals examined in this chapter possess such skills; what matters is the nuanced nature of an individual’s ability to implement those skills effectively in a peace process by virtue of their own unique traits, style, and position.

In this chapter, we examined the roles of five individuals—Lakhdar Brahimi, Kofi Annan, Martti Ahtisaari, Vidar Helgesen, and Erik Solheim—in their respective peace processes. In each case, we can understand how their personalities and mediation styles influenced their effectiveness as mediators. By surveying the five individuals together, a few common themes emerge. First, being seen as impartial is one of the most important and fundamental traits a mediator must have. In each peace process, any question of partiality or bias was or would have been detrimental. Solheim, who of these five was the only one formally accused of a lack of neutrality, was barely allowed to stay involved with the Sri Lanka peace process following the Sri Lankan government’s unease with his proximity to the LTTE. A mediator must remain impartial and be perceived as impartial in their interactions with stakeholders. This means that mediators such as Solheim—whose effectiveness in mediation comes from his warm personality and willingness to create relationships—must retain a balance of formality and informality. This allows mediators to retain the merits of forming relationships while avoiding any potential negative consequences that might arise from them.

Furthermore, we see this balance between formal and informal interactions play out in the cases of Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi. While both individuals had a diplomatic style of mediation from their background as senior representatives of the UN and careers of diplomacy, their personalities lent themselves to different approaches to reaching peace. While Brahimi pursued relationships with those involved in the peace process, at the same time remaining more neutral

(146) Ibid., 102.

(147) Ibid., 121.

(148) Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz, “Third-Party Intervention in International Conflicts: Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in the Post-Cold War Era,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations* 3, no. 11 (2006), 34.

(149) Ibid., 34.


than someone with a less explicitly diplomatic nature like Solheim, Annan pursued peace through more official channels, taking a hardline approach to negotiations that emphasized his role as a mediator that represents the UN. Similar to Annan who carried the prestige of being a former Secretary-General of the UN, Ahtisaari leveraged his identity as a former head of state to command the respect necessary to forcefully drive negotiations forward with his straightforward style and personality to great effect.

There is no single way to prescribe a set of traits that can be successful in all cases of peacemaking, and therefore this chapter does not seek to prescribe one. Each individual negotiator examined in this chapter has their own personality and style of mediation that, while sharing common norms and goals, are distinct. Rather, we emphasize the important role of the individual in peacemaking and seek to highlight some of the ways in which the personalities of those individuals can affect the process.

We see that peacemaking is not something that is done only on the organizational level, but also behind closed doors in conversations between leaders and representatives that may never become public. Those conversations are between individuals; although they may represent their organization, they still retain their own personalities and have the ability to individually influence the mediation process through their words and actions. Peacemaking missions must ensure that the individuals that comprise them have the necessary mediation skills to move the peace process forward, as well as the personality traits that are conducive to personal interactions that allow the successful cessation of violence and attainment of peace.

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Dues and Don'ts: How Much Peacemaking Costs and Why It Matters

Chapter 5

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Introduction

Peacemaking operations may share more differences than similarities, but all peacemaking operations are united by at least one factor: money. To put it simply, they all need it. Though peacemaking countries certainly spend money for peacemaking endeavors to be possible, little is known about how financing operates in terms of peacemaking. Peace agreements do not come with clear-cut price tags—but perhaps they should.

Many costs associated with peacemaking are hardly related to diplomacy and international affairs at first glance. Peacemaking costs can come in the form of transport, lodging, and salaries for security personnel and other staff. The actual crux of peacemaking—the dialogue between conflicting parties—is usually free, unless one or more parties were paid as an incentive to attend. Still, there is something to be said for how the most important aspect of peacemaking is, in theory, free. Everything else is paradoxically on the peacemaking periphery: absolutely crucial to the peacemaking endeavor, but so unglamorous, unsexy, and seemingly irrelevant that states hardly keep track of the expenses.

The finances of peacemaking are little known, but discovering the details of peacemaking financing has the potential to improve the practice of peacemaking. Better understanding the role of finances in peacemaking carries distinct potential benefits for smaller states. This chapter, therefore, seeks to answer one central question: How much does peacemaking cost? In working to shed light on that query, this paper will also consider how to estimate the cost of peacemaking—and, most importantly, why clarifying the finances of peacemaking even matters, especially for smaller states.

This chapter will proceed in four parts. It will begin by identifying issues and gaps related to the current understanding of the financing of peacemaking. Second, it will propose a unique methodology for determining an estimated cost of peacemaking operations. Third, it will apply that methodology to the Bougainville peace agreement in an effort to understand the cost of that particular peacemaking process. This chapter will conclude by analyzing the efficacy of the proposed methodology and considering what facets of peacemaking warrant more funds than others.

Holes in Understanding Peacemaking Financing And Why It Matters

There is no balance sheet when it comes to international peacemaking. In the case of Bougainville, New Zealand did not leave Papua New Guinea with an itemized invoice once it finalized the peace agreement. In fact, New Zealand probably would not have been able to provide an invoice—let alone an itemized one—because countries do not monitor how much each aspect of peacemaking costs, if they keep track of the total sum at all. Everything has a price, and peacemaking is no exception.

Although the finance details of peacemaking are quite murky, the costs of peacekeeping are rather transparent—likely because the United Nations organizes most peacekeeping missions, which are also more expensive than peacemaking operations.

Some governments are more transparent than others regarding their general operating budgets. Sweden and Ireland, for instance, make public a relatively detailed budget for their respective Department of Foreign Affairs and Ministry for Foreign Affairs. For example, in 2016, Ireland's Department of Foreign Affairs spent €67.3 million of its €698.4 million budget to serve its “people at home and abroad and promote reconciliation and co-operation,” likely referring to conflict resolution programs, among other things.¹⁵⁰

(150) “How We Spend Our Money,” Ireland Department of Foreign Affairs, accessed December 7, 2021, <https://www.dfa.ie/about-us/what-we-do/how-we-spend-your-money/>.

Sweden gets even more specific than Ireland. In 2018, the Scandinavian country's Ministry for Foreign Affairs allocated 1,328,554,000 SEK for contributions to international organizations; 192,276,000 SEK to peace- and security-building activities; and 41,606,382,000 SEK on development aid, among other expenditures.¹⁵¹

Sweden and Ireland still both leave a lot to be desired; their budgets leave a lot of questions unanswered. Even though Sweden and Ireland provide comparatively abundant information on their foreign affairs and peacemaking spending, they—like most, if not all countries—do not report how much they spend on specific peacemaking operations. Nevertheless, Sweden and Ireland are also both outliers in their relative transparency. In the case of Portugal, for instance, finding any specific government budgetary details—beyond the total lump sum—is a challenge. That's not to say that the Portuguese government does not make its budgets public; rather, these authors found that identifying detailed Portuguese budgetary information is much more difficult than finding Swedish or Irish data. The relative challenge of finding the data in the first place speaks to how little is known about the finances of peacemaking. Details like the accessibility of this information seem minute, but that inaccessibility is the crux of the problem.

When it comes to peacemaking, as often is the case in international affairs, money is the most important thing. Although a potentially grisly truth, money is what lubricates the cogs of the international system. It facilitates diplomacy. It brings stakeholders to the table—including through mundane things like flights and lodging—to even have a shot at peacefully settling a conflict in the first place. The international community's current understanding of how much peacemaking costs, however, does not reflect how crucial money is.

Transparency in peacemaking financing carries obvious benefits, like combating corruption. In the case of the study and practice of peacemaking, financial transparency—generally and also in specific cases—would also provide great benefits for peacemaking itself. If practitioners better understand where countries are specifically spending their money, they may be better positioned to determine what modes of peacemaking are actually worth spending money on. The current dearth of information means that international actors have a hard time identifying any semblance of a return on their investment. Figuring out what states are spending money on will help inform what states should spend money on, which ultimately has the potential to improve the practice of peacemaking itself.

The supremacy of money's role in peacemaking, therefore, draws into question the role of smaller states in peacemaking, since most smaller states often have smaller budgets than bigger powers. Perhaps money is not as important as previously thought. That is not particularly likely, but considering how little is actually known about peacemaking financing, it remains a possibility. Perhaps peacemaking is not a game that only rich countries can play. Perhaps some less expensive aspects of peacemaking are particularly successful or necessary, which would open up opportunities for smaller states to play a more active and effective role in international peacemaking.

Ultimately, when it comes to the finances of international peacemaking, the holes outnumber the answers. Due to the vast scope of this topic, this chapter does not seek to answer every question. Rather, the remainder of this chapter will aim to only begin to shed light on peacemaking financing, with a particular focus on the role of smaller states.

Estimating the Cost of Peacemaking: A Model

(151) "Ministry for Foreign Affairs areas of the Budget Bill for 2018," Government Offices of Sweden, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2017, accessed December 7, 2021, <https://www.regeringen.se/4a7e9a/contentassets/e239af8bc1404dfb84b083038c4f4b69/mofa-areas-or-the-budget-bill-for-2018.pdf>.

In an attempt to shed light on how peacemaking is financed, we construct an accounting model to illustrate the financial burden of one peacemaking mission on one peacemaking state (Figure 1). Through deconstructing a variety of past peacekeeping missions, we identify costs and considerations peacemakers face. This model can be used to estimate what one peacemaker faces during one peacemaking summit, but it is not meant to serve as a replication of a given state's peacemaking budget. This model includes two main variables: "cost centers" and "multipliers." The "cost centers" identified are the common areas in which peacemaking countries must spend money. The "multipliers" are the variables that increase or decrease costs for a peacemaker. To use this model, the cost centers are first identified. Then, the costs of each cost center should be calculated on a per-unit basis (e.g. cost of housing per day, per person).

Figure 1: Costs Incurred by a Peacemaking State

COST CENTERS:	COST <i>(price per unit)</i>	MULTIPLIERS			TOTAL
		# People	# Of days	Split bill	
Int'l Transport			N/A		
Local Transport					
Security					
Food					
Housing		N/A			
Peacemaking Venue					
Salary of Peacemakers					
FINAL TOTAL:					= SUM of above

Figure 2: Template for peacemaking cost accounting

COST CENTERS:	COST <i>(price per unit)</i>	MULTIPLIERS			TOTAL
		Manpower	Time	Split bill	
FINAL TOTAL:					

The first category of cost centers is the cost of transportation and security. There is a lot of variation across countries when it comes to transportation and security costs. The first question for the peacemaking country is whether they are hosting the peacemaking talks in their home country, in another country, or in the place of conflict. This will impact costs as it impacts what types of

flights the peacemakers would need to get to where the peace talks will take place. Will commercial flights be purchased, or will there need to be a charter flight? If it is a charter flight, would it need to be a military aircraft? If the stakeholders are flying to and from conflict zones, commercial flights are likely unavailable, so additional funding would be required.

Local transportation is another cost center in this category. Local transportation would most likely refer to chartered cars paid at a daily rate. The location of the peace talks would likely impact the cost of local transportation. If the peace talks are taking place in a conflict zone, would transportation need to be via military vehicles? It is also possible that security vehicles would be necessary. Security costs are likely going to be high. The cost of security needs to account for the costs of security for housing, transportation, the peace talk venue, and personal security. Whether a country is using local security or a diplomatic security team from the home country would contribute to variation in security costs. If a peacemaking mission brings its own diplomatic security team, that could also add to the cost of housing, food, and travel. The host country would also most likely have to invest in a security team to secure the venue of the peace talks as well.

The second cost category is housing and food. The price tag on this is likely the least significant of the cost centers and varies a lot between host, participant, and observer countries. The price of housing will likely be based on whether they are housed in state guesthouses or hotels. If housed in a state guesthouse, observer or participant countries likely will not be paying. The price can be calculated based on the standard price of the venue per day. If housed in hotels, the figure could be easily estimated by looking up hotel prices on the given date. The host country will also likely cover the costs of food. To estimate the price of food, this paper employs the price of food for one person each day. A good source of these prices is to look at the average cost of food per person in the host country per day.

The last category to delve into is the cost of the summit itself, including the venue and the peacemaking staff. Was the summit hosted at a hotel or comparable private location or at a state guest house? If hosted at a state guesthouse, the cost will most likely fall on the host country. From translators to security personnel to the negotiators themselves, the salary of peacemaking staff is another cost to consider. The salary of peacemaking staff can be estimated by looking at the average salary of a person in each respective staffer's role.

In this model, three main multipliers affect the cost centers: time, manpower, and how the costs are divided among those participating in the peace talks. In this model, days are used as the measure for time because most costs can be calculated on a per-day basis. We used "person" as a unit of measure for manpower as a multiplier because costs can be calculated on a per-person basis. Costs like housing and transportation, for example, are calculated based on the number of people and number of days. The most important multiplier in all of this is in how a peacemaking deal is split between different participants. Observer countries, host countries, and participating countries contribute to the different cost areas differently. For example, the host country may cover housing and food but may split the budget with a co-host or observer country. Countries may also respectively pay for their own security.

The goal of this model is to show what the costs of one peacemaking mission could look like and provide a ballpark estimate of the costs. The model allows for comparison within one country's budget sheet as it helps us visualize what costs most and what costs least in each peace-keeping mission. A host country, observer country, and participating country would likely have different final costs. This model can be used to visualize what the per-country cost of a peacemaking mission is, enabling comparison between different countries, their roles, and their incurred costs. When using this chart, it is important to adjust costs for the prices at the time of the peace deal. While there is variation in norms surrounding what countries may spend on hotels and food (i.e.

more or less fancy) these price variations would not likely amount to a significant difference in the final estimate.

Applying the Model to Bougainville

To demonstrate the usability of the methodology, we turned to the case of the Bougainville conflict in Papua New Guinea. Tension had been building between local Bougainvilleans and the Papua New Guinea government for years over a variety of issues, breaking out into full conflict between the Papua New Guinea Defense Force and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army in 1988.¹⁵² The conflict continued for nearly ten years, with support for the Papua New Guinea government coming from Australia and Indonesia and support for the insurgents coming from the Solomon Islands.¹⁵³ As the conflict escalated, the threat of growing instability affecting the region necessitated action. New Zealand stepped in as a neutral, regionally-respected, smaller power to act as a peacemaker in mid-1997.¹⁵⁴ Given the recent nature of the conflict and the highly praised success of New Zealand in establishing peace, it serves as a good case study for the application of our methodology in finding the cost of peacemaking. For the purposes of this study, we will calculate costs beginning in July 1997 when New Zealand first began its peacemaking mission, carried through the truce talks in Honiara, Solomon Islands and Burnham, New Zealand, and ending with the peace talks in Christchurch, New Zealand that culminated in the signing of the Lincoln Agreement in January 1998.

With the case study set, there are a couple of clarifications to be made about the application of our methodology. First, within the time frame, there was a temporary implementation of a Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) separate from the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) established after the peace agreement. The TMG was led by New Zealand and supported by Australia, Fiji, and Vanuatu, and it was critical in ensuring stability for the peace talks that followed. However, our methodology will not include the costs spent by New Zealand on the TMG, or subsequent PMG, as they are out of the scope of our consideration.¹⁵⁵ Second, given the time frame of the case—late July 1997 to early January 1998—we simplified our estimates of costs to a six-month time frame for salaries and to separate time chunks spent in Bougainville, at the truce talks, and at the peace talks to more easily calculate lodging costs. Finally, it is important to note that all of the information we have available on costs are *estimates*, as there are no itemized expenditures kept by the Kiwi government—at least not publicly. Cost estimates come from a variety of sources and have to be scaled back to the amount they would have cost during the time period of analysis, as well as reduced to an estimated average.

With these specifications in mind, the case study we lay out here is an estimate of the costs of New Zealand's peacemaking mission in Bougainville. The limiting factors of having a lack of access to specific information, making general estimates, and the time gap all serve to highlight the difficulties of defining the cost of peacemaking in general. For smaller states, it is critical that they employ a methodology similar to that as we have laid out in order to identify the hidden costs and clearly lay out the total costs of a peacemaking mission. Without doing so, financial issues may arise that damage the overall goal of a peacemaking mission. As such, we expect that despite its limitations, our methodology and this case study can serve as an example for smaller states and a tem-

(152) "A risky assignment: How opportunity, diplomatic skill, and luck helped New Zealand play a role in resolving conflict in Bougainville," New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed December 8, 2021, <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/mfat75/bougainville-a-risky-assignment>.

(153) Ibid.

(154) Ibid.

(155) Considering the costs of these facets of peacemaking would be important to examine in another study or proposed methodology.

plate for proper implementation. The simplified budget sheet is as follows:

COST CENTERS:	COST (price per unit)	MULTIPLIERS			TOTAL (\$)
		Amount	Duration	Locations	
Int'l Transport	10,000	-	99 hours	-	990,000
Local Transport	700	~30	-	3	70,000
Security	~20,000	-	-	3	65,000
Food	40	100	180 days	-	450,000
Housing	9,000	-	~2 months	2	35,000
Peacemaking Venue	10,000	2	-	3	20,000
Salary of Peacemakers	100,000	10	½ year	-	500,000
Salary of Support Staff	~50,000	30	½ year	-	800,000
FINAL TOTAL:					2,930,000.00

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(156) The methodology for the information found in the table was as follows. Firstly, the specific steps to ensure peace were identified from a compilation of information from the following sources: (1) "A Risky Assignment: How Opportunity, Diplomatic Skill, and Luck Helped New Zealand Play a Role in Resolving Conflict in Bougainville," New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand Government, accessed December 8, 2021, <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/mfat75/bougainville-a-risky-assignment/>, (2) Joseph Kabui, "Reconciliation A Priori," *Peace on Bougainville Truce Monitoring Group*, edited by Rebecca Adams, Victoria University Press, 2001, (3) John Braithwaite, Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy, and Leah Dunn, "Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing Peace in Bougainville." ANU Press. September 2010. Accessed at <http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p57571/pdf/ch0516.pdf> and <http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p57571/pdf/ch0418.pdf>. Then the price for each individual step was identified as follows: *International transport* - The cost to transport actors on a C-130 Hercules was found to be 120k based on <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/07/31/c130j-tops-surges-in-pentagon-weapons-estimates.html> a two way 6 hour flight and per hour flight costs. Transport to PNG was on the same aircraft for a different duration and found to be around 100k. Moving all actors to the first venue required flights with costs found at <https://www.businessinsider.com/price-military-aircraft-per-flight-hour-2016-8#a-10c-1> as New Zealand uses similar aerial tech, then calculations based on distance flown, number of actors transported, and various destinations/originations, found the cost to move actors to the first location to be roughly 200k. Using similar calculations and flight patterns an additional 150k was added for movement to the second venue. An additional 100k for various movements. 200k for transports to final talks. 120k for transport home. *Local transport* - Based on expenditures by the New Zealand government at similar business/government conferences per delegate found at <https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/5745-business-events-delegate-survey-report-year-to-december-2018> scaled to location, delegate quantity, and duration of talks was found to be 70,000. *Security* - Expenses for the military security protection was based on routine military security costs found to be 25k based on the duration of the mission and estimates from <https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/nzdf/>. Expenses for security at the venues for peace talks and negotiations were based on <http://www.police.govt.nz/about-us/structure/teams-units/diplomatic-protection-squad> and the expense of the diplomatic protection squad, 40k. *Food* - Estimation for food costs were made based on general food expenditures in New Zealand found at <https://www.paknsave.co.nz/food-budgeting/1-person> and then scaled based on who was on the NZ payroll for food costs and which personnel were considered for a total 6 month estimate of 450k. *Housing* - The lodging for New Zealand actors abroad was done through military expenditures, and using baseline estimates from <https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/nzdf/> scaled based on duration abroad and lodging needed was found to be 20k. The estimate for lodging during talks was found using data from New Zealand's diplomatic guidelines (found at <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Consular/Diplomatic-and-Consular-Corps-Guidelines/Guidelines-2021-Edition.pdf>), then scaled backwards and up by the number of actors brought for lodging and duration of the talks. The estimate is around 15k. *Venue* -

Limitations & Extensions of the Model

It is important to note the limitations of the model. First, this model does not address the costs peacemakers incur to set up a peace negotiation and bring stakeholders to the negotiating table. That could refer to several things—monetary incentives (aid, investment, etc.), the logistics and operations on the ground, and the investigative work on the conflict before peace talks begin. Another cost of peacemaking not addressed in this methodology is what happens after the peace agreement. Serving as the guarantor of a treaty or agreement can be expensive. Whether it is weapons disposal or truce monitoring, the implementation of peace agreements must be funded. How much is a smaller state willing or able to fund? While some of these costs are often split, how much leverage do smaller states have to bring international organizations to pay for what is agreed upon in peace agreements? Considering these costs could be the subject of another study.

Second, this model does not address the long-term costs of diplomacy and peacemaking. Information is one of the most important factors that lead to the success of a peace negotiation. Having a well-informed, knowledgeable, and professional peace negotiating staff requires a country to be continuously funding a well-staffed international affairs department. A country needs to be dedicating staff and money to the generation of peacemaking knowledge in the long term to ultimately succeed as a peace broker when seated at the negotiating table. On top of investing in think tanks and research staff, the country also needs to be consistently working on building diplomatic relationships. This is one of the areas in which smaller states are at a disadvantage from larger states, as they do not have foreign affairs departments of the size and means that larger states do. Considering these costs could be the subject of another study.

Last but not least, peace talks are unpredictable in length; they take different lengths of time and can become an iterative process. While this does not affect the functionality of this chart, as costs are retroactively constructed, it is important to note that a lot of this budgeting occurs on an ad hoc basis. Smaller states may have less of a financial bandwidth to spend a large amount of money without prior planning.

Conclusion

The model we have put forth is limited in scope and application, but it is still useful for the sake of identifying the hidden costs of peacemaking for a small state to consider when engaging with international peacemaking missions. We have also considered cases for expanding the model to provide a more complex and accurate picture of the funding that goes toward a peacemaking mission. Using the current model applied across all actors involved in a peacemaking mission could be used to create a total evaluation of the cost of one peacemaking operation. Additionally, if a government finds it valuable to do so, adding the itemized costs of all extra costs of peacemaking that we purposefully left out of our method could serve to create a complete picture of all of the costs associated with peacemaking. Furthermore, our budget does not factor in the possibilities of funding assistance from international actors or the monetary value of things like expertise, reputation, or diplomacy, or non-governmental/individual actors. With more access to information and decision-making power, the model could be decidedly stronger, so we encourage smaller states to


Venue expense in Solomon Islands was unable to be determined based on available information from the government. The venues in Christchurch were valued at around 20k for the duration of both rounds of talks by J. Braithwaite (mentioned above). *Salary* - The core team, made up of senior level foreign service officers, had their salaries valued for the duration of this peacemaking mission to be around 500k <https://www.careers.govt.nz/jobs-database/government-law-and-safety/government/foreign-policy-officer/>. For other support staff, including logistics management, support teams, security, and the like, the salary estimates for positions found at <https://www.careers.govt.nz/jobs-database/> were scaled down for the duration of the period to total around 800,000. The totals were then summed by category and totalled for our final price tag.

keep these ideas in mind as they map out a financial path toward peace.

Regardless of the limitations of this model, or how a country chooses to expand upon the gaps that this model leaves, we recognize the importance of putting a price tag on peacemaking, and we believe our model is a good place to start. When smaller states choose to get involved with peacemaking efforts, there can be numerous benefits—international recognition, regional stability, strengthened allyships, etc.—but also significant costs. By using models such as ours, applied rigorously to a variety of case studies in contemporary contexts, the hidden costs and true price tag of peacemaking can be revealed. With this information, smaller states can have a better understanding of the cost-benefit analysis needed to embark upon an international peacemaking mission. Especially for countries that have limited resources, efficiency in resource allocation is critical, so we recommend the application of a budgetary analysis model for any smaller state wishing to engage in peacemaking.

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The Role of National Security in Peacemaking

Chapter 6

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Introduction

National security refers to the ability of a state to maintain its survival. A state utilizes its hard and soft power to protect its geopolitical, economic, and social interests. Smaller states, in particular, are more likely to struggle from limited budgets, less potent military, weak political institutions, and small geographical size and population. These constraints highlight the resource-based advantages that larger states have regarding security. The security dilemma underscores how states may choose to heighten their own security measures in reaction to other states making a similar decision. Conflict has the potential to quickly escalate in a realist world, and smaller states lie at the lower end of the power ranking. Therefore, smaller states are especially conscious of how their political decisions align with their national security objectives. Peacemaking is a method for smaller states to not only resolve conflicts but also to build their own reputations and leverage their value propositions to the international community in the process. The cases of Qatar and Portugal, two smaller states who each engage in peacemaking initiatives, exemplify the ways in which national security is a constant, underlying consideration for heads of state.

National Security Motivations for Peacemaking

Smaller states have various motivations for engaging in peacemaking efforts, depending on their geopolitical context. Survival, at its most basic level, dictates the decisions that smaller states make in involving themselves in peacemaking in any capacity. Qatar, a small state located in the turbulent Middle East region, is one unique example of how a small state might engage in peacemaking for national security. Following Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani's bloodless coup over his father in 1995, the new emir opened the largely closed off country to the international system and raised its international profile. Qatar, under its most liberal monarch in its history, undertook massive construction projects, invited sporting events to its venues, and opened its door for mediation between hostile parties. Emir Hamad recognized the regional enemies he faced, including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, so he positioned Qatar as a neutral peacemaker to avoid attracting more enemies and to gain a positive reputation perhaps to attract allies. According to Kamrava, Qatar was motivated by a mix of "international prestige and survival strategies."¹⁵⁷ One could argue that Qatar's fear of the threats of its enemies are justified, considering the failed 1996 counter-coup attempt against Emir Hamad that involved direct support from government officials from Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain. The 2017 blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt is another example of how regional actors as a collective can politically and economically isolate Qatar.

Qatar has directed its attention towards peacemaking by creating its image as an impartial and experienced mediator. Qatar aims to be seen as an honest broker interested in peace and stability.¹⁵⁸ However, Qatar's national interests have been central for its involvement as mediator in the region and world. In Yemen, Qatar mediated the Houthi conflict not only for altruistic purposes but also to challenge Saudi Arabia's hegemony in the region.¹⁵⁹ In 2011, Qatar mediated a peace agreement for the government of Sudan, a country from which it gained the opportunity to purchase farmland for food security.¹⁶⁰ In Libya, Qatar supplied Libyan rebels with weapons and supplies in their fight against Gaddafi's regime. In fact, Libyan rebels raised a Qatari flag in Gaddafi's home in 2011, showing support to Qatar's international presence.¹⁶¹ Although this case is not exact-

(157) Mehran Kamrava, "Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy," *Middle East Journal* 65, no. 4 (2011), 539, <https://doi.org/10.3751/65.4.11>, 539.

(158) *Ibid.*, 542.

(159) *Ibid.*, 549.

(160) *Ibid.*, 542.

(161) Blake Hounshell, "The Qatar Bubble," *Foreign Policy*, no. 193 (June 2012), 24, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23242417>.

ly mediation but rather indirect involvement, it is clear that Qatar has a personal stake in its international affairs for establishing some form of peace goals.

Though Qatar has the disadvantage of its small size and population to develop a strong diplomacy, it has the advantage of enormous self-investment to contract outside diplomats and conduct its peacemaking efforts at a basic operational level. Another advantage of Qatar's national security and reputation is that it does not have the kind of baggage as Saudi Arabia or Egypt in international diplomacy, thanks to its late entry in the field after 1995. So, Qatar recognizes its limits and also its strengths, calculating that diplomacy and reputation-building may be the best route to advance its national security interests. Qatar's successful bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup exemplifies how the country's financial resources are an integral part of its national security strategy.¹⁶² Qatar can demonstrate a positive gesture to the world in welcoming various countries to enjoy a sports game, thus building its positive image.

Portugal is another smaller state that began to heavily involve itself in peacemaking to elevate its international reputation and influence in a way that promotes its own national security. While very different from the case of Qatar in many respects (region, relative size, budget, population), Portugal does share a motivation other than pure altruism for engaging in international peacemaking. Similar to Qatar's historical inactivity, Portugal was largely absent from participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) during the Cold War.¹⁶³ Arguably, Portugal's relative isolation made its national security a lesser priority compared to other European states that bound their national security to international peace. A shift in political direction, not entirely different from Qatar, pushed Portuguese policymakers to believe that peacekeeping involvement promoted Portugal's national interests by exerting influence in the United Nations (UN) and the international community.¹⁶⁴ Uniquely, Portugal increased its international prestige in the UN and international security institutions because it adopted the predominant values and global norms in its domestic politics. In other words, one could say Portugal got with the program, promoted it, and elevated itself by championing it. Portugal's 2013 National Strategic Defense Concept outlines the role of diplomacy to assert its presence in the world and promote peace and international security.¹⁶⁵ This domestic political document not only reflects Portugal's desire to align its national interests with international norms, but it also reflects Portugal's deliberate attempt to boost its soft power by taking a lead in promoting international security.

Considering its smaller state status with limited financial resources, Portugal has managed to elevate its own national security by promoting international peacemaking. In 2010, Portugal was elected to the UN Security Council partly because of its soft power.¹⁶⁶ Portugal's heavy participation in PKOs contributed to Portuguese diplomats and military being elected to top positions in international organizations; Portuguese government officials themselves publicly acknowledged how their PKO participation increased Portugal's clout and voice in international matters.¹⁶⁷ By adopting international objectives into its domestic priority list, Portugal engaged in multilateral relations, building an undeniable international reputation for itself.

The cases of Qatar and Portugal have many differences, but the motivation for national security and international reputation is present in both countries's peacemaking and international

(162) Ibid., 24.

(163) Maria do Céu Pinto, "A Small State's Search for Relevance: Peace Missions as Foreign Policy," *International Peacekeeping* 21, no. 3 (2014), 390, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2014.938580>.

(164) Ibid.

(165) Ibid., 398.

(166) Ibid., 397.

(167) Ibid., 399.

security efforts. Coincidentally, a dramatic change in political objectives propelled each country to pursue international peace as a way of building soft power for its national security. Before Emir Hamad's political vision in 1995 and before Portuguese politicians' adoption of international norms after the Cold War, neither country had expressed such a vested interest in peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts.

Security Dilemma for Smaller States

Scholars in both the realist/neorealist schools of thought in international relations have argued that the security dilemma is the most important source of conflict between states. They hold that there is no legitimate monopoly of violence in the international system. In other words, there is no world government and, as a consequence, each state must strengthen its own security. For this reason, the primary goal of states, especially small ones, is to maximize their own security and protect their national sovereignty.¹⁶⁸ Additionally, smaller states' lack of capacity, resources, influence, and perhaps their secondary role compared to great powers may affect the actions taken in pursuit of that goal. Therefore, smaller states have developed national security strategies with peacemaking components to leverage political and diplomatic gains.

Firstly, structural changes within the state system need to be considered. Post-Cold War transformation from a bipolar to a multipolar system, the delegitimation of colonialism, and the rise of self-determination movements, among others, are geopolitical trends that required a role adaptation of states' actions regarding peacemaking efforts and maintenance of national security. In this way, the Cold War is a turning point that has shaped how the security dilemma theoretical framework has applied to smaller states and their national security, as well as their role in peacemaking activities.

During the Cold War, smaller actors relinquished part of their sovereignty, security, and state personality to bigger states and were unable to participate in peacekeeping activities. By allying with either the U.S. or the Soviet Union in a polarized world, smaller states, such as Cuba, became places of conflict between both larger states. Likewise, this bipolar world order led other smaller states, such as Switzerland, to opt for neutrality regarding peacemaking. Considering the security dilemma, favoring one party or the other in a conflict can threaten the national security of smaller states, so neutrality can be the best strategy in this case. Conversely, after the Cold War, smaller actors also organized their claims and diplomacy efforts around nation-state identity, playing a more active role in peacemaking. Finally, the polarization of the world during the Cold War has helped smaller states such as Bhutan and Nepal to secure their territorial, national, and jurisdictional statehood.

The security dilemma is also related to the changing international environment in the modern world as transnational and asymmetric threats become more prevalent than traditional interstate war. The realist approach that historically guided world politics is evolving towards a system better understood by liberal and constructivist approaches. This shift in world politics, consequently, has shaped the perception of national security and smaller states' peacemaking policies in order to maintain it. Specifically, under a realist approach and considering Hobbesian perception of the "state of nature," violence prevails as a mechanism to maintain security and individual interests of states since the international system lacks governance and rules. Under a constructivist approach, peacemaking strategies consolidate and evolve towards mediation and other peaceful strategies (as opposed to further violent conflict in a realist world).¹⁶⁹ Some compelling examples would be Nor-

(168) Anders Wivel, "Security Dilemma," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, January 7, 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/security-dilemma>.

(169) Andreas Graf and David Lanz, "Conclusions: Switzerland as a paradigmatic case of small-state peace policy?" *Swiss Political Science Review* 19, no. 3 (September 2013), 410-423, <http://proxy.library.georgetown.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,uid&db=eoh&AN=1400708&site=ehost-live&scope=site>.

way and Sweden's roles as mediators, including peacemaking in their foreign policies. Also, Qatar, as a small state seeking to preserve its national security and interests, mediates conflicts such as the ones in Yemen, Sudan, and Lebanon, offering financial support and investment to facilitate peaceful outcomes. Conversely, Switzerland fostered transformation of a typically Nordic approach based on international solidarity and global peace to a more aggressive defense of liberal world order, if necessary even by using military means.¹⁷⁰

Bandwagoning and balancing strategies for peacemaking also need to be considered while exploring the evolution and role of the security dilemma in relation to smaller states' peacemaking strategies and in their pursuit for maintaining their national security. In this line, smaller states seek alliances with bigger powers in order to maintain the balance of power by allying with the most powerful. Likewise, smaller states can strategize with a balance of threat by allying with the most threatening big state. Furthermore, smaller states' responses towards a hegemonic power, in order to benefit from them, could form alliances against it (balancing) or alliances with it (bandwagoning), in which the latter seems the most appealing and useful strategy for smaller powers. Bandwagoning alliances have been key for smaller actors in order to face insecurity and rivalry in a defensive way. The latter exemplifies how small states get involved in peacemaking using alliances with bigger powers. These strategies are peaceful means for facing the insecurity for smaller states that can cause the security dilemma, hence safeguarding national security.

Qatar's mediation in Yemen in relation to the Houthi rebellion and in opposition to Saudi Arabia's presence illustrates bandwagoning and balancing strategies.¹⁷¹ Moreover, Qatar's diplomatic support to the United States in Afghanistan is an example of bandwagoning peacemaking strategies. The Afghan peace talks between the U.S. and Taliban hosted in Doha were an important tool for Qatar to work with a superpower in the region through diplomacy. Qatar facilitated the negotiation as the office in Doha was instrumental in negotiating the U.S. withdrawal between Trump and Afghanistan that the Biden administration implemented.¹⁷²

Smaller states are likely more concerned about their national security than others, so peacemaking is a way for overcoming the security dilemma facing small states. Regarding Qatar, its leaders are always worried about their own regime since Qatar is a smaller state located in the Middle East conflict hotspot. Nevertheless, Qatar shows its capacity for peacemaking by offering economic incentives, considering that it is the second largest producer and exporter of natural gas and looking for bandwagoning alliances. Strong alliances with bigger partners, such as the U.S., France, and Turkey for instance, help ensure its security, as well as its economic, political, and geopolitical protection.¹⁷³ Finally, hosting the World Cup in 2022 is a political tool used to demonstrate its friendliness and international goodwill and bolster Qatar's reputation. Qatar's pledges to dismantle stadiums afterward and donate them to developing countries in Africa and Asia, helps this small state receive great returns on investment (ROI) while also demonstrating its goodwill. Inviting parties to Doha for mediations rather than sending mediators abroad is an intelligent peacemaking strategy to safeguard their national security. Moreover, Qatar's role leading mediation between Sudan's central government and the Darfur as well as between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah constitutional issues¹⁷⁴ are also illustrative examples.

Smaller States as Independent Security Actors

(170) Ibid.

(171) Kamrava, "Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy," 539-556.

(172) Ibid.

(173) Ibid.

(174) Ibid.

National security interests in peacemaking activities can drive smaller states to behave as independent security actors in many situations. It is important to understand the role independent actors can play on the national security level, how smaller states build and operationalize national security interests through peacemaking, and the challenges of operationalizing national security objectives as an independent actor. The connection between the role of national security interests in smaller states' peacemaking attempts is crucial to understanding how and when smaller states should attempt to act as peacemakers.

Smaller states still depend on bigger states financially, militarily, diplomatically, and politically but can still take on a role as "independent security actors." Developments in international norms and laws have empowered smaller states to build and operationalize a more independent foreign policy despite still being dependent, to some extent, on bigger states. This gives smaller states the tools for international integration and cooperation while protecting national security interests. The United States's security shelter with the Al Udeid Air Base and Central Command (CENTCOM) provides Qatar with strong military protection against regional antagonists and subtle checks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE while also demonstrating how Qatar depends on the United States militarily.¹⁷⁵ This security cooperation between the U.S. and Qatar, however, has not prevented Qatar from taking part in diplomatic offensives that did not necessarily align with U.S. interests, challenging the idea that smaller states have a weak and reactive foreign policy despite the dependence on bigger states in crucial areas such as security.¹⁷⁶ This independent foreign policy element allows Qatar to pursue national security interests beyond its borders, taking part in conflict mediation in Lebanon, Sudan, and Afghanistan, and constantly talking with conflicting parties in Palestine and Yemen.¹⁷⁷ Thus, the term independent security actors does not indicate that there is a lack of participation of bigger states in the security affairs of smaller states or singularity in the international arena, but that smaller states can still pursue national security interests without direct interference or pressure from bigger actors in the decision making and operational processes.

Smaller states need means to build and operationalize peacemaking activities as independent security actors. Understanding smaller states' strategic capabilities through particular intrinsic and derivative power illustrates how smaller states plan and put into practice peacemaking operations through national security programs. Intrinsic power refers to capabilities that are inherent aspects of a state's identity. For example, a state can possess specific resources such as oil, natural gas, strategic location, and institutional strength.¹⁷⁸ Qatar's natural gas is a great example of the use of particular intrinsic power to pursue its national security interests independently. Qatar's natural gas reserves give them an economic surplus which allows for more robust national security and foreign policy programs through significant financial allocations to mediation and facilitation efforts in the region.¹⁷⁹ Maintaining stability and sovereignty are core elements in Qatar's national security strategy and foreign policy.¹⁸⁰ With this, Qatar is able to shape its national security objectives around providing financial support and humanitarian aid operations that can open channels for diplomatic and political leverage to areas of interest. Portugal, which has strong democracy and institutions, is another example of a smaller state using intrinsic power to build and operationalize peacemaking activities independently. The adoption of international norms in the democratic consolidation pe-

(175) Rory Miller and Harry Verhoeven, "Overcoming Smallness: Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Strategic Realignment in the Gulf," *International Politics* 57, no. 1 (2020), 10, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-019-00180-0>.

(176) Ibid.

(177) Ibid.

(178) Tom Long, "Small States, Great Power? Gaining Influence through Intrinsic, Derivative, and Collective Power: Table 1," *International Studies Review* 19, no. 2 (2017), 15, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viw040>.

(179) Miller and Verhoeven, "Overcoming Smallness," 17.

(180) Bernd Kaussler, "Tracing Qatar's Foreign Policy Trajectory and Its Impact on Regional Security," *Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies*, 2015, 3, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12689>.

riod allowed Portugal to strengthen its institutions and develop a national security strategy with the incorporation of peacemaking aspects.¹⁸¹ As a result of this process, Portugal was ranked among the 10 top-contributing countries to UN operations in the early 2000s.¹⁸²

Derivative power refers to the idea that smaller states manipulate bigger states as much as possible to commit to and help with international actions that support their interests.¹⁸³ The blockade imposed on Qatar in 2016 illustrates the use of derivative power in its national security strategy. With the United States seemingly siding with Saudi Arabia and UAE in the beginning of the diplomatic rift, Qatar's diplomatic efforts resulted in a change to a more neutral position of the United States towards the conflict. Both Qatar and Portugal use their unique strategic capabilities to build and operationalize national security programs with peacemaking elements. Understanding intrinsic and derivative powers helps illustrate how states such as Qatar and Portugal can incorporate peacemaking into their national security objectives. Smaller states encounter challenges when operationalizing national security strategies to incorporate peacemaking elements. Smaller states need money and personnel to put into practice national security programs, but smaller states usually face a lack of either one. For example, Qatar uses its natural gas as a derivative power to join peacemaking activities, yet lacks human resources to operationalize and maintain them. Qatar relies extensively on foreigners to obtain skilled human resources, yet still faces a lack of qualified personnel to represent the state abroad and assist in policymaking in the mainland.¹⁸⁴ This causes institutional problems that prevent the state from following up in peacemaking efforts achieved in the short-run. On the other hand, Portugal uses its institutional capacity to incorporate peacemaking in its national security strategy, yet it lacks the financial resources to operationalize some of the desired efforts that prevent further contributions to UN operations.¹⁸⁵ Even when smaller states have some capacity to build and operationalize national security strategies with peacemaking components, they may not have enough resources to fully act as independent security actors in peacemaking efforts.

Conclusion

Smaller states have different motivations to incorporate peacemaking elements in their national security. The reasons can include security concerns, prestige, and political and diplomatic gains. The examples of Portugal and Qatar illustrate why smaller states decide to incorporate peacemaking efforts in their national security strategy. Changes in both countries brought the opportunity to implement peacemaking efforts in their national security to get international prestige and recognition. Both countries use the international system to protect their national interests and peacemaking activities have played an important role to achieve international success.

Changes in the security dilemma since the Cold War empowered smaller actors to take a more proactive role in the international arena and pursue their national security goals. The concept of balancing and bandwagoning illustrate how states can behave in the international arena and develop strategic hedging with peacemaking elements to tackle the security dilemma. National security interests in peacemaking activities can drive smaller states to behave as independent security actors. They can achieve this through particular intrinsic and derivative powers that provide the tools to engage in peacemaking efforts at the national security level. However, smaller states face challenges that prevent them from fully engaging as independent actors. This can include but is not limited to a lack of human and financial resources, as illustrated in the cases of Qatar and Portugal.

(181) do Céu Pinto, "A Small State's Search for Relevance," 391.

(182) *Ibid.*, 390.


(183) Long, "Small States, Great Power?" 17.

(184) Gabriella Gonzalez et al., "Human Resource Challenges and Reform Efforts in Qatar, UAE, Oman, and Lebanon," in *Facing Human Capital Challenges of the 21st Century*, ed. Lynn A. Karoly (RAND Corporation, 2008), 30-31.

(185) do Céu Pinto, "A Small State's Search for Relevance," 390.

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War in Peace: The Role of Peacekeepers in Peacemaking

Chapter 7

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Introduction: What is Peacekeeping?

Smaller states' peacekeeping operations (PKO) serve a critical role within the broader peace-making enterprise by acting as the restorative foundation on which peace may be built. As a discipline, peacekeeping centers around the employment of arms to restore security and facilitate peace processes, not to prosecute conflict—a notable distinction from traditional armed intervention. Smaller states are able to leverage unique comparative advantages in peacekeeping operations in contrast to traditional modes of multilateral peacekeeping, cementing their role in the small state policymaker's niche toolbox.

Understanding the optimal use of this small state tool means understanding its foundation. We structure our analysis of these factors in a regimented manner, beginning first with an exploration of high-level strategic factors. We then explore its unique on-the-ground tactical factors, before concluding with an in-depth exploration of the role disarmament campaigns play in the broader peacekeeping process. We cement these individual analyses in relevant, detailed case studies of global peacekeeping operations—all contextualized in terms of their relevance to small state peacekeeping. Finally, we conclude with a reiteration of key points, a comparative analysis of lessons learned, and best practices for small state peacemakers.

Peacekeeping: Strategies of Legitimation

Strategic considerations—referring here to long-term, big-picture planning—determine how small states approach their involvement in peacekeeping operations. Advancing an understanding of successful strategic planning requires an analysis based on case studies. The two selected for this are the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and International Force East Timor (INTERFET). Why these two? Both of these peacekeeping missions were non-UN-mandated, Australia-led, and successful.¹⁸⁶ Research conducted on these missions means that insight into the strategies of Australia and other participating states are available. An evaluation of the strategies pursued and the successes achieved by these peacemaking forces provides lessons for other peacekeepers. Of course, both INTERFET and RAMSI were both Australian interventions in maritime Southeast Asia/Melanesia. This limits the universal applicability of these prescriptions. Nevertheless, policy prescriptions for the broader world of smaller state peacemaking can be gleaned from a review of the strategic factors and policies that facilitated the success of these two missions. In this section of our report, we explore the strategic factors that contribute to the success of small state peacekeeping missions: prioritizing goals-based commitments and legitimizing peacekeeping missions to both host country civilian populations and regional neighbors.

A defining quality of the RAMSI and INTERFET peacekeeping missions were their commitments to define mission success based on the achievement of measurable goals, rather than planning withdrawal based on a specific timeframe from the beginning.¹⁸⁷ This commitment requires strong domestic political support for peacekeeping operations—indefinite overseas involvement is difficult to justify.¹⁸⁸ Australia's strategic plan for RAMSI exemplifies goal-based planning. RAMSI's three-phase plan began with commencement, where stability would be restored through disarmament and law and order would be reestablished. Consolidation (institutional reform and the elimination of corruption) was concluded by a transition to sustainability and self-reliance.

(186) Determining whether a peacekeeping mission was “successful” is difficult. However, both RAMSI and INTERFET are generally regarded as successful peacekeeping missions which substantially reduced violence in both the Solomon Islands and East Timor. See “RAMSI hailed a success for regional partnership as final Enhanced Consultative Meeting held in Solomon Islands.” *Pacific Islands Forum*. and Blaxland, John. “Seventeen years on, East Timor intervention remains a success.” *The Sydney Morning Herald*. 20. September 2016.

(187) Glenn, Russell. *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)*. RAND Corporation. 2007.

(188) McDougall, Derek. “Australia's Peacekeeping Role in the Post-Cold War Era.” *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 24:3 (2002).

Likewise, INTERFET's strategic planning was goal-oriented: to secure cities and disarm militias.¹⁸⁹ Defining the success of small state peacekeeping missions by concrete goals—rather than opaque and general time commitments—is a critical foundational factor for success in the strategic planning process.

Securing legitimacy for a peacekeeping intervention is a complex task. Australia, as a smaller state operating without a UN mandate, utilized its unique regional positioning and military capabilities to secure legitimacy and support for a peacekeeping presence both in-country and internationally. Legitimacy does not consist of a one-time approval but rather a process of dialogue that needs to be continuously maintained and renegotiated as the mission proceeds and conditions change. Australia sought to portray itself as a “capable-but-nonthreatening force” that would be intolerant of all “personal and bureaucratic agendas.”¹⁹⁰ Maintaining the perception of Australia as capable but benevolent was especially important for INTERFET, in which Australia's intervention was complicated because of the presence of the Indonesian military in East Timor. Dee argues that Australia was disadvantaged in a region which sought to prioritize “Asian solutions to Asian problems,” especially as Australia could be perceived as a European state in the Asian region. Australia sought to ameliorate this perception by maintaining in-country legitimacy through strategic outreach to native populations in multiple peacekeeping missions. For example, Australian peacekeepers traveled throughout the Solomon Islands to explain their presence to locals in an attempt to win over “hearts and minds.” While these actions generally fall under the umbrella of tactical considerations, strategy and tactics are inherently interwoven—legitimacy is maintained and reinforced through effective tactics. This strategy served to convince Solomonese civilian populations they would not be abandoned by the international community, helping to legitimize the presence of Australian peacekeepers, and reflecting the goal-oriented nature of RAMSI's presence.¹⁹¹ In both case studies, senior peacekeeping mission officials defined the enemy as of secondary rather than primary importance, identifying its overarching goal as winning the support of the population. The INTERFET peacekeeping mission notably also emphasized consent and cooperation in planning and mission achievement, where Australia sought to multilateralize good relationships “not only between the protagonists and INTERFET, but also between the local population and the departing members” of the Indonesian National Armed Forces.¹⁹²

Australia's strategy of legitimation was also based on its regional proximity to the conflicts in question, strengthening its popular mandate both within Australia and within the Southeast Asia/Oceania region. Australia was able to intervene in East Timor—the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was limited in its actions because of Indonesia's membership in that organization. Regional proximity to sites of peacekeeping appears to strengthen both international mandates and strategic knowledge of the conflict, and it need not be mutually exclusive with UN peacekeeping operations.¹⁹³ For example, the joint operation of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission in Liberia appear to have strengthened the acceptance of peacekeeping troops within Liberia and regional interest and involvement in finding a resolution to the conflict.¹⁹⁴ Likewise, Dee argues that “without

(189) Dee, Moreen. “‘Coalitions of the willing’ and humanitarian intervention: Australia's involvement with INTERFET.” *International Peacekeeping*, 8:3 1-20 (2001).

(190) Glenn, xviii.

(191) Fraenkel, Jon et al. “The RAMSI Decade: A Review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, 2003-2013.” 14. July 2014.

(192) Dickens, David. “The United Nations in East Timor: Intervention at the Military Operational Level.” *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 23:2 (2001).

(193) Coleman, Katharina. “Innovations in ‘African solutions to African problems’: the evolving practice of regional peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa.” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 49:4 (2011).

(194) Ofuately-Kodjoe, W. “Regional organizations and the resolution of internal conflict: The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia.” *International Peacekeeping*, 3 (1994).

substantial participation by the ASEAN nations, the legitimacy of [INTERFET], not to mention Australia's regional relationships, would be seriously undermined." Peacekeeping strategy should be holistically evaluated, including dynamics within regional international organizations.

Peacekeeping: Tactical Considerations

Executive Summary

Peacekeeping operations offer a unique challenge to those seeking to protect and facilitate the peace process. In particular, a unique blend of factors—at both the tactical and strategic level—has a determining effect on the efficacy of peacekeeping operations, and more broadly, their ability to safeguard the peace process. At first glance, a country's strategic political decisions—such as how it defines mission success or legitimizes its presence—have little to do with tactical military decisions, such as how a peacekeeping contingent interacts with the local population, or what that contingent does when it comes under hostile small arms fire. In reality, the two are interwoven; the tactical aspects of small state peacekeeping are viewed through the lens of the strategic.

In our exploration of the tactical considerations of peacekeeping, we sequentially explore the impact of ideological principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)—all contextualized within their effect on ground-level operations. We support our analysis with a large, diverse body of case studies detailing numerous global peacekeeping operations ranging from the Solomon Islands to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cyprus, and Bosnia. We conclude with an assessment of respective efficacy and advise best practices for smaller state peacekeeping mission policy implementation.

Tactical Principles: Rules for Peacekeepers

Principles guide action. Taken in the context of the complexities of smaller state peacekeeping operations—whose operational environment is often characterized by trying and ethically demanding situations—no exploration of tactical considerations can be conducted without identifying driving principles. At a minimum, we find that peacekeepers must be guided by three principles: the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the use of minimum force, and empowerment of the lowest echelon.

The Responsibility to Protect doctrine charges peacekeepers with the responsibility to protect civilian populations from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity” through all appropriate and necessary means—including the use of force.¹⁹⁵ Although derived and promulgated by a United Nations report issued in the wake of peacekeeping failures in Bosnia and Rwanda, the principle remains relevant for small state peacekeepers.¹⁹⁶

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) define the nuts and bolts of small-state peacekeeping. They represent *how* peacekeepers on the ground operate, how they structure military operations, how they engage with local populations, how they interpret rules of engagement, and how they distribute forces. In particular, we examine the roles rules of engagement (ROE) and interaction with local populations play in the small-state peacekeeping process.

Rules of Engagement serve as the gate that determines whether or not peacekeepers are able to act on the R2P. They represent a specific set of codified principles that define when, where, how,

(195) United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome: Resolution 60/1 § (2005). 30.

(196) Szulc, Tad. *Peacekeeping and Diplomacy in Cyprus, 1964-1993*. Washington, D.C: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1994. 6-7.

and against whom force may be used. In the past, restrictive Rules of Engagement that allow only for the use of force in self-defense have manifested in “phone home” syndrome, delaying or preventing the protection of civilian populations as peacekeepers engage in a lengthy approval process with peacekeeper command elements and their respective national military headquarters. Such processes have preceded almost all massacres in common memory, such as the 1964 Kokkina massacre in Cyprus, the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, or the 1995 ethnic cleansing of civilians during the Bosnian Genocide.¹⁹⁷ Important counterfactual examples are evident in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) peacekeeping operation; although it is a multilateral United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation, lessons of interest remain. Historically, most violence that has characterized noted peacekeeping failures (e.g. massacres in Bosnia, Rwanda, Cyprus, etc.) was conducted by breakaway *non-state* factions, criminal elements, or spoilers who opposed peace agreements; traditional Rules of Engagement forbid the employment of force against non-state parties.¹⁹⁸ Thanks to non-restrictive ROE, which allowed for the use of force against non-state parties, MONUSCO peacekeepers were able to prevent the massacre of hundreds in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2012.¹⁹⁹ By capitalizing on the minimal bureaucracy implicit in small-state peacekeeping operations and defining peacekeeper rules of engagement in reference to the R2P, smaller states can provide security in a way others cannot.

A second factor exists in *how* peacekeepers interact with local populations. Successful lessons in small state peacekeeping can be drawn from Australian involvement in the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) peacekeeping operation, the success of which was uniquely defined in terms of how peacekeepers considered community engagement, economic, and policing-related factors. RAMSI peacekeepers leveraged community relationships built during regular presence patrols to yield concrete dividends; they used “information about warlords, criminals, and persons of interest, [to] capture those targeted, and intimidate militia members with potential to harm the population.”²⁰⁰ In economic terms, peacekeepers were permitted to go into town only for official reasons in order to prevent their patronage and interference in the local economy, thereby avoiding a sudden influx of cash and rampant price inflation.²⁰¹ Finally, peacekeepers played a subordinate role to Australian and reconstituted Solomonese police—complementing joint patrols, taking backseat quick-reaction-force (QRF) roles, or deferring arrests to police—in order to reinforce the legitimacy and re-establishment of the rule of law.²⁰²

Assessment

Smaller-state peacekeeping operations leverage the unique international political dynamic that only smaller states are able to provide in order to protect the most vulnerable: civilians. At the tactical level, smaller state peacekeeping operations benefit from a grounding in principles that emphasize the R2P and decision-making independence at the low level, common TTPs that underscore community engagement and return to stable government, and an overall decision-making framework that favors robust peacekeeping. Proper application of these lessons can ensure peacekeeping operations remain an effective moral tool for smaller-state policymakers.

(197) Szulc, Tad. *Peacekeeping and Diplomacy in Cyprus, 1964-1993*. 6.

(198) United Nations General Assembly Security Council. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping. New York, NY: United Nations. 17 August 2000.

(199) Nsia-Pepira, Kofi. *UN Robust Peacekeeping : Civilian Protection in Violent Civil Wars*. First edition. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 130.

(200) Glenn, Russell W. *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)*. 1st ed. RAND Corporation, 2007. 28-37.

(201) Glenn, Russell W. 28.

(202) Glenn, Russell W. 25.

Peacekeeping: Disarmament

There is a well-established consensus that disarmament is the first step towards creating lasting peace in a fractured state.²⁰³ Smaller state peacemakers should use the tool of disarming parties in conflict, as weapons are seen as the root of sustained and violent conflict.²⁰⁴ As a smaller state peacemaker, there are two major considerations to be made when approaching disarmament: an armed, or unarmed, presence in the state and the use of local grassroots leaders in sustaining disarmament. The specific outcomes of these different challenges are hard to quantify, but are important factors to take into account when promoting a policy of disarmament in a shattered state. Two case studies will be utilized to highlight these dichotomies—Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, two fractured Pacific Island states supported by smaller-state-led peacekeeping missions.

Disarmament as a key stepping stone for peace

Bougainville, an island located in Melanesia, was a nation completely devastated by civil war. The conflict was not only internal to the island, but also between Bougainville and Papua New Guinea. The UN and a coalition of neighboring Pacific Island peacekeepers formed a third-party intervention to resolve the conflict, with disarmament seen as the most effective method for peace. Disarmament was successful in Bougainville, with a large percentage of weapons being destroyed. The peacemaking process culminated with a steady peace, which has kept the nation stable, led by a team of unarmed peacekeepers. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration has been cited as an important factor in creating lasting peace, and is constantly employed by UN peacekeeping forces and small-state-coalition-led activities.²⁰⁵ Peacekeeping in Bougainville highlights an unprecedented case of unarmed intervention and peacekeepers, with great success and strong bonds created between the locals and the peacekeepers. The peacekeeping force referred to their policy as “guitars instead of rifles,”²⁰⁶ highlighting the importance levied on preventing violence.

In the case of the Solomon Islands, the initial small state intervention was much more aggressive. Unlike the unarmed group of 300 troops in Bougainville handling disarmament,²⁰⁷ the Australian-led assistance mission (RAMSI) deemed a large-scale show of force necessary to persuade militants to surrender their guns, with a starting force of around 1,989 troops.²⁰⁸ This can also be attributed to the fact that Solomon Islanders had failed to hand over their weapons during the previous unarmed operation. This presents a contrast in disarmament methodology as peacekeepers and third-party members, in an ideal world, should not enact peace at the barrel of a gun. The Bougainville peacekeepers were entirely unarmed, and they had great success in the disarmament process. The leader of the mission, Col. John Hutcheson, cited that in contrast to other members of the peacekeeping mission, “personnel from the New Zealand Defence Force and the ADF never achieved a rapport with the local people,” which may be attributable to the language barrier or their armaments.²⁰⁹ Either way, the contrast between armed and unarmed peacekeepers is an interesting dichotomy. Despite the rapid mobilization of troops, military personnel were quickly curtailed and reduced after the mission began, allowing RAMSI to focus on creating a new stable

(203) Levin and Miodownik, “The Imperative to Explore the Impact of Disarmament on Peacemaking Efforts and Conflict Recurrence,” *De Gruyter*, 1 Dec. 2016.

(204) Levin and Miodownik, “The Imperative to Explore the Impact of Disarmament on Peacemaking Efforts and Conflict Recurrence,” *De Gruyter*, 1 Dec. 2016.

(205) “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.” *ReliefWeb*, OCHA, 23 Mar. 2000.

(206) Stayner, “Soldiers without Guns,” *SBS News*, 24 Apr. 2019.

(207) Spark and Bailey “Disarmament in Bougainville: ‘guns in boxes,’” *International Peacekeeping*, 6 Aug. 2006, 599-608.

(208) Fraenkel, et al, “*The RAMSI Decade: A Review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 2003-2013*,” 14 July 2014.

(209) Fraenkel, et al, “*The RAMSI Decade: A Review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 2003-2013*,” 14 July 2014.

government without militarization of the country. Despite the seeming contrast, the military presence for public security may have been a key role in convincing people to give up their guns as they were no longer needed for self-defense.²¹⁰ The influence of force and the establishment of the fear of punishment allowed RAMSI to push forward with disarmament, but they presented an issue in terms of popular support when advancing its agenda. Smaller states should carefully consider how they approach disarmament, and they should consider the unintended effects of policies that could hinder their future agendas.

Inclusion of Grassroots Organizations and Women in the Disarmament Process

The U.S. Observer Mission on Bougainville, in line with UN peacekeeping policy, worked with the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG), made up of peacekeepers from surrounding smaller states such as New Zealand and Australia, to facilitate the weapons disposal on the island. People with weapons in feuding states most likely have usurped traditional ways of life and structures in society. Many commentators described how using pre-existing societal structures, such as local elders and women, grassroots organizations, and regional leaders can help facilitate the peace process and disarmament. Bougainvillean representatives helped to settle disputes and prevent conflict build-up. An unarmed New Zealand peacekeeper named Fiona Cassidy mentioned the importance of women in the peacekeeping process, stating, “The women were fundamentally important to getting the peace process to where it did—for ten years they had watched their brothers—their children—their grandmothers be ravaged by war.”²¹¹ This highlights how important of an asset women can be for smaller state peacekeepers. In North Bougainville, women enacted a peace march to petition the PNGDF (Papua New Guinea Defense Force) and BRA (Bougainville Revolutionary Army) to put down their arms, and start to move on the track to peace. Furthermore, in 1995, the Bougainville Inter-church Women’s Forum was formed (BICWF) to help create an environment for peace, leading to many successful peace forums.²¹² This coercive approach, which refrains from enacting hard military power, for establishing a lasting resolution to conflict. Bougainville stands as a strong case for the value of including these local leaders in the disarmament process, as they can imbue a level of trust in society that foreigners can not. However, women and grassroots leaders were often sidelined in negotiations, which is not an efficient use of built-in resources that are available to help bring about peace.

The Solomon Islands experienced a similar arc to Bougainville, and the RAMSI coalition that led to peace was also formed by neighboring smaller states, including New Zealand and Australia, as well as other small Pacific states. Disarmament was a key component of stopping tensions and violence in the Solomon Islands, and some of the major proponents on the ground were local women and grassroots leaders. As a smaller state engaging in peacekeeping activities, having local populations with a similar goal and willingness to help prevent violence is an invaluable asset. Women in the Solomon Islands played an “active role in advocating nonviolence through dialogue, promoting disarmament, and emphasizing shared communal values”, highlighting a key role that foreign peacemakers cannot play.²¹³ Church organizations and other grassroots incentives also served as a voice in the community, as well as an important outlet for women. However, women, like in Bougainville, were structurally excluded from peace agreements, such as the Townsville

(210) Whalan, Jeni. “The Power of Friends: The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands.” *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 5 (2010), 627–37.

(211) Stayner, “Soldiers without Guns,” *SBS News*, 24 Apr. 2019.

(212) Garasu, Lorraine. “The Role of Women in Promoting Peace and Reconciliation.” *PeaceWomen*, 8 Feb. 2015.

(213) Brigg, Morgan, et al. “Women and Peace: The Role of Solomon Islands Women in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding.” A Compendium of Case Studies from Pacific Island Countries, Jan. 2015,

Peace Agreement in 2000, which formally ended the conflict.²¹⁴

Conclusion: Best Practices

Smaller state peacekeeping operations are able to manifest unique comparative advantages, helping to stabilize states torn apart by civil wars or other conflicts by protecting the most vulnerable: people. Smaller state policymakers must ask themselves whether the possible benefits of these peacekeeping operations outweigh the costs. We believe they do, and that furthermore, the unique capabilities small state peacekeeping operations are able to leverage provide the best chance for restorative and enduring peace in many contemporary conflict zones. Several lessons and best practices for policymakers can be drawn from our robust analysis.

At the strategic level, small state peacekeeping operations would benefit from defining success through the achievement of concrete goals. Small states need to keep in mind two key audiences central to legitimation of operations: in-country local civilian populations and international actors with a focus on regional organizations and countries.

At the tactical level, small state policymakers and peacekeeper contingent commanders should ground tactics in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the use of minimum necessary force, and empowerment of the lowest echelon. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) should likewise center around robust Rules of Engagement (ROE) that allow for the protection of civilian lives, as well as maintaining an approach that prioritizes small state peacekeeper engagement with local communities and the restoration of the rule of law.

In specific terms of disarmament, small state peacekeeping operations should adopt a peaceful approach, setting the baseline for the creation of lasting peace in a fractured state. Disarming aggravated parties is a useful tool for small states to reduce tensions and create a stable environment to further project their long-term goals. Less common methods, such as the approach taken in Bougainville, highlight how small state peacekeeping forces can engage in disarmament peacefully, setting a solid example, as well as showing their commitment to ensuring a nonviolent future. Furthermore, incorporating grassroots organizations and local leaders and women in the disarmament process is a useful tool for small states to further their aim and create a peaceful transition with local representatives legitimizing their movement to peace.


Peacekeeping is effective at resolving civil wars, reducing violence during wars, preventing wars from recurring, and rebuilding state institutions.²¹⁵ Smaller state peacekeeping operations have proven over time—whether in the context of Bougainville, Colombia, Cyprus, East Timor, or the Solomon Islands—that they are an effective, critical tool for building the road to peace.

(214) Brigg, Morgan, et al. “Women and Peace: The Role of Solomon Islands Women in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding.” A Compendium of Case Studies from Pacific Island Countries, Jan. 2015.

(215) Walter, Barbara F., Lise Morjé Howard, and V. Page Fortna. “The Astonishing Success of Peacekeeping.” *Foreign Affairs*, November 29, 2021.

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Seat at the Table: The Intersection of Gender and Peacemaking

Chapter 8

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Introduction

This chapter will emphasize the importance of gender in peacemaking by exploring the strong correlation between the inclusion of the perspectives of everyone affected by the conflict and the increased probability that the resulting agreement will lead to a sustainable peace. First, this section will cover background information pertaining to sustainable peace, women's past and present involvement in peace processes, and why this topic matters for smaller states; then, it will examine two case studies, Northern Ireland and Liberia; finally, it will conclude with a reiteration of the main takeaways when it comes to gender—or “do's and don'ts” for smaller states wishing to engage in peacemaking.

Background

Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung differentiates between “negative peace” and “positive peace”: negative peace is defined by the absence of violence, conflict, or war; positive peace encompasses ideas such as the absence of structural violence, the importance of justice, and a society in which all people's needs are met.²¹⁶ Recently, academics have added to the list the term “sustainable peace,” which refers to a long-lasting condition where “the probability of using destructive conflict, oppression, and violence to solve problems is so low that it does not enter into any party's strategy” and also where “the probability of using cooperation, dialogue, and collaborative problem-solving to promote social justice and well-being is so high that it governs social organization and life.”²¹⁷ Clearly, sustainable peace should be the goal. But how do peacemakers and peacebuilders attain it?

Women's participation and a gendered perspective must be seriously taken into account in order to create a lasting and sustainable peace. Researchers at the International Peace Institute examined 182 peace agreements that had been signed between 1989 and 2011, and the study concluded that the probability of a peace agreement lasting at least 15 years increases by 35 percent when women are involved in the peace processes.²¹⁸ However, simply adding a few women to peace processes is not enough by itself—those long-lasting peace agreements were successful because negotiators and mediators genuinely listened to the concerns of everyone affected by the conflict. If only armed actors (usually men) are at the table, then the peace agreement will not reflect the needs of the people affected by the conflict. In peace negotiations, members of armed groups tend to focus on issues such as “military action, power-sharing arrangements, and territorial gains.”²¹⁹ Conversely, women's involvement often leads peace agreements to include frameworks for truth and reconciliation commissions; their participation also increases the likelihood the agreement will address issues such as education, economic development, transitional justice, accountability for conflict-related sexual- and gender-based violence, and women's political participation. Taking seriously the needs and perspectives of every group affected by the conflict “increases the prospects of long-term stability and reduces the likelihood of state failure.”²²⁰

Women have played important roles in peace processes in a number of ways. Their official inclusion at the table as negotiators or mediators is incredibly important, as is their involvement with commissions charged with specific aspects of post-conflict recovery—those commissions

(216) Peter Coleman, “The Missing Piece in Sustainable Peace,” Columbia Climate School: State of the Planet, November 6, 2012. <https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2012/11/06/the-missing-piece-in-sustainable-peace/>

(217) Coleman, “The Missing Piece.”

(218) Nancy Lindborg, “The Essential Role of Women in Peacebuilding,” United States Institute of Peace, November 20, 2017. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/11/essential-role-women-peacebuilding>

(219) “Why It Matters: Women's Participation in Peace Processes.” Council on Foreign Relations, 2020. <https://www.cfr.org/womens-participation-in-peace-processes/why-it-matters>

(220) “Why It Matters.”

prove to be more effective with their participation. However, when left out of formal discussions, women have organized protests and social movements to pressure conflicting parties to come to the negotiating table, served as coalition builders, leveraged community networks to organize people across ethnic and religious lines, and acted as go-betweens to opposing parties. When formal methods of peacemaking fail to include women, these informal methods become integral to the process, as they allow for the inclusion of the perspectives of all people affected by the conflict.²²¹

The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 in 2000. This resolution marked one of the first steps the international community took to emphasize the necessity of involving women in peace processes, addressing conflict-related sexual violence in peace agreements, and practicing gender mainstreaming. It has been 21 years since the adoption of UNSCR 1325 and the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda. While progress has been made, there is still a long way to go. UN Women reviewed 664 peace agreements from the period 1990-2000, and they found that only 11 percent contained references to “women’s security and inclusion.”²²² However, seven out of ten peace agreements signed in 2015 included provisions regarding those topics.²²³ From 1992 to 2011, women only represented 4 percent of signatories to peace agreements and fewer than 10 percent of negotiators of peace agreements.²²⁴ From 2015 to 2019, women made up 14 percent of negotiators, 11 percent of mediators, and 7 percent of signatories.²²⁵ The slight increase in those statistics is encouraging, but women are still vastly underrepresented in peace negotiations and post-conflict reconstruction plans. In 2020, women constituted only 10 percent of negotiators involved in the Afghan talks, 20 percent of negotiators working on Libya’s political talks, and zero percent of negotiators involved with Yemen or Libya’s military talks.²²⁶

So, what does this mean for smaller states? As peace agreements are more durable and can lead to more sustainable peace with the serious involvement of women, smaller states hoping to build or facilitate long-lasting peace can use this correlation to make the most of their peacekeeping efforts. It is true that all countries that engage in peacebuilding and mediation should consciously include women in peace processes, take seriously the experiences everyone had during the conflict, and aim for sustainable peace as opposed to negative peace. However, this is important for smaller states to consider, especially if they wish to develop experience in this area and build resumes of successful peace agreements in order to boost their standing in the international community. Moreover, smaller states can act as norm entrepreneurs by taking UNSCR 1325 seriously and applying it to peace processes. Over time, larger states may begin to adopt this practice as standard as well, and the smaller states would have been the ones to help effect this change, leading to an increase in their recognition and respect in the international arena, as well as an increase in lasting peace agreements.

Smaller states should also keep in mind that they can advocate for women’s involvement in peace processes without themselves being an official negotiator or mediator in a given process. For example, Norway has pushed for the empowerment and involvement of Afghan women as peacebuilders, negotiators, and mediators despite the country not being at the negotiation table in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Norway has partnered with the Nordic Network of Women Mediators to “establish a global alliance” of women mediators.²²⁷ In 2019, this network held discussions in Oslo

(221) “Why It Matters.”

(222) Lindborg, “The Essential Role.”

(223) Lindborg, “The Essential Role.”

(224) Lindborg, “The Essential Role.”

(225) “Why It Matters.”

(226) “Why It Matters.”

(227) Norwegian Ministries, “Implementing Norway’s National Action Plan 2019-2022 Women, peace and security,” Annual Report 2019, 11. <https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/1e3345054cdd4fa1ad7c915dd0ef673d/norway-annual-report-wps-2019-2022-final.pdf>

with women from Yemen, Libya, and Afghanistan; there, they were able to speak about “challenges and opportunities for women’s rights and participation” in their respective countries’ peace and conflict resolution processes. This network, led by five smaller states, allows politicians, civil society representatives, negotiators, mediators, and other actors to learn from each other about how to include and empower women in peace processes.

Northern Ireland Case Study

The Northern Ireland peace process, beginning in the 1990s, highlights the crucial role of women in peacemaking via formal participation in the peace process. The sectarian conflict had deep roots that began when Britain colonized Ireland, leading to a wave of Protestant settlement in the Catholic country. Under British control, Irish Catholics faced widespread discrimination, persecution, and economic deprivation. In 1920, facing a nationalist movement, Britain partitioned Ireland into an independent, majority-Catholic Republic of Ireland and a (smaller) majority-Protestant Northern Ireland, which remained a constituent country of Britain. This created a divide in Northern Ireland between the primarily Catholic nationalists, who wanted to unify with Ireland, and the primarily Protestant unionists, who wished to remain part of Britain.

In the 1960s, Northern Irish Catholics began organizing to demand better treatment, some as part of women-led groups. British forces suppressed these protests, resulting in riots. In 1972, Britain suspended local government, bringing the country under their direct control and imprisoning anyone suspected of political violence without trial—a policy primarily targeting Catholics. The resulting ethno-nationalist conflict was known as the Troubles, a nickname that belies the constancy of violence in Northern Ireland during this time. As Patty Chang describes, “already-segregated neighborhoods became militarized; curfews, night raids, and assassinations destabilized communities; and bombings frequently took innocent casualties.”²²⁸ From 1969 until 1994, more than 3,500 people lost their lives in the conflict—the majority of them civilians.²²⁹

Women in Northern Ireland served as community leaders prior to the peace process; due to the huge numbers of incarcerated men, women were often breadwinners. Prior to the 1990s, peace activism had limited success in uniting Catholic and Protestant women, some of whom created nonsectarian women’s groups in order to demand an end to the violence. In 1976, one of these groups, Peace People, won the Nobel Peace Prize. But a serious attempt at ending the apparently irresolvable conflict did not occur until the early 1990s due to international pressure from the United States, Britain and Ireland. In 1994, Britain entered negotiations with the Northern Irish nationalist party Sinn Féin—the delegation of which was almost half women—leading to a key ceasefire agreement. In 1996, Northern Ireland held elections for the Forum for Political Dialogue, a 110-member body tasked with forming multi-party talks.

Crucially, the electoral system, designed as a departure from past secret negotiations, enabled smaller parties to win seats in the Forum—while the majority would be allocated to winners of constituency elections, which were correctly predicted to be dominated by Northern Ireland’s four major parties, would also be granted to the ten parties that received the most votes countrywide.²³⁰ Women civil society leaders, sensing an opportunity (and angry with the major parties for ignoring

(228) Patty Chang et al., *Women Leading Peace: A close examination of women’s political participation in peace processes in Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines* (Washington, DC: GIWPS, 2015), 34, <https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Women-Leading-Peace.pdf>.

(229) “Northern Ireland Case Study,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/womens-participation-in-peace-processes/northern-ireland>.

(230) Tuohy Ahern, “An Analysis of Women’s Participation In Peace Negotiations, 1992 - 2010,” (Capstone Collection, SIT Graduate Institute, 2011), 22.

their requests for substantive women’s involvement) opted to create a new, cross-sectarian party—the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC), founded on the principles of inclusion, equality, and women’s rights.

With only 6 weeks until elections, the NIWC worked to leverage a grassroots network under the aegis of existing civil society leaders. The NIWC was careful to equally include Catholic and Protestant women, adopting a strategy of running a candidate in every constituency so as to maximize their nationwide vote. Ultimately, the NIWC earned 1.03 percent of the vote, ranking 9th of the parties and earning two seats. Though women were also present in the Forum from other parties—most notably Sinn Féin—their presence was limited: women only made up 14 of the 108 non-NIWC members.²³¹ However, it is important to note that several non-NIWC women did play crucial roles during negotiations, generally from the nationalist parties.

One of the NIWC’s key strengths during negotiations was its reputation as an “honest broker”—as a smaller, cross-sectarian party, it was widely trusted by the other parties.²³² Crucially, after Sinn Féin was temporarily ejected from the negotiations following a ceasefire breach, the NIWC was the one party that consistently stayed in close contact with Sinn Féin, keeping them updated. Leveraging this trust, the NIWC worked to ensure that the resulting agreement included provisions on their key priorities—the rights of victims, the reintegration of political prisoners into society, and ethnically integrated housing and education. These issues, largely ignored by the existing negotiators, ultimately proved essential to peace.

Afterwards, the NIWC campaigned zealously during the referendum approving the Good Friday Agreement, which was ultimately overwhelmingly approved in Northern Ireland with 72 percent of the vote.²³³ The accord largely succeeded in closing the book on the Troubles and bringing lasting peace to Northern Ireland.

Liberia Case Study

Liberia, a smaller state located along the Atlantic Coast of West Africa, is another exemplary case study of a country that has benefited greatly from the participation of women in the peace-building and reconstruction processes following the Second Liberian Civil War (1999-2003). In 1997, Charles Taylor was elected President of Liberia. During his term, the combined force of the tensions between military groups and the continuation of corruption, political repression, poverty, and exploitation led two rebel armies — the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in 1999 and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) in early 2003 — to challenge Taylor’s presidency. By the summer of 2003, LURD and MODEL controlled two-thirds of the country and surrounded Monrovia, Liberia’s capital.²³⁴

While peace talks were already underway by 2003, the fear that Monrovia would eventually fall to rebel forces did not waver. On August 1, 2003, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution in support of a ceasefire between the Liberian government and LURD and MODEL, prompting the arrival of West African peacemakers and beginning Liberia’s formal transition to peace.²³⁵ In the face of increasing pressure from the international community, Taylor resigned on

(231) Chang et al., *Women Leading Peace*, 38.

(232) “Northern Ireland Case Study.”

(233) Kate Fearon, “Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition: institutionalizing a political voice and ensuring representation,” *Accord* 13 (December 2002): 80.

(234) Patrick Vinck et al., *Talking Peace: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Security, Dispute Resolution, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Liberia*, (Berkeley, California: Human Rights Center at University of California, Berkeley), 12.

(235) Vinck et al., *Talking Peace*, 13.

August 11 and left Vice President Moses Blah in charge of all government affairs. Just a week after his resignation, the Liberian government signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and formally ended the civil conflict.

Women's groups such as the Mano River Women's Peace Network (MARWOPNET) and the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET) served crucial roles in the peacemaking process in Liberia and have continued to ensure the representation of women in Liberian politics after the signing of the CPA. As victims of gender-based violence during the civil war, women became active advocates for peace from the outset of the conflict and occupied various roles in the peacebuilding process, including those as mediators, formal observers, and activists.

The role of women's groups as mediators for peace is best exemplified by their work as intermediaries for discussions between Taylor and leading members of rebel forces. In April 2003, Taylor responded to WIPNET's demands to be included in peace talks by challenging them to find rebel leaders. Proving themselves to be capable and well-organized negotiators, WIPNET members funded a delegation troop to Sierra Leone, where rebel leaders were staying, and arranged meetings between the rebels and Taylor.²³⁶ Following this, WIPNET also began the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace campaign, which involved members traveling across Liberia, as well as the greater West African region, to directly engage and discuss peace efforts with the rebel armies. Skillfully employing assumptions of women as nurturing figures and as being naturally inclined to peace, the women of WIPNET were able to successfully build a reputation as objective intermediaries and avoid claims of subversion, both of which allowed for significant developments in the peace process, such as expediting disarmament.²³⁷

After the UN Security Council passed the ceasefire resolution, six civil society groups were invited to take part in peace talks, one of which was MARWOPNET.²³⁸ As formal observers, the women of MARWOPNET were not only able to advocate for an end to the conflict but also push forward their mission of addressing gender inequality and gender-based violence in Liberia. For instance, after Taylor's resignation, they advocated for the increased inclusion of women in government positions, as well as the creation of government institutions specifically focused on addressing gender-based issues. Such institutions include the 2005 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Act, which established formal procedures for addressing the experiences of women, as well as those of other vulnerable groups, during the civil war. It also outlined clear objectives regarding issues of gender, such as the prioritization of women's safety and the reintegration of women in Liberian society through skills-based training.²³⁹

During peace talks, women's groups were able to mobilize members in ways that put pressure on actors to formalize peace agreements and led to major peacebuilding developments. For example, WIPNET organized trips to discuss their goals with Liberian women living in refugee camps in Ghana, spreading awareness of their goals, mobilizing women to stage peaceful protests, and cultivating a strong community of women activists in the region.²⁴⁰ Through their activism, the women of WIPNET were also able to skillfully employ aspects of Liberian patriarchal culture in their favor. For example, after growing impatient after months of dead-end negotiations, they organized a sit-in during peace negotiation meetings and threatened to undress if negotiators failed

(236) "Women's Role in Liberia's Reconstruction," United States Institute of Peace, last modified 2007, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2007/05/womens-role-liberias-reconstruction>.

(237) "Women's Role in Liberia's Reconstruction."

(238) "Case Study: Women in Peace and Transition Processes. Liberia (2003-2011)," Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative (April 2008), 3.

(239) Liezelle Kumalo, "Why women should have a greater role in peacebuilding," May 2015, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/05/why-women-should-have-a-greater-role-in-peacebuilding/>.

(240) "Case Study: Women in Peace and Transition Processes. Liberia (2003-2011)," 11.

to come to a final peace agreement, an act that, according to Liberian cultural norms, would shame and curse the male negotiators.²⁴¹ Their persistence during the sit-in proved successful, as the chief mediator of the peace agreements met with the women and promised them a peace agreement, and marked a significant turning point in the peacemaking process as it helped quicken the pace of peace talks.

The role of women in the peacemaking process in Liberia did not come to an end after the CPA was signed, as women's groups remain active civil societies in Liberian political and social life today. Since peace talks ended, the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace group has convened at Monrovia to continue to prioritize peace in the context of significant political moments, such as the elections of 2005 and 2011.²⁴² Additionally, groups like MARWOPNET played an important role in nominating leaders for Liberia's transitional government, who would go on to appoint Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as the head of the Governance Reform Commission. She was subsequently elected President of Liberia in 2005, becoming the first female head of state in Africa, and she was awarded the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize for her work in elevating the voices and work of women in the peacebuilding process.

Lessons and Applications

In terms of the role of women in peacemaking, there are many lessons from the case studies of Northern Ireland and Liberia that smaller states can apply to their own missions. As both case studies show, it is necessary that women are not merely present during peace talks and negotiations, but that they are listened to and taken seriously. In Northern Ireland, the other participating parties acting on the NIWC's concerns allowed them to consider unaddressed issues that proved crucial to the agreement's success. The same holds true for Liberia, as the prevalence of gender-based violence during the Second Liberian Civil War made women peacemakers seem more trustworthy than men, giving them an advantage that allowed WIPNET and MARWOPNET to mobilize women in Liberia and the surrounding region.

Similarly, in order for the role of women in peacemaking to be maximally effective, female representatives must be given latitude to work. This is an area where the process in Liberia fell through—the participation of women's groups plateaued during the implementation of the CPA as they gained representation in government offices. Conversely, smaller states can learn from Northern Ireland, as the NIWC acted on their prerogatives, strengthening the agreement, as when they worked to keep Sinn Féin involved. Allowing the NIWC to fervently campaign for the agreement during the referendum also helped lead to its victory.

This grassroots success highlights another lesson for smaller states: peacemakers should be selected who have experience and community ties—that is, it matters which women are included. In Northern Ireland, the NIWC succeeded because they were seen as honest brokers, unaffiliated with existing factions or parties and working across the sectarian divide. This gave them latitude, as they were not bound to a party platform. The same applies to WIPNET and MARWOPNET in Liberia; their reputation as objective intermediaries allowed them to take on key roles in the peace process, such as mediating conflicts between the Liberian government and rebel armies. While the grassroots efforts of women groups in both Northern Ireland and Liberia ultimately proved effective, it is likely that their work would have been easier had there been frameworks in place at the time of peace talks that intentionally ensured women's representation. In the case of Liberia, the

(241) "How the Women of Liberia Fought for Peace and Won," Tavaana, <https://tavaana.org/en/en/content/how-women-liberia-fought-peace-and-won>.

(242) "Case Study: Women in Peace and Transition Processes. Liberia (2003-2011)," 6.

women of WIPNET were never formal negotiators during peace talks. While the process in Northern Ireland happened to include women's groups by virtue of allowing any top political party seats at negotiations, a more intentional institutional design may have been more successful in bringing women to the table.

In addition to the institutional inclusion of women in negotiations, smaller states should include women on their own negotiating teams, as this can help increase the clout of women participants in peacemaking processes. This was especially evident in Northern Ireland, where American First Lady Hillary Clinton took a personal interest in the peace process and was a strong advocate of the NIWC, as were other American, British, and Irish women diplomats.

The final lesson smaller states can learn is that it is necessary to actively keep women involved post-conflict. Today, the NIWC is defunct, partially as a result of the political design in the agreement, as well as the fact that women were not given roles in post-conflict monitoring. On the other hand, the continuation of women's participation was a major priority for women's groups in Liberia, which helped garner support for the creation of institutions such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and electing women into prominent positions in the Liberian government. This gets at the heart of the main takeaway for smaller states seeking to effectively involve women in peacemaking efforts—do so intentionally, meaningfully, and consistently.

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Conclusion

Smaller states interested in peacemaking must contend with the topics discussed in this book in order to understand their potential for peacemaking and learn how best to conduct peacemaking. States should understand how they can craft and leverage their personal identity narratives in the peacemaking process. Furthermore, smaller state peacemakers are more likely to succeed in resource-based conflict if they do not have ties to the material in question, and they are more likely to succeed in ideational conflict if they understand the cultural and historical dimensions between the warring parties. Smaller states should also look towards regional institutions and limited finances to better understand how to take part in peacemaking. Although organizations and governments may be the most visible actors in the peacemaking process, they are but a composite of individuals; the personalities, positions, and skills of individuals can greatly influence the ultimate outcome of the peacemaking process. Furthermore, peacemaking can align with the strategic objectives of small states and work towards their national security interests. Moreover, evaluating the strategic and tactical considerations of small state actors conducting peacemaking shows that small state peacekeeping operations should adopt a peaceful approach, setting the baseline for the creation of lasting peace in a fractured state. Lastly, smaller states must take into consideration gender perspectives through the formal inclusion of women when conducting peacemaking in order to maximize the potential success of mediation efforts.

